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Abstract 
 
Nigel Pantak: Hitting the target but missing the point: Merseyside Police’s 
response to the BRM satisfaction gap  
 
The study is an evaluation of how Merseyside Police attempted to narrow the 
Black and Racial Minority (BRM) satisfaction gap, as measured by the Home 
Office performance indicator. The research considers the sense with which both 
police officers and, more importantly, victims made of the policies and 
processes used. It asks whether this activity resulted in an improvement to the 
service being provided, therefore benefitting the victim, or in the construction of 
performance data thereby benefitting the organisation. 
 
The research was undertaken between 2011 and 2015 and completed as a 
case study. It involved the views of those people within Merseyside Police who 
were responsible for the design and implementation of policy along, with some 
of those responsible for delivering the service to the public. The research also 
includes the narrative of victims who had taken part in Merseyside Police’s 
monthly victim satisfaction survey. 
 
The BRM satisfaction gap was initially proposed by the Macpherson Report, 
which had examined the murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence. It was 
one of ten performance indicators intending to monitor and assess whether trust 
and confidence in the police was improving within BRM communities. Previous 
research had identified factors other than the quality of police contact as 
influencing a person’s level of satisfaction. However, this research shows how 
the BRM satisfaction gap was treated as a single subject by Merseyside Police, 
who chose to focus purely on service delivery to improve victim satisfaction. 
Warnings regarding statistical relevance of the BRM satisfaction gap, along with 
concerns as to whether the victim satisfaction survey was fit for purpose, were 
ignored in their efforts to ensure the performance indicator was on target. 
 
The research highlights how New Public Management (NPM) principles of 
performance management were used to produce organisational focus and 
develop a system which closely tracked the service provided to BRM victims by 
individual officers. However, it shows that although it resulted in a good 
knowledge amongst senior officers, this was not embedded amongst those 
delivering the service. Instead, reporting officers developed their own working 
practices to deliver Merseyside Police’s required ‘Gold Service’ to BRM victims, 
whilst many victims remained confused and frustrated with the service 
provided. 
 
Merseyside Police did statistically narrow the BRM satisfaction gap. However, 
the research highlights the influence of performance construction and questions 
whether the recorded improvement in performance was as result of an 
improved service or was manufactured by gaming techniques. Although the 
BRM satisfaction gap was intended to measure trust and confidence, the 
research concludes this was never a consideration for Merseyside Police who, 
instead, focussed their efforts on improving their performance indicator. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
On 22 April 1993 Stephen Lawrence was murdered in Eltham, south London 
whilst walking home with a friend. The police investigation undertaken by the 
Metropolitan Police Service attracted a great deal of public attention and media 
criticism. The circumstances of the murder, the absence of a successful 
prosecution and a broad perception that the police investigation was handled 
incompetently, led to a campaign by the Lawrence family to seek explanations 
(Foster, Newburn and Souhami, 2005). On 31 July 1997 Home Secretary Jack 
Straw announced a public inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence and the 
subsequent police investigation. Sir William Macpherson of Cluny was 
appointed chairman and specifically instructed to identify the lessons to be 
learned in the investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crimes 
(Macpherson 1999). The subsequent report produced 70 recommendations 
which were accepted by the New Labour Government and was said to amount 
to the most extensive programme of reform in the history of the relationship 
between the police and ethnic minority communities in the UK (Bowling and 
Phillips 2002).  
 
The first recommendation of the Macpherson report stated that a Ministerial 
Priority should be established for all police services: 
 
“To increase trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic 
communities.” 
(Macpherson 1999:327) 
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The second recommendation proposed ten performance indicators as a way of 
implementing, monitoring and assessing the Ministerial Priority. 
Recommendation five was; 
 
(v) achieving equal satisfaction levels across all ethnic groups in public 
satisfaction surveys. 
(Macpherson, 1999 p327) 
 
This thesis provides an evaluation of how Merseyside Police responded to this 
performance indictor. It is a case study examining the policies and tactics 
implemented to improve victim satisfaction and thereby obtain equal levels of 
satisfaction between white and BRM victims. One of the main aspects of the 
research question is to ask what sense Merseyside police officers and victims 
of crime made of this process. The research establishes those policies and 
processes introduced by Merseyside Police to narrow the satisfaction gap 
between Black Racial Minority (BRM) and white victims. It then examines 
whether these were understood and viewed positively by both the police officer 
delivering the service and the victim of crime receiving it. 
 
Victim satisfaction and the BRM satisfaction gap gained prominence within 
Merseyside Police as part of the Citizen Focus agenda (Home Office 2006). At 
that time, I was a Police Inspector who was asked to lead a small Basic 
Command Unit (BCU)1 Citizen Focus team to improve the general level of victim 
                                                 
1 BCU refers to a geographical area of command within a police force. At this time, Merseyside Police 
had six BCUs. Wirral, Sefton, Knowsley, St Helens, Liverpool North and Liverpool South.  
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satisfaction for the area. The problem and challenges of the BRM satisfaction 
gap soon became apparent, as it proved difficult to impact on the level of 
measured performance. Merseyside Police Citizen Focus department2, 
provided each BCU with a system of guidance and governance along with 
tactics and actions which, they said, if complied with would result in the 
narrowing of the gap, by increasing the level of satisfaction amongst BRM 
victims. However, their suggestions and directions only concerned the service 
provided to each victim at the time of their reporting or during the investigation 
of the crime. My personal experience and knowledge of policing BRM 
communities suggested the problem was being simplified by this approach. 
When I questioned the Citizen Focus department, it was made clear to me that 
Merseyside Police had completed research which, considered empirical by 
them, showed service delivery was the only factor that needed to change to 
achieve the required improvement in performance. At that time, I was used to 
the organisational culture of acceptance and compliance rather than 
questioning policy decisions. Therefore, whilst suspecting more needed to be 
known about the principles of the BRM satisfaction gap, I accepted the notion 
that service delivery was the sole factor to be addressed. 
 
During this time, an opportunity arose to complete post-graduate research into 
any police related subject that could justify further examination. This was to be 
supported by a Bramshill Policing Staff College Fellowship. Therefore, I 
successfully made a proposal for research to be conducted into establishing if 
                                                 
2 Merseyside Citizen focus department was responsible for the force’s overall performance.  
 15 
there were separate factors which individual BRM communities considered 
important contributors to levels of satisfaction with the police service. 
 
As will be explained, my research developed greatly from this proposal. Initially, 
I believed there was a need for the police organisation to look out at the 
communities to obtain the answers, however this view quickly reversed as the 
need to look in at the police organisation and their performance regime became 
apparent. Whilst there has been other research completed which explores how 
public trust, confidence and satisfaction in the police is created, this research 
approaches the subject differently. Due to being able to access the recordings 
of individual victim satisfaction surveys, it has allowed this research to explore 
whether the policies and practices employed improved the service provided to 
the victim or, instead, caused confusion and further dissatisfaction.   
 
Curtis (2015) states that in exploring the use of targets in policing, and gaining 
an understanding of their effects, it quickly becomes clear that the use of 
numerical targets is just part of a wider issue around effective police 
performance management. It is the aim of this research to contribute to the 
understanding of how this type of performance management can impact on the 
victim. To that end, the following research question was decided on. 
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Why is Merseyside Police trying to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap? 
i) How have Merseyside Police tried to measure the gap?   
ii) How have Merseyside Police tried to reduce the gap?  
iii) What sense, if any, have police officers and ‘victims’ made of these 
processes? 
iv) Has there been improved levels of service that benefited the victim or 
was the performance data constructed by organisational processes? 
 
The term BRM 
It should be noted that the term BRM is specific to Merseyside whereas Black 
Minority Ethnic (BME) is the accepted terminology used by the Home Office. 
However, it was established during this research that the use of the word 
‘ethnic’ has caused offence in Liverpool for several decades, due to the 
meaning of ‘pagan or heathen’ being attached to it. Due to this, the term BRM 
is used in Merseyside, which has also been accepted as the local term by the 
Home Office. Therefore, this research will use ‘BRM’ rather than ‘BME’.  
 
Outline of this thesis 
Chapter two examines where the BRM satisfaction gap came from. The chapter 
provides background information and considers how the Scarman and 
Macpherson reports raised concerns regarding the style of policing which had 
been used towards BRM communities. The chapter explains how the BRM 
satisfaction gap was introduced for the police, via National Policing Plans, 
before being embedded as part of the Citizen Focus Policing agenda. 
Consideration is also given to the influence which New Public Management 
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(NPM) had on the performance regime of the police and explains how this 
contributed to the Citizen Focus agenda. 
 
Chapter three reviews the principles of trust, confidence and satisfaction. It 
highlights that although these terms tend to be used interchangeably within the 
police, there are some very distinct differences. The chapter will highlight the 
theory of low and high trust communities and examines how an understanding 
of these can impact on the way in which police try to improve trust. The impact 
which public perception and bias can have on a person’s assessment of police 
contact is also considered along with those factors, other than contact, which 
impact on satisfaction. 
 
Chapter four focuses specifically on how Merseyside Police implemented the 
policies and tactics, they considered necessary, to narrow the BRM satisfaction 
gap. The issues involved in measuring trust, confidence and satisfaction with 
the police are examined, along with the influence of how a victim can be viewed. 
The chapter also introduces the principles behind the victim satisfaction survey 
and presents the notion of the Merseyside Police ‘Gold Service’ for BRM victims 
of crime and the use of Customer Service Recovery Opportunities (CSRO) as 
specific tactics employed to improve recorded performance. 
 
Chapter five considers the qualitative methods used to gather the data for this 
research and explains why a case study was considered the best way of 
completing it. The importance that social construction has on this research is 
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introduced along with the reflexive and ethical issues which had to be 
addressed before data gathering could commence. 
 
Chapters six, seven and eight present the findings of my research. Chapter six 
examines how Merseyside Police tried to deliver satisfaction to victims of crime 
whilst concerns being raised externally from the organisation were ignored. The 
chapter establishes that Merseyside Police’s focus on the BRM satisfaction gap 
was not driven by the need to improve trust and confidence, but due to a desire 
to become the best police force in the country.  
 
Chapter seven looks at how performance was constructed within the victim 
satisfaction survey via the CSRO process. It also examines how the gaming of 
data occurred by adapting Home Office guidelines to remove dissatisfied 
victims from data sets in order to improve levels of satisfaction. Chapter eight 
then considers how this activity impacted on the victim of crime and whether 
the policies introduced resulted in an improvement to the service being 
provided. The chapter also explores the attitudes of those Constables and 
Sergeants who were responsible for delivering the service and question 
whether prejudice on their part contributed to the BRM satisfaction gap. To 
assist with this, all three chapters contain vignettes that present the experience 
of individual victims of crime, as recorded by the victim satisfaction survey, to 
highlight specific points. 
 
Finally, chapter nine reviews the research and considers the implications and 
conclusions arising from it. 
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Chapter 2: Where did the problem come from? 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the problems experienced by the policing of BRM 
communities within the UK. Firstly, it will consider the Scarman Report (1981), 
which investigated the incidents of disorder in the Brixton area of London along 
with other outbreaks of unrest in Southall London, Liverpool, Birmingham and 
Manchester in 1981, and the subsequent recommendations it made. The 
chapter will then explain how the issue of a satisfaction gap, between white and 
BRM victims of crime, with the police service came to be identified as a 
contributing factor to the poor levels of trust and confidence amongst BRM 
communities. It will explain that recommendations contained within the 
Macpherson report, which examined the circumstances around the murder of 
Stephen Lawrence, resulted in changes in government policy. These 
introduced the performance indicator which challenged each police force to 
narrow their BRM satisfaction gap, and which came to sit under the heading of 
‘Citizen Focus Policing’. To that end, a time line will describe how a 
recommendation contained within the Macpherson report became a 
performance indicator for the police via a Home Secretary’s action plan (Home 
Office 1999) and the National Policing Plans (Home Office 2002, 2003, 2004b). 
Finally, the chapter will consider the influence that New Public Management 
(NPM) had on policy implementation and explain how this was a key part of the 
Citizen Focus agenda. It will propose that this activity resulted in something 
 20 
other than that intended of improving trust and confidence for the BRM 
communities. 
 
The background 
There is an acceptance that BRM communities have always had a different 
relationship and received a poorer level of service from police within the UK 
(Rowe 2004). Policing practices within BRM communities operated with the 
assumption that black people presented a threat to society. Therefore, policing 
styles developed to counter this threat and resulted in the targeting of BRM 
males as main criminal offenders. This resulted in the questioning of police 
accountability during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Cashmore and 
McLaughlin, 1991) as many BRM communities formed the opinion that the 
service provided was ineffective, inactive or indeed at times overactive towards 
their neighbourhoods (Hallam 2000). 
 
During this period, it was also viewed that the police service was failing BRM 
communities when individuals became victims of crime. Hall et al (2009) state 
that crimes motivated by racial prejudice have a long history in the UK, yet 
official recognition of the problem can only be traced back to the 1980s. The 
development of victims’ surveys began to reveal the extent, nature and impact 
of victimisation which had been previously unknown. This resulted in the 
acknowledgment that BRM people were collectively having a different 
experience with the service provided by the police from that of the white 
majority. This was evidenced by disproportionality at all stages of the criminal 
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justice system from victimisation, stop search, arrest and conviction to 
sentencing (Crane and Hall 2009). 
 
Bowling and Phillips (2003) state the controversies of abuse of police powers, 
the failure to properly investigate crimes against people from BRM communities 
and the view the police were unresponsive and unaccountable to the people 
they served, resulted in the breakdown of trust and confidence towards the 
police within these communities. This was to have dramatic consequences, with 
the problem of racism being thrust into the public consciousness in the early 
1980s by widespread public disorder within inner-city areas (Hall et al 2009). 
 
Scarman Report 
The strained relationship between BRM communities and the police was vividly 
demonstrated when public disorder occurred in St Pauls, Bristol in 1980, and 
then Brixton, London in 1981. This was followed by further disturbances in 
Manchester, Liverpool, and Birmingham that same year (Bowling and Philips 
2003). The Brixton disturbances received widespread, high profile media 
coverage and in response to this the then Secretary of State, William Whitelaw, 
ordered Lord Scarman to: 
 
“Inquire urgently into the serious disorder in Brixton on 10 – 12 April 1981 and 
to report, with the power to make recommendation” 
(Scarman, 1981 p1) 
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Between 10th and 12th April 1981, Brixton had witnessed three days of serious 
disorder which Bowling and Phillips (2002) describe as an outburst of anger 
and resentment by young black people with the policing style employed within 
their communities. However, Scarman (1981) stated there were in fact two 
views forcefully expressed to the Inquiry as to the causes of the disorder. The 
first was, indeed, the oppressive policing style which had developed over a 
period of years, resulting in the harassment of young, black people. However, 
the second went beyond the remit of the police and was viewed as a backlash 
against society by people frustrated and deprived, who used disorder to obtain 
public attention for their plight. 
 
Crane and Hall (2009) state the Scarman Inquiry was probably the most 
influential report into the inadequate policing of BRM communities up to that 
time. It stressed that contrary to the growing image of the police’s role being 
one of crime-fighters; most uniformed police work consisted of service calls 
responding to incidents. The Inquiry highlighted a need for a change from the 
oppressive style of policing to that of a community style so that the police would 
be fit for purpose for BRM communities (Reiner 2010).  Brain (2010) develops 
this, and says that by Scarman not viewing the riots as discrete events but as 
part of a larger pattern he was able to place the immediate symptoms of the 
disorder within a broader perspective of British society. Indeed, Scarman (1981) 
identified a problem of policing a multi-racial community in a deprived inner-city 
area where unemployment, especially among young black people, was high, 
whilst their hopes were low. This, he said, resulted in a protest against society 
by people deeply frustrated and deprived. He concluded that the breakdown of 
 23 
trust and confidence in the police within certain communities had resulted from 
a lack of communication and consent. This had been identified as a problem 
for many years prior to the disorders but Bowling and Phillips (2003) say it was 
still the policing style of a police operation, Operation Swamp ‘81’, giving police 
specific instructions to stop and question anyone who looked ‘suspicious’, 
which proved to be the catalyst for the subsequent disorder.  
 
Newburn (2003) states the Scarman Report emphasised there was a need for 
change regarding the way the police service was being delivered to BRM 
communities and acted as a trigger for a reorientation of policing on a wider 
front. Walklate (2000) went further by suggesting it identified that action was 
required to address overt racist behaviour by some police officers. However, 
Scarman (1981) explicitly rejected ‘institutional racism’ within the police as an 
explanation for these problems. But when later questioned on this, he 
responded by saying that if the suggestion being made was that some practices 
adopted by public bodies and private individuals are unwittingly discriminatory 
against BRM communities, then the allegation deserved serious consideration 
and, where proved, required quick action to be taken (Mayberry 2008). This 
comment from Scarman appears to contradict, somewhat, the reports rejection 
of institutional racism and perhaps indicates a reluctance in Scarman to draw 
full conclusions from the evidence discovered. However, this rejection resulted 
in his report often being cited by many as the classic defence against 
allegations that Britain, and in particular the British police, were institutionally 
racist (Bowling and Phillips 2002). This, they say, resulted in the report failing 
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to fully explain why BRM communities were so angry with the police and how 
this was rooted in their experiences of oppressive policing.  
 
Scarman in Liverpool  
Lord Scarman visited Toxteth, Liverpool, an area which had also witnessed 
serious disorder following that experienced in Brixton. Scarman (1981, p152 - 
154) noted that police relations with the community had been unsatisfactory for 
some time and identified it as one of the main causes for disorder. Residents 
highlighted lack of confidence with the local police complaints procedure, the 
juvenile cautioning system and the harassment of young people, as specific 
factors which undermined their relationship with the police. The fact that the 
disorder resulted in the first use of CS gas by police on the British mainland, 
appear to support the view that Toxteth was policed in an abrasive and heavy-
handed manner. However, Scarman (1981, p11 – 12) points out that the social 
conditions he had witnessed in Brixton were not necessarily reproduced in other 
parts of the country which had experienced disorder, however there was 
acknowledgement that deprivation was indeed a factor in the Toxteth area. He 
notes that the Toxteth BRM community had two elements, one being formed by 
a black community that had been established in the city for several generations, 
and another made up of new immigrants. These, by nature, providing separate 
problems and challenges for the police, which had to be dealt with in order to 
improve confidence. However, he acknowledges his terms of reference for the 
inquiry did not allow him to look with any great detail outside of Brixton, and so 
comment appears to be restricted. He concludes by saying that a combination 
of a high BRM population, high unemployment, declining economic base and 
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physical environment, bad housing and lack of amenities combined with a high 
crime rate and a heavy policing style were the common factors. 
 
Scandal and change 
Newburn (2003) states it was against this backdrop of significant urban disorder 
in 1981 and 1985, and the bitter miners’ strike of 1984 to 1985, that resulted in 
public satisfaction with the style and nature of policing greatly declining. To 
address this the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) published the,” 
Setting the Standards for Policing: Meeting Community Expectations” (ACPO 
1990), which proposed an almost paradigm shift by promoting the police as a 
‘service’ rather than a ‘force’ and reinforced the principles of neighbourhood 
policing. These ACPO proposals were made on the back of numerous police 
corruption scandals in the 1970s, such as Operation Countryman, that 
examined corruption in the Metropolitan Police across all the ranks and 
departments (Reiner 2010). When, in the 1980s, the subject matter of these 
scandals switched to the abuse of police powers towards BRM communities, it 
was viewed that the rule of law was beginning to be undermined, resulting in 
the image of the police as an impersonal and disciplined law enforcer being 
fatally damaged.   
 
Rowe (2004) points out that although these scandals, and the resulting 
attempts to transform the police force into a service, were not directly related to 
the policing of BRM communities, they represented a point Scarman made. The 
doctrine of policing by consent had to be fully embraced by senior officers to 
repair damage being done, by their officers, within certain communities. 
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However, the Scarman Report continued to attract criticism from both sides for 
either denying racism was institutionalised within police practice or, conversely, 
that the report was an attack on the integrity and impartiality of the police 
service, which then resulted in a closing of ranks to any proposed change 
(Reiner 2010). Against this shifting and contested backcloth, the murder of 
Stephen Lawrence occurred which ensured the question of policing, racism, 
inequality, fairness and justice, raised in the previous decades, remained in the 
public eye (Bowling and Phillips 2003). 
 
Stephen Lawrence 
On 22nd April 1993 Stephen Lawrence, an 18-year-old black student, was 
stabbed to death whilst walking home with a friend. The local Metropolitan 
Police set up an investigation and in June two youths appeared in court charged 
with his murder (Brain 2010). However, a month later the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) dropped the charges, leaving the Lawrence family with the only 
remaining option of taking out a private prosecution against the suspects. 
However, although this subsequently proved unsuccessful, the persistent 
campaigning by the family kept their story in the public domain. At the coroner’s 
inquest in February 1997, it was concluded Stephen Lawrence was unlawfully 
killed, following which his mother accused the Metropolitan Police of treating 
her family like criminals because they were black. 
 
Even though there was mounting criticism of the police investigation during this 
period, the Conservative government resisted pressure for a public inquiry into 
the police handling of the case. However, following the General Election in 
 27 
1997, which saw New Labour gain power, Home Secretary Jack Straw met with 
the Lawrence family. Following this he announced there would be a public 
inquiry (Brain 2010). Sir William Macpherson, a retired High Court judge 
appointed to lead the inquiry, was provided with the following terms of 
reference: 
 
“To inquire into matters arising from the death of Stephen Lawrence on 22nd 
April 1993 to date, in order particularly to identify the lessons to be learned for 
the investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crimes” 
(Macpherson 1999, p6) 
 
The Macpherson Report 
The first preliminary hearing of the Inquiry took place at Woolwich on 8th 
October 1997 with the terms of reference being split to form two distinctly, 
separate, parts to the inquiry. Part 1, which investigated “the matters arising 
from the death of Stephen Lawrence” sat for 59 days, whilst part 2 “to identify 
the lessons to be learned for the investigation and prosecution of racially 
motivated crimes” sat for 10 days. Combined recommendations and 
suggestions were heard from 100 people and organisations (Macpherson 
1999). It was during the second stage that the report highlighted the apparently 
inescapable evidence of the lack of trust which existed between the police and 
BRM communities. This, it said, was threatening the ability of the police service 
to police by consent in all areas of their work, and not simply in the policing of 
racist incidents and crimes. 
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The Macpherson report made 70 recommendations, almost all of which were 
accepted by the government, and amounted to the most extensive program of 
reform in the history of relationships between police and BRM communities 
(Bowling and Phillips, 2003). Foster (2008) agrees and says the key message 
the Macpherson report wanted to convey was the importance of the differential 
treatment minority victims, suspects and witnesses experienced when dealing 
with the police and criminal justice system. It did not matter what the police 
thought they were doing, or how they sought to explain events, it was how their 
actions were perceived by the family and within the BRM communities which 
was important. However, the report stated the fundamental flaws resulting in 
the initial failed murder enquiry resulted from professional incompetence, 
institutional racism and leadership failure. There was an absence of confidence 
and trust in the police amongst ethnic minority communities stemming from 
disproportionality across the criminal justice system, which resulted in the BRM 
communities being over-policed and under-protected (Macpherson 1999, 
Bowling 1999, Newburn 2003).   
 
Even though it is a mistake to conclude little had changed in the years between 
Scarman and the Macpherson reports (Walklate 2000), Bowling and Phillips 
(2002) state that it became clear during the Lawrence Inquiry that the loss of 
confidence and trust among BRM communities had worsened since Scarman. 
This resulted in the need to re-establish police legitimacy by a thorough 
examination of existing failings alongside appropriate remedies. However, 
Reiner (2010) says that although Macpherson was undoubtedly more hard-
hitting as a critique of police failure, it was the Scarman Report which had a 
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keener grasp of how police discrimination was intimately bound up with wider 
structures of racial and social inequality and disadvantage. 
 
Rowe (2004) states the Macpherson Report was a seminal moment in British 
race relations, which produced a collective response that reform would no 
longer be stifled, whilst a raft of targets, pledges and activity pointed to the 
process by which public trust and confidence could be secured. It required the 
police service to adopt a proactive and interventionist approach to recognise 
that minority groups had legitimate needs, not shared by the majority. The 
police concern with community and race relations, prior to the Lawrence Inquiry 
was generally focused on ensuring all BRM groups received an equal level of 
service delivery. However, recognition that individual BRM groups had different 
needs, resulted in the acceptance that the provisions of identical services, one 
that was designed for the majority of minority ethnic communities and assumed 
to be applicable to all, was no longer valid (Rowe, 2004).  
 
The Macpherson Report was instrumental in generating and accelerating a 
range of changes within the police service. There was the formalisation of 
murder investigation reviews, the establishment of the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission (IPCC) and a framework for police response to ‘hate 
crime’. It resulted in a paradigm shift within the police ‘mind set’ and in external 
expectations of what policing should be delivering (Hall, Grieve and Savage, 
2009). Reiner (2010) agreed, and stated the Macpherson Report was 
absolutely critical in shaking police forces out of their complacency with regard 
to the manner in which they were policing BRM communities. However, he 
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warned that whilst it was tough on the police it was soft on the causes of racist 
policing, as the focus was primarily on the police organisation rather than the 
individuals within it.  
 
Regardless, the Macpherson Report provided the police service with an 
opportunity to improve trust and confidence within BRM communities. Within 
this it set recommendations that led to the principles of the BRM satisfaction 
gap being introduced as a way of directly measuring trust and confidence in 
policing amongst BRM communities. 
 
The BRM satisfaction gap 
The Macpherson Report stated the need to improve trust and confidence in the 
police amongst BRM communities with its’ first two recommendations; 
 
Recommendation 1: 
1. That a Ministerial Priority be established for all Police Services: 
“To increase trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic 
communities” 
 
Recommendation 2: 
2. The process of implementing monitoring and assessing the Ministerial 
Priority should include Performance Indicators in relation to:  
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(i)  the existence and application of strategies for the prevention, 
recording, investigation and prosecution of racists incidents; 
(ii) measures to encourage reporting of racist incidents; 
(iii) the number of recorded racist incidents and related detection 
levels; 
(iv) the degree of multi-agency co-operation and information 
exchange; 
(v) achieving equal satisfaction levels across all ethnic groups in 
public satisfaction surveys; 
(vi) the adequacy of provision and training of family and witness / 
victim liaison officers; 
(vii) the nature, extent and achievements of racism awareness 
training; 
(viii) the policy directives governing stop and search procedures and 
their outcomes; 
(ix) levels of recruitment, retention and progression of minority ethnic 
recruits; and 
(x) levels of complaint of racist behaviour or attitude and their 
outcomes. 
The overall aim being the elimination of racist prejudice and 
disadvantage and the demonstration of fairness in all aspects of policing.                                                           
(Macpherson 1999, p327) 
 32 
Recommendation 2 (v) suggests the level of satisfaction a person has with the 
service provided by the police can differ depending on whether the person is a 
member of a BRM or white community. As will be shown, it was this 
recommendation which set out the principles of the BRM satisfaction gap for 
the police service and linked it directly to the levels of trust and confidence in 
policing amongst BRM communities. 
 
Implementation of the Macpherson Report’s recommendations      
The Lawrence Steering Group 
In March 1999, the month after the publication of the Macpherson Report, the 
Home Secretary produced the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Home Secretary’s 
Action Plan (Home Office 1999) with the intention of explaining how the 
government proposed to implement and develop the report’s 
recommendations. It promised to set out the main program of work to be 
covered by the recommendations, show who would lead on each one and how 
the outcomes would be reviewed and assessed. The Home Secretary stated 
that real practical change had to be delivered and went on to say that new 
policies or procedures would not be enough unless they were turned into action 
which built trust and confidence, and helped to provide a better service. This 
resulted in a great emphasis on the importance of actual change to the culture 
and actions of the police service, rather than just a set of well-intentioned 
proposals (Rowe, 2004). To deliver and monitor this implementation, the action 
plan proposed that a Lawrence Steering Group be set up, chaired by the Home 
Secretary.  
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The Home Secretary’s Action Plan (Home Office 1999) stated that the 
Macpherson Report’s first recommendation, to set the new Ministerial Priority, 
would be added to the three statutory objectives for the police that had already 
been set by the Home Office for 1999/2000e. These concerned the policing of 
drugs, youth justice, and local crime and disorder strategies. To develop the 
performance indicators required by recommendation 2, the action plan stated 
that during the forthcoming year the Home Office would ‘consult widely’ to 
develop more effective indicators so that delivery of the priority could be 
‘rigorously assessed from next year onwards’ (Home Office 1999, p5). Although 
in hindsight there does not appear to be a great deal of action contained within 
the initial Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Home Secretary’s Action Plan (Home 
Office 1999), it should be noted it was published only a month after the 
Macpherson report.  
 
For the next four years, the Home Secretary published progress reports on the 
action plan. After the first year, it was stated the Ministerial Priority was set and 
the development of indicators, by which police performance could be assessed, 
were well advanced (Home Office 2000). It also highlighted a further 
development by stating that surveys of public satisfaction, where available by 
different BRM groups, would be used as a performance indicator. However, it 
was acknowledged that further work, at force level, was needed to develop this 
to the required standard. 
 
The second progress report, published in 2001, expressed a belief that the 
breadth and depth of change, required for the various reforms to take place, 
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was starting to take shape (Home Office 2001). It said that increasing trust and 
confidence in policing amongst BRM communities would be just one of two 
Ministerial Priorities for the police during 2001 – 2002. The report also stated 
that surveys of public satisfaction from BRM communities at a force level would, 
in the future, provide each local policing team with performance statistics which 
would then be inspected during HMIC visits. However, although this report 
passes comment on the improvement in police recruitment from BRM 
communities and the investigation of hate crime, after two years there appeared 
to be few outcomes from the initial recommendation to ‘achieve equal 
satisfaction levels across all ethnic groups in public satisfaction surveys’ 
(Macpherson 1999, p327). This questions the pace of change which was taking 
place, and whether the progress reports were reporting performance against 
the requirements of the Macpherson report or that contained within the action 
plan.    
 
The third progress report, published in 2002, was written in the aftermath of 
disturbances within BRM communities in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham. It 
acknowledged that, amongst other issues, there was still a deep and lasting 
division between different communities and the police. This was characterised 
by a lack of understanding and trust, and a clear failure on the part of the 
statutory agencies to take the necessary steps to address this. The report also 
said there was a need for the Steering Group to ‘take into account the way in 
which the landscape has changed over the last three years’ (Home Office 
2002a, p1). It stated the group should change and work thematically, looking at 
areas which were central to the Macpherson Report. This, it said, would include 
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training and development, racist incidents, stop and search, and issues around 
trust and confidence amongst BRM communities in the wider criminal justice 
system. Each would be examined in detail to evaluate the current situation and 
make recommendations for the future. Although this apparent shift to an audit 
and inspection approach appears a positive development, there is no 
assessment of the success or otherwise that had resulted from the previous 
three years’ of the action plan. This therefore questions how successful the 
Home Secretary’s Action Plan (Home Office 1999) had been in implementing 
the initial recommendations of the Macpherson Report. Indeed, it states the 
disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham suggested there was still much 
work to do but should not to be interpreted as any reflection of the success or 
failure of the Steering Group (Home Office 2002a)   
 
To support this change of direction, the progress report recommended a 
restructuring of how business would be conducted within the steering group. It 
states that the Ministerial Priority was set and qualitative and quantitative 
performance indicators were in place to monitor the progress in the areas 
mentioned in recommendation 2. It explained they had been tracked in a variety 
of ways including Best Value reviews of Police Authorities or through the British 
Crime Survey, HMIC inspections, or other Home Office bulletins (Home Office 
2002a). However, this strongly suggested the performance data was not being 
collected centrally and raised the question of how strong a grasp the Lawrence 
Steering Group had on any progress which the recommendations were making. 
The fourth progress report, published in 2003, says that the third report had set 
out proposals for a series of sub groups that would explore compliance with the 
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recommendations, and looked at conformance with the recommendations in 
operational delivery areas (Home Office 2003a). However, the report then 
stated that the new sub groups had first met in November 2002. When 
considering that it was the progress report of June 2002 which initially stated 
this intention, there is again a question raised as to the drive that was being 
placed behind the Home Secretary’s action plan. It is interesting to note that the 
fourth progress report then recommends ‘rather than detail what has been 
achieved, as with previous Annual Reports, this report will look forward to what 
we plan to achieve in the months ahead’ (Home Office 2003a, p3). The report 
states the vast majority of the recommendations had been implemented and an 
assessment would be carried out by the London School of Economics. It goes 
on to confirm that the Ministerial Priority was in place with performance 
indicators measuring it. 
 
No further progress reports could be found during this research. Several of the 
units and groups referred to in this final progress report, CJS Race Unit for 
example, continued their work. However, reading the progress reports leaves 
a feeling that although the action plan did produce change, the success it had 
with police organisations and their culture is questionable. The Ministerial 
Priority was indeed put in place. However, the content of the progress reports 
question how successful they were at introducing the ten performance 
measures, as contained within recommendation 2, as there was no apparent 
emphasis on the need to improve the performance they were supposed to be 
measuring. Rowe (2004, p155 – 157) said that if the success of the Macpherson 
Report was measured in terms of policy and program development, then much 
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had been achieved. However, the quantitative measures of performance shed 
little light on the qualitative issues of public trust and confidence in the police. 
He stated that while there had been a plethora of initiatives, with the stated aim 
of implementing the Lawrence agenda, it is far more difficult to assess the effect 
these had on policing. 
 
Foster (2008) stated the key message the Lawrence Inquiry wanted to convey 
was the differential treatment of minority victims, suspects and witness’s 
experiences across the whole of the criminal justice system, but says this 
message was ultimately rejected, resented, or simply not understood by the 
police service. Shiner (2010) agreed that the way police tried to address some 
of the Macpherson recommendations, at a time when automatic trust, 
satisfaction and confidence was lost, may not have served the broader interests 
of the police.  
 
It is interesting to note that on 24th February 1999, at Prime Minister’s 
Questions, Tony Blair stated that; 
 
“The test of our sincerity as law makers ….is not how well we can express 
sympathy with the Lawrence family but how well we implement the 
recommendations to make sure this type of thing never happens again in our 
country”                   
(Mayberry 2008, p 10) 
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It would appear that whilst the Macpherson Report should have provided the 
stimulus for significant change in police practice, whilst visibly challenging a 
culture which had been branded institutionally racist, a step further than the 
Scarman Report was prepared to go, recommendations were undermined by a 
lack of commitment by the government and senior police officers (Mayberry 
2008). Brain (2010, p279) agrees and stated the Home Secretary’s action plan 
allowed the Home Office to step back and leave implementation to the police 
service. This resulted in forces having to hit performance targets without the 
type of legislative support that was necessary for success. 
 
Drive for ‘efficiency’ 
Before we consider how the BRM satisfaction gap was introduced into the 
police service, it needs to be placed in context with the drive for public sector 
efficiency which was occurring at the same time. Indeed, the principles of New 
Public Management (NPM) and the footprint it left within the police organisation 
may go some way to explain why the performance indicator became so 
important to some police organisations. 
 
In the early 1980s the Conservative government found NPM an ideal vehicle 
for changing public services in ways that aligned to their central philosophies. 
NPM used private sector management techniques, driven by an intrusive 
performance regime, to improve organisational performance. By setting clear 
targets; planning and controlling systems; monitoring techniques and quality 
control; and by using tools such as cost-benefit analysis, performance 
indicators, customer satisfaction ratings and service level agreements, market 
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conditions were created within the public sector (Noordegraaf 2015). This was 
intended to challenge inefficient managers and practices and thereby increase 
public sector output, whilst reducing expenditure (Brain 2010).  
 
NPM began with the introduction of economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
principles into the governance of public sector organisations through Home 
Office circular 114 of 1983 (Long 2003). This meant moving away from the 
‘inputs’ or cost of the public sector in favour of measuring what public sector 
organisations produced, or ‘outputs’. For this to be achieved, ‘outputs’ were 
assessed through measurement by quantifiable numerical criteria. This allowed 
public sector organisations, including the police, to be ranked according to the 
performance indicators and their relative ‘success’ or ‘failure’ could then be 
benchmarked. Waters (2000) states this resulted in an emphasis on market 
forces, and a reorganization of public sector management to resemble a more 
business oriented approach by promoting the principle of greater efficiency and 
making public agencies more consumer responsive. Butterfield et al (2004) 
agree that these NPM principles involved several interconnected elements 
such as extensive use of competitive market and quasi-market mechanisms, 
privatisation of public utilities, organisational restructuring, including 
decentralisation of management, and a heavy emphasis upon organisational 
performance rather than procedure. Although it is acknowledged there was a 
substantial body of opinion arguing that public sector organisations are very 
different from those in the private sector, and that NPM precepts were therefore 
inappropriate, support for the NPM agenda came from evidence which 
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proposed there was in fact no sharp difference between the public and private 
sectors. 
 
Reiner (2010), however, questions the effectiveness NPM had on the police 
service. He states NPM involves the principle of central government ruling from 
a distance by devolving responsibility to local levels of service delivery whilst 
steering the delivery by targeting setting, performance management, league 
tables, competition, ‘best value’, financial and other instrumental sanctions. 
This, he says, appealed to the police manager who took over an enthusiasm 
for these tactics with the neo-liberal belief that private enterprise and market 
models work best. However, he states there is little evidence that these 
managerial models had the intended effect on practice, except where 
performance was unequivocally poor. Loveday et al (2007) warned the way 
NPM had been implemented was likely to produce perverse incentives that may 
have directed police activity away from the important but hard to the trivial but 
achievable. 
 
Fitzgerald et al (2002) stated that, as a result of NPM, the complexities of police 
work was forgotten as public sector managerialism increasingly dominated 
police administration. Although this was accidental and unintended, it resulted 
in quantitative targets being set for the police by successive Home Secretaries 
which gave primacy to narrowing crime-fighting objectives. Whilst this process 
was intended to improve police performance, they state it had the obverse 
effect. Long (2003) agrees with this concern. He says that NPM placed primary 
emphasis on the management rather than the leadership elements of the police 
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officer’s role. He argued that in this performance culture of continuous 
improvement, the dual requirements of management, leadership and 
partnership challenged the police service in a potentially negative manner. 
Butterfield et al (2004) also conclude NPM may not have resulted in improved 
performance for the public sector. The focus placed upon output rather than 
outcome resulted in the manipulation of systems and evasion of poor service 
delivery. This, he says, can result in the police service being unable to display 
the flexibility, leadership and customer focus extolled by the advocates of NPM. 
 
The impact that NPM had on the BRM satisfaction performance indicator, and 
thereby trust and confidence, has never been fully considered. Foster, Newburn 
and Souhami (2005) state that police forces have tended to focus attention on 
measured performance that was most easily identified and achieved. Whilst 
perhaps understandable, they say this can result in problems with routine 
working practice and service delivery which focus on ‘quick wins’, whilst 
ignoring the more difficult issues that would need tailor made services for 
specific communities. The impact that such working practices can have on 
organisational performance and how the ‘gaming’ of performance data is 
considered, by some, as a natural consequence of NPM will be discussed in 
chapter four. However, if police organisations did treat the BRM Satisfaction 
gap as an output to be assessed through measurement according to 
quantifiable numerical criteria (Long 2003), then the following question remains. 
Did NPM assist the police to deliver success or contribute to a failure of 
improving trust and confidence via the BRM satisfaction gap? 
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National Policing Plan 
As part of their drive for efficiency, the New Labour government published the 
first National Policing Plan in 2002 for 2003 – 06 (Home Office 2002).  It aimed 
to provide a strategic national overview and establish a single point of contact 
for the government’s priorities, performance indicators and plans for new 
developments, whilst outlining the various dimensions against which the 
performance of the police would be measured (Newburn 2003). This followed 
the key principles of NPM, as outlined by Waters (2000) and Reiner (2010), by 
placing an expectation on Chief Constables and Police Authorities to prepare 
their own local three-year strategy and annual policing plan. More importantly 
for this research, the plan contained a Home Office Public Service Agreement 
which stated: 
 
‘Improve the level of public confidence in the criminal justice 
system, including increasing that of ethnic minority communities, 
and increasing year on year the satisfaction of victims and 
witnesses, whilst respecting the rights of defendant’. 
(Home Office 2002: 42) 
 
However, although the Police Authorities (Best Value) Performance Indicators 
Order 2003 (Home Office 2003b) contained performance indicators to address 
the above requirement of the National Policing Plan, there was no specific 
performance indicator to measure the presence of a BRM satisfaction gap. 
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The second National Policing Plan was set for 2004 – 07 (Home Office 2003) 
and developed the requirement for each force to examine the service they 
provided to BRM communities. Within the Police Performance Assessment 
Framework (PPAF), that had been introduced, there was a proposal for a new 
statutory indicator of user satisfaction from ‘minority ethnic’ respondents for 
victims of racist incidents. This was set out in the statutory instruments No.644 
Police Authorities (Best Value) Performance Indicators Order 2004 (Home 
Office 2004a) and required each police authority to:  
 
3 (b) ‘From 1 (e), comparison of satisfaction for white users and users from 
visible minority ethnic groups with respect to the overall service provided’  
(Home Office 2004a: 3) 
 
This new performance indicator was further developed by the third National 
Policing Plan set for 2005 – 08 (Home Office 2004b). Again, in line with NPM 
principles it stated that work to increase the satisfaction of victims and 
witnesses would have a significant impact on the targets relating to confidence 
within the criminal justice system and those offences brought to justice.  
 
This was the last national policing plan to be published in this way. However, 
their legacy appears to be the establishment of the BRM satisfaction gap as a 
performance indicator for the police service. The Police Authorities (Best Value) 
Performance Indicators Order 2008 set a comparison of satisfaction between 
white users and users from BRM groups with overall service provided by the 
police as a statutory performance indicator (Home Office 2008).    
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Hall, Grieve and Savage (2010) acknowledge that a paradigm shift takes time 
to unfold and may not be implemented evenly across the police service. 
However, having examined the pace of change introduced via the National 
Policing Plan, the question still remains if the change agenda from the 
Macpherson Report was indeed quick enough. For example, even though the 
Police Authorities (Best Value) Performance Indicators Order 2003 (Home 
Office 2003b) contains performance indicators to address the content of the 
first National Policing Plan, it was not until the second National Policing Plan 
was introduced, 5 years after the publication of Macpherson, that there was a 
specific performance indicator to measure the BRM satisfaction gap as required 
by the report. 
 
Citizen Focus Policing 
The term Citizen Focus Policing was introduced to the police service in the 
publication of ‘Citizen Focus: Good Practice Guide’ (Home Office 2006). The 
guide stated that citizen-focus policing reflected the needs and expectations of 
individuals and local communities in decision-making, service delivery and 
practice (Home Office 2006). The objectives were to improve public confidence, 
increase satisfaction of service users and that of public involvement in policing. 
However, the guide does not appear to pick up on the Macpherson Report’s 
(1999) concerns regarding the levels of trust and confidence within BRM 
communities towards the police. Instead it solely highlights the BRM 
satisfaction gap performance indicator as being the main way to highlight 
disparate levels of satisfaction in different BRM communities with the police 
under the heading of ‘fairness and equality’.  
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The guide reflects the NPM principles of devolving responsibility to local levels 
of service delivery, whilst maintaining a control by target setting, performance 
management and league tables. The guide stated that substantially different 
levels of satisfaction across the country and amongst different communities 
showed the police service needed to do more to improve the experience of 
those involved. It goes on to list a number of activities it specifically states BRM 
victims perceived the police performing poorly, compared to the perception of 
white victims.  
 
• The police did not appear to know what they were doing 
• The police did not explain what would happen next and why 
• They were not given a reference number 
• They were not provided with a contact name and number 
• They were not referred to Victim Support 
• The information they needed was not provided quickly 
• The call was not returned within a reasonable time 
• The police did not communicate clearly 
• The police did not make an effort to understand the nature of their 
enquiry 
(Home Office 2006: 38) 
 
It stated that victims experiencing the highest levels of satisfaction were those 
shown empathy by the police service at the first point of contact. However, it 
pointed out that even if individual experiences are positive they may not 
contribute to favourable perceptions of the police if victims perceive their 
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experience was atypical. It concluded that, generally, BRM communities 
received a poor service and provided a detailed analysis of service provision by 
the police, with a challenge for each police service to implement their own 
initiatives within the philosophy of Citizen Focus policing. The ‘Citizen Focus: 
Good Practice Guide’ (Home Office 2006) listed the ‘drivers of satisfaction’ and 
said that if police officers complied with them then victim satisfaction would 
increase. This guide appears to adopt the approach that by police officers 
adopting a tick box approach to service delivery, the required increase in victim 
satisfaction would be achieved.  
 
The guide states it is the responsibility of all forces, even those with small BRM 
communities, to take steps to ensure they are providing a fair and equal level 
of service. However, there is no necessity for consultation with communities to 
ascertain their specific needs, but states that during the research, very little 
evidence could be found of forces focusing on closing the satisfaction gap 
(Home Office 2006). Disappointingly, there is no mention of the connection 
between the BRM satisfaction gap and levels of trust and confidence, as 
suggested by the Macpherson Report. It is perhaps interesting to note that the 
guide, published in 2006, highlights Dorset Police as having an example of 
good practice in respect of their use of BRM community members to shape and 
deliver police training. However, in 2010 the success of this training was 
questioned when Dorset Police were highlighted as having some of the highest 
black / white disproportionality ratios in the country for stop and search, which 
seems to question the effectiveness of their practice (Equality and Human 
Rights Commission 2010).   
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The Policing Pledge 
In 2008, the New Labour government introduced the Policing Pledge. This was 
intended to build on the principles of Citizen Focus policing by requiring the 
police to treat people with dignity and respect, whilst providing fair access to 
services. It said that a victim of crime would be able to specify how they would 
like to be kept informed of progress in their case, with an additional specific 
right to be kept informed of progress once a month (Keenan 2009). 
 
Brain (2010) states it was difficult to argue with the sentiment of the Policing 
Pledge as it tried to deliver an antidote to the results based style of policing 
emanating from NPM. However, it soon became apparent that, despite the 
rhetoric, the police service would retain many of the existing performance 
targets, as well as creating new ones. The Policing Pledge said it would 
increase performance delivery by challenging each police organisation to 
improve public confidence amongst all communities. To do this it introduced a 
single performance target to improve levels of public confidence (Keenan 
2009), even though there was acknowledgment that the link between police 
action and public confidence was hard to establish (Brain 2010). 
 
In 2010 one of the first acts of the new Conservative-led coalition government 
was to abolish the Policing Pledge. This may have been a shrewd move as 
Keenan (2009) had questioned the direction some police organisations were 
going by developing their own initiatives to address performance indicators. He 
warned against the developing practice of specifically targeting the individual 
service provided between white and BRM victims as it raised the question over 
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whether police were profiling victims of crime by their ethnicity to determine the 
service they received. This would result in the police targeting BRM victims of 
crime to ensure they received a better service than a white victim of crime, for 
the BRM satisfaction gap to narrow. When considering Macpherson’s view that 
the police could be considered institutionally racist; as seen in processes, 
attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting 
prejudice ignorance and racists stereotyping (Macpherson 1999), there appear 
to be questions as to whether such a policy would be positively accepted by 
both the public and the wider police organisation. This results in Keenan (2009) 
challenging some Macpherson Report recommendations by suggesting there 
may be a level where a satisfaction gap becomes acceptable for the police 
service as the underlying causes may be wider than the policing remit. 
 
Summary 
Chapter two has examined how the BRM satisfaction gap became a 
performance indicator for the police service, and shown there has been 
dissatisfaction in BRM communities towards the police in the UK for many 
years.  
 
The Scarman Report (1981), which examined some of the most serious public 
disorder within the UK in recent times, provided some suggestions as to where 
improvements needed be made, but there is a consensus that it was left 
wanting with its’ conclusions and therefore failed to deliver (Newburn 2003, 
Bowling and Phillips 2002). 
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The Macpherson Report into the murder of Stephen Lawrence set out 70 
recommendations, with the first one being to improve trust and confidence 
amongst BRM communities. To achieve this, recommendation 2 proposed 10 
performance indicators, with one being to achieve equal satisfaction levels 
across all ethnic groups in public satisfaction surveys. The Stephen Lawrence 
Steering Group was set up and quickly took credit for implementing the 
Ministerial Priority, as required by the first recommendation. However, there 
appears to be a question as to how effective the steering group was in turning 
policy into action. Little comment was made about the time it took to introduce 
the BRM satisfaction gap as a performance indicator.  
 
It is questionable that the recommendations within the Macpherson Report and 
the desire to improve trust and confidence in BRM communities could be so 
simply translated into individual performance indicators. The chapter has asked 
whether each police organisation which developed working practices to narrow 
the BRM satisfaction gap may have considered it an output within the 
requirements of NPM whilst ignoring the more complex challenge of improving 
trust and confidence with the police amongst BRM communities (Loveday et al 
2007). 
 
Indeed, Crane and Hall (2009) suggest that the differing levels of measured 
satisfaction across communities may not be as a result of indifferent standards 
in service but rather a vision of success at the front, driven by the translation of 
the Home Office guidelines into a small number of easily measurable targets 
for front line officers. The desire to be efficient and effective in a business-like 
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manner, as required by NPM, does not always match the victim’s vision of 
success (Eterno and Silverman 2012). Thus, despite the emphasis shifting 
towards more victim-focused approaches, an NPM cultural legacy may remain 
where police success or performance is interpreted by officers as arrest or 
detection, whilst the victim of crime is left dissatisfied with the service provided. 
Chapter three will now consider the principles of trust, confidence and 
satisfaction and whether these can be so easily referred as interconnecting 
principles for victims of crime when considering policy design and service 
delivery by the police. 
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Chapter 3: Trust, Confidence and Satisfaction 
 
Introduction 
Chapter two explained how the principles of the BRM satisfaction gap 
performance indicator was developed from the second recommendation 
contained within the Macpherson Report. The recommendation was made with 
the intention of it contributing to the assessment of the Ministerial Priority 
contained within the first recommendation. Macpherson (1999, p327) stated the 
overall aim was to eliminate racist prejudice and disadvantage and thereby 
demonstrate fairness in all aspects of policing.  To achieve this, Macpherson 
appears to consider the improvement of trust and confidence between BRM 
communities and the police to be a vital component. 
 
However, Cao (2015) warns that when considering the substantial literature 
concerning citizens’ perceptions of the police, the terms trust, confidence and 
satisfaction are often used interchangeably with little recognition of any 
differences between them. Whereas satisfaction describes an internal state of 
mind of the individual based on simply formed opinion, trust and confidence are 
different in that they are an overall assessment, externally focused, that imply an 
awareness of possible risk or danger arising from the breaking of the trust or 
misplacing of confidence. Jackson, Bradford, Stanko and Hohl (2013) state there 
are a variety of measures which researchers assume indicate the perceived 
fairness, integrity, competence and effectiveness of the police. These include 
questions about public confidence and satisfaction concerning a police service’s 
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ability to reduce crime or interact positively with the community. However, they 
warn no one single question will ever be enough to assess the concepts of trust 
and confidence, but rather a range of indicators will always be needed to capture 
the complexity of public opinion. Bradford, Stanko and Jackson (2009) point out 
that diminishing public confidence with the police over the last 20 years have 
been mirrored by growing dissatisfaction, thereby suggesting there is a 
connection between the terms for the police service to consider. 
 
All of this presents a view that the issue of trust and confidence, as presented by 
the Macpherson Report (1999) recommendations, may not be straight forward to 
address. This chapter will examine some proposed differences between trust, 
confidence and satisfaction. Within this it will consider how factors such as public 
perception, neighbourhood conditions and legitimacy impact on them from a 
police context. It will conclude that the improvement of BRM victim satisfaction 
appears to involve more issues than just the quality of service provided to a 
person at a specific time. 
 
Trust 
There is an acceptance that trust is an important influence on both individuals 
and communities in the building of social relations, yet a lack of consensus as to 
how this actually operates (Sztompka 1999). Luhmann (1979) states that trust, 
considered in the broadest sense as confidence in one’s expectations, is a basic 
fact of social life. In many situations, a person can choose whether to bestow 
trust or not, but points out that a complete absence of trust would prevent the 
completion of even the simplest daily activity due to the feeling of overwhelming 
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risk. Sztompka (1999) explains that when acting in uncertain and uncontrollable 
conditions, we take risks, we gamble and make best of future uncertainties. Thus, 
in order to deal with the risks that the future presents, we must trust.  
 
Giddens (1991) expands on the above point and says that trust is the non-
negotiable basis of ontological security. It is an essential screening off device in 
relation to risk, which removes individual chaos and anxiety from the surrounding 
setting of action and interaction. Luhmann (1979) adds that to show trust is to 
anticipate the future, and requires a person to behave as if the future is certain. 
Sztompka (1999) adds that the logical conclusion is when we are practically 
certain of the future, there is no need to trust. It is only when uncertainty is added 
does an individual need to trust in a course of action or indeed an organisation. 
Cao (2015) concludes by asserting trust stands between “blind faith and open-
eyed confidence.” 
 
Types of Trust 
So, there is a consensus that trust is a fundamental factor in the building of social 
relations and in addressing risk. If this is indeed the case then consideration 
needs to be given into how people trust and whether this may change, depending 
on whom or what their trust is being placed in.  
 
Fenton (2000) says people demonstrate three kinds of trust. These being: 
Characteristic-based trust; which is tied to a person’s social or cultural 
background. Process-based trust; that is tied to past or present exchanges, as 
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in reputation or gift exchanges. Institutionally-based trust; which is tied to forms 
of certification or legal constraints.  
 
However, Fukuyama (1995) believes it is only the person’s cultural background, 
‘characteristic-based trust’, which influences how a person trusts. Nooteboom 
(2006), however, views the issue slightly differently and focuses on what people 
trust in. For example, he states people may trust in an organisation which he 
calls ‘behavioural trust’. This then results in a variety of aspects: trust in their 
competence, intentions, honesty or truthfulness. Owen and Powell (2006), 
appears to agree with this. They say that one can distinguish between trust in 
contracts between people and State, trust in friendships, trust in love and 
relationships and trust in foreign issues. However, they appear to question the 
concept of trust in the police by arguing that “the state”, “the government” and 
“the media” are not regarded as social actors as they do not possess the agency 
to formulate and act upon decisions, but are controlled by other influences. They 
therefore conclude that with the erosion of traditional institutions and scientific 
knowledge, trust becomes an issue more often produced only by individual social 
actors. 
 
Sztompka (1999) dismisses this view and agrees with Fenton (2000) and 
Nooteboom (2006). Organisations, he says, can be the object of trust, in both 
their competence and their intentions. However, he appears to provide clarity to 
the opinions of Owen and Powell (2006) by pointing out that often trust in an 
organisation is indeed based on trust in the individual people. He goes on to state 
that trust within the individual can be transferred to the organisation by them 
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being backed by authority, position, managers and personnel. The 
implementation of organisational interests and rules of trustworthy conduct will 
then ensure organisational trust is, in return, transferred back to the person. 
 
The practice of dividing trust between the principles of ‘personal’ and 
‘organisational or social’ trust appear to be a general theme running through 
many writings which appear to have commonalities with Fenton’s (2000) 
characteristic-based, institutionally-based and process-based trust. The issue 
raised by Sztompka and Nooteboom are relevant to the police service. The fact 
that trust in an organisation is ultimately underpinned by trust in the people within 
it, and that it is possible for this to be transferred two ways should not be lost. 
However, as will be seen, it is Tyler (2005) who proposes a model which captures 
many principles, already discussed, in a structure that is applicable to the police.  
  
Trust in the police 
Tyler (2005) proposes two types of trust in the police. The first is ‘institutional 
trust’ which is a measure of how honest an organisation is considered to be, and 
how it cares for the people it serves. Institutional trust in the police exists when 
members of the public view the police as being an honest and competent 
authority, who exercises their responsibilities on behalf of all citizens. Although 
labelled differently, this appears to mirror Nooteboom’s ‘behavioural trust’, 
Fenton’s ‘institutionally-based trust’ and Sztompka’s view that organisations can 
be the subject of trust.  
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Tyler’s (2005) second type of trust in the police is ‘motive-based trust’. This 
involves inferences about the motives and intentions of the police. People place 
motive-based trust by how much they believe police officers possess caring 
intentions when dealing with the public, and show good faith when responding to 
requests for assistance. This appears to support Sztompka’s (1999) view that 
trust in an organisation is based on trust in the people. Nooteboom (2006) agrees 
by saying trust in the police requires trust in individual officers, as well as the 
organisation, and the underlying institutions of law and law enforcement. He 
reaffirms that both competence and intentional trust, measures of how much a 
police service can be trusted to carry out their key functions in a proper manner, 
are considerations for when people place trust in the police. However, these 
proposals still mirror Tyler’s (2005) broad proposal of ‘institutional trust’ and 
‘motive-based trust’ and thus for the purpose of this research this model appears 
to be the most relevant for considering public trust in the police.  
 
Why trust the police? 
Jackson et al (2013) say that citizen’s trust in the police is important as it will 
result in an individual’s active and willing cooperation. The absence of this can 
result in aggressive interventions from the police in the face of public opposition. 
This appears to support the view that Tyler (2006) presents regarding the 
importance of police legitimacy in the eyes of the communities they police. He 
claims public perceptions of police trustworthiness, both institutional and motive-
based, will allow the police to be viewed as a legitimate organisation and are, 
thus, critical for cooperation between public and police (Tyler 2006).  
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Put in more practical terms, public trust with the police involves the belief that 
police officers are nominally competent with the individual’s best interest at heart. 
This enables one to assume they will act in predictable ways, in keeping with the 
role they have in society. This is highlighted by Jackson and Bradford (2010) who 
say that in the UK trust in police fairness, caught up heavily with trust in its 
commitment to community values, is the most fundamental aspect of trust. 
 
However, Fukuyama (1995) is an advocate of the impact of culture on the ability 
to trust. Although his view is linked more to economics, many of his principles 
and observations appear relevant to the police service as he comments greatly 
on trust in communities. He says that economic life is deeply embedded in social 
life, and it cannot be separated from the customs, morals and habits of the 
society in which it occurs. A cultural community is formed not based on explicit 
rules and regulations but out of a set of ethical habits and reciprocal moral 
obligations. It provides members of that community grounds for trusting one 
another. This, he argues, results in different communities trusting differently, due 
to their individual culture. 
 
Fukuyama’s (1995) view therefore suggests that each community will trust the 
police differently, due to their culture. This attracts support from Weitzer and Tuch 
(2005) and Rowe (2004). Jackson et al (2013) add that low trust in the police 
tends to cluster in neighbourhoods which are disadvantaged, experience high 
crime rates, public disorder and fear of crime and low residential stability and 
collective efficacy. However, they go on to say that individual issues of gender, 
age, employment status and ethnicity makes little difference to the levels of trust 
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in the police. They appear to support Fukuyama when they say that trust in the 
police is a matter of location as it can ‘cluster’ in areas whereby people who share 
the same locality tend to share the same level of trust.  
 
Trust within a community 
Sztompka (1999) highlights that trust has important functions, not only for 
individuals but also for wider communities (groups, associations and 
organizations) within which it prevails. It encourages sociability, participation and 
thereby enriches interpersonal ties and enlarges the field of interactions. He says 
it will generally strengthen the bond of an individual with a community and 
contribute to a feeling of identity by providing cooperation. 
 
Fenton (2000) states that trust is indeed the fundamental precursor for a society, 
whilst Fukuyama (1995) also highlights the positive impact trust has on a 
community. He states that trust arises when a community shares a set of moral 
values in such a way as to create expectations of regular and honest behaviour. 
However, the use of the word ‘honest’ appears troubling when considering the 
influence that crime can have on a community, he goes on to point out that the 
particular character of moral values, both positive and negative, is less important 
than the fact they are shared by the community. He therefore concludes that trust 
does not necessarily produce a ‘positive’ set of values for a community but rather 
a shared set. When this is considered in context with Owen and Powell’s (2006) 
observation that a person will develop trust if a person or situation has specific 
characteristics, positively valued by that community, then it does raise the 
question as to whether trust always has a positive influence. 
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The ability of trust to ‘bind’ a community, organisation or group, regardless of the 
legality, does appear to be agreed upon. However, Fukuyama (1995) is clearly 
of the opinion there are varying degrees, and differing types of trust in a 
community. These are heavily influenced by culture, resulting in the creation of 
high and low trust(ing) communities. Depending on which community a person 
comes from will depend on whom and how much an individual will trust. He says 
that some societies have very strong families but relatively weak bonds of trust 
among people unrelated to one another. He observes that in these cases 
individuals will tend to focus on the family and be reluctant to place trust in 
organisations which are not related. Alternatively, some cultures may have 
vigorous, private non-profit organisations like schools, hospitals and charities 
that develop strong bonds of association and trust that go beyond the family. He 
says this can result in cultures trusting only people related to them or, conversely, 
being comfortable in trusting people outside of family and kinship group. 
 
Sztompka (1999) highlights the work of Fukuyama and proposes there are 
expanding concentric circles of trust, ‘radii of trust’ as described by Fukuyama, 
that encompasses both interpersonal and social trust, the most concrete 
interpersonal relations, toward the institutional and motive-based trust, which is 
placed in the police. The narrowest radius of trust, he says, covers that placed in 
members of a person’s family, after which comes trust toward people known 
personally. The wider radius embraces other members of the community whom 
are known indirectly, whilst the widest includes large categories of people, with 
whom there is a belief that individuals have something in common but who are 
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mostly absent, not directly encountered, and constructed as a real collective only 
in the imagination (compatriots, members of ethnic groups, of a religion, gender, 
generation or profession). Here, Sztompka (1999) says, trust in concrete persons 
shades off into trust in more abstract social items.  
 
Diagrammatically Sztompka’s (1999) proposal can be presented as below: 
 
Diagram 3.1: Sztompka’s concentric circles of trust 
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However, Sztompka’s (1999) proposals may not be as straightforward as first 
suggested. When reconsidering Fukuyama’s proposal of high and low trust 
cultures, the principle of measuring trust within a community via radii of trust 
appears not to be so straight forward as shown in diagram 3.1. The principles of 
‘high’ and ‘low’ trust cultures would suggest the radius of trust would change 
depending on each community’s individual culture, as suggested below: 
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Diagram 3.2: Fukuyama’s high trust culture 
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3.3: Fukuyama’s low trust culture 
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As Fukuyama (1995) describes the ‘radii of trust’, with high trusting cultures more 
readily prepared to trust other members of their community and those whom they 
believe they have something in common with, then that radius should shorten to 
produce smaller concentric circles (Diagram 3.2). Likewise, in the case of a low 
trust culture where, as he says, there are very strong families but relatively weak 
bonds of trust among people unrelated to one another, then the radius would 
increase for all groups other than family and produce larger circles (Diagram 3.3). 
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Within the policing context, it would appear the message from Sztompka (1999) 
and Fukuyama (1995) is that different communities will trust institutions and 
organisations, like the police, differently according to their culture. This appears 
to suggest that to increase victim satisfaction and thereby improve trust and 
confidence in the police, as required by Macpherson (1999), it may require a 
larger investment, than just generic service delivery being applied to all victims 
of crime. 
 
Confidence 
The Macpherson Report (1999) spoke of both trust and confidence when it 
proposed the BRM Satisfaction gap as a measure of the police’s relationships 
with BRM communities. However, there is no further detail explaining whether 
this should be considered as two separate or one individual principle. Indeed, 
when these terms are applied to policing there appears some confusion. This 
supports Cao’s (2015) view that ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’ tend to be used 
interchangeably with little recognition of any differences among them. 
 
This confusion results in some disagreement over when the terms confidence 
should be used rather than trust, and whether there is such a significant 
difference between the two. Misztal (1996) and Luhmann (1979) state that a 
difference does exist and it is important to differentiate between the two, in order 
to understand the actions of individuals. However, Holdaway (2010) questions 
the importance of any difference and has the view that trust is a proxy of 
confidence with regards to measuring public views of the police. Jackson and 
Bradford (2010) argue that confidence is, in fact, a type of motive-based trust 
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that is rooted in a social alignment between the police and community. This, they 
say, is founded on public assessments of the ability of the police to secure public 
respect and embody community values. However, Jackson and Sunshine (2007) 
adopt the views of Holdaway (2010) and Cao’s (2015), by stating that in Britain, 
the term public confidence in policing has become a short-hand for trust, 
legitimacy and consent. 
 
Choice 
Misztal (1996, pp 15 - 18) says that the main difference between trust and 
confidence is connected to the degree of certainty attached to expectations. 
Trust is a matter of individual determination and involves choosing between 
alternatives, for example a person decides to take a risk and trust the police to 
efficiently investigate their crime. On the other hand, confidence is more of a 
habitual expectation, a person is confident that the police will do a good job when 
investigating their crime. This appears to involve less risk if it then transpires not 
to be the case. 
 
Nooteboom (2006) highlights the aspect of choice that any individual may have 
when comparing the issues of trust and confidence. He argues that since a 
person cannot choose whether they have contact with the police or which officer 
they would like to engage with, it is better to speak of confidence rather than trust 
in the police.  
 
This, however, does appear flawed when considering victims of crime, as 
Nooteboom’s (2006) statement that individuals cannot choose to avoid the police 
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does not stand up to scrutiny. There has been a great deal published regarding 
the issue of under reporting crime within the UK, especially related to hate crime 
and domestic violence (Rowe 2004, Hall et al 2009). Often the reasons given are 
connected to a belief that the police are incapable of effectively dealing with the 
crime, which may indicate a serious lack of confidence. It could be argued that, 
certainly with regard to the victim of crime, a decision not to report a crime 
demonstrates a choice between using the police and avoiding them, resulting in 
the level of trust becoming the issue. However, Nooteboom (2006) clearly states 
that when the object of trust is imposed, inevitable and beyond choice, as in the 
case of laws of nature, higher powers as well as organisations and institutions 
like the police, then one should not consider the aspect of trust but rather one of 
confidence.  
 
Fenton (2000) disagrees with this. She states that a society where individuals 
have choice and are free to make rational decisions to fulfil their personal interest 
would not need trust to mediate forms of uncertainty and risk. But if individuals 
do not have the freedom to choose, if information received is incomplete or 
impenetrable, they are left only with the ability to exercise caution and with 
caution comes the need to consider the concept of trust. Spalek (2000) also 
highlights the potential problem that lack of choice may have on trust and 
confidence She states there may be situations where people do not have a 
choice over the risks they will be exposed to. This results in them being coerced 
into a course of trusting, regardless of their level of confidence, they would not 
usually choose to take. 
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Knowledge 
Misztal (1996) states another difference between trust and confidence is 
connected to the degree of certainty we can attach to our expectations stemming 
from some level of knowledge or familiarity. Luhmann (1979) agrees, and says 
that for the individual to trust, they must have at least some knowledge. He says 
that trust is scarcely possible without any previous information as it ‘overdraws’ 
on it and rests on the individual being already au fait and informed with certain 
general features, even if incomplete and unreliable. There is no need for 
knowledge to be complete about the likely behaviour to be trusted, rather it 
serves as a springboard for the leap into uncertainty, although bounded and 
structured. However, Luhmann (1979) says if the individual has no knowledge or 
experience of the organisation in question, then the correct measure is one of 
public confidence rather than public trust. Owen and Powell (2006) agree with 
the importance of knowledge. They say that, unlike confidence, trust is 
incompatible with complete ignorance of the possibility and probability of future 
events. It is implied that public confidence is formed or developed from opinions 
not created from knowledge of the subject matter but from something else. 
Fukuyama (1995) says individual communities may tend to use knowledge 
differently as people do not always pursue utility, however defined, in a rational 
way but rather by considering available alternatives and choosing the one that 
maximises utility in the long run. Indeed, it may well be that, as with trust, it is the 
individual’s culture which shapes the level of confidence, rather than the level of 
knowledge within it. 
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Confidence in the police 
From the discussion so far, it appears that public trust in the police requires an 
individual to have both choice and knowledge of the service. If this is non-existent 
or relevant, then public confidence should be considered instead. This appears 
to be supported by both Jackson and Bradford (2010) and Cao (2015). Jackson 
and Bradford (2010) state that public trust with the police involves the belief, or 
knowledge, that they are at least nominally competent and have the individual’s 
best interest at heart. This enables one to assume the police will act in 
predictable ways and will behave in keeping with the role they have in society. 
Cao (2015) states that confidence in the police represents a general support for 
the police as an institution and, as such, constitutes a reservoir of good will. The 
level of confidence at any one time reveals the strength of public sentiment, that 
the police are working on behalf of the community to deliver order and secure a 
sense of justice (Ren et al 2005).  
 
Donovan et al (2001) say that people’s views about public services are only partly 
formed by their direct use of them. They warn there is no simple relationship 
between increasing the performance and quality of the service and increasing 
the level of confidence. This is linked to the user’s expectations of the service 
they will receive and their perceptions of the service they have received. 
Flanagan et al (2005) agree with this. They say that a person’s prior views of 
such organisations, which could be viewed as knowledge, including an 
individual’s expectations of them, are influenced by personal beliefs, media 
coverage and word of mouth experience of friends and family. The public’s 
confidence in the police is affected not only by the media’s portrayal of the police 
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on both documentary and drama programmes, but also by the individual’s belief 
in the police, often based on their perception of the crime level, which is invariably 
inaccurate. 
 
Stanko et al (2012) say that trusting the police to be effective is less important in 
predicting overall confidence than the fairness of interpersonal treatment and the 
sense that the police are in tune with community values and expectations. This 
is supported by Jackson and Sunshine (2006) who state that public confidence 
in the police is driven not by worries about crime rates, but by concerns regarding 
social cohesion. The public lose confidence in the activities of the police when 
community values and norms are seen to be deteriorating, not when they are 
worrying about their own safety.  
 
Fleming and McLaughlin (2012) state that trust and confidence in public 
institutions is a function of the extent to which these institutions produce preferred 
outcomes. They say that high-performing public institutions, that are efficient and 
effective, are likely to elicit the ongoing confidence of citizens, whilst those that 
perform badly or ineffectively, generate feeling of public distrust and low 
confidence. Who judges that a public institution is efficient and effective and what 
this means appears to be rather subjective. However, Flanagan et al (2005) pick 
up on the issue of ‘performance’ in relation to public confidence. They state that 
the concept of confidence, and the need to increase public confidence, is in fact 
an underlying, though usually implicit, tenet of NPM. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, this is intended to incorporate private sector techniques into public 
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sector organisations to create leaner, more flexible and “customer focused” 
services, whilst providing better value for money.  
 
Is there a difference between trust and confidence in practical terms for the 
police? Some say that a person needs choice and knowledge to express trust, 
whereas this is not necessary for confidence. Donovan et al (2001) and Flanagan 
et al (2005) argue that this evaluation of confidence is formed without direct 
knowledge of the organisation and is thus influenced by other factors. If this is 
the case, then how does a police organisation go about improving public 
confidence when they may have little or no direct control on these influencing 
factors? However, when some argue that trust could be a proxy for confidence, 
it raises the question of whether there is actually a need to differentiate at all 
between the two for the setting of police policy but rather a need to just 
acknowledge the importance of increasing positive attitudes whilst reducing 
negative ones. 
 
Satisfaction 
In their discussion paper examining satisfaction with key public services, 
Donovan, Brown and Bellulo (2001) state that people tend to be satisfied with a 
service or a product when their perceptions of what they have received matches 
their expectations. When it falls short there will be dissatisfaction. However, they 
explain that expectations are formed by many factors other than the direct 
customer service provided. These include previous experience, word of mouth, 
reputation, media, communication by the provider and, crucially, the needs and 
characteristics of the customer or user. Flanagan, Johnston and Talbot (2004) 
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agree with this definition by stating that a person’s expectation of a service or 
product can be directly linked to their level of confidence of the provider.   
 
Models of satisfaction 
Donovan et al (2001) break down their general submission of satisfaction into 
three theories; equity theory, attribution theory and performance theory. These, 
they say, can be applied to any goods or service provided to a customer including 
that by the police service. 
 
The Equity Theory says that satisfaction occurs where a consumer feels that the 
outcome of the purchase of goods or service provided is in balance with their 
inputs, such as cost, time and effort, and that of the product provider. The 
consumer needs to feel fairly treated in the consumption process to develop 
satisfaction. This theory does appear to have some relevance to the police when 
considering how the police service has been challenged to demonstrate their 
cost effectiveness with regards to public funding over the past 30 years (Brain 
2010). Such a theory would suggest that police satisfaction should be measured 
by police solving problems and reducing fear of crime. Therefore, one easy way 
of increasing satisfaction with the police would be to increase the number of 
patrols (Dukes, Portillos and Miles, 2009). However, this does not appear to be 
so straight forward when considering Donovan et al (2001) and Flanagan et al 
(2004) who argue that there are other factors in play, regarding satisfaction with 
the police, other than the service provided. 
 
 70 
Attribution theory is where people or customers try to search for reasons to 
explain why an event turned out the way it did. Consumers use three factors to 
determine attribution’s effect in satisfaction. These are ‘locus of causality’, which 
is where either the service provider receives the credit or blame for a service or 
the consumer is deemed responsible for the product or service performance. 
‘Stability’ refers to the reliability of the product or service and can have a major 
effect on satisfaction, as consumers or service users tend to only be more 
forgiving of product or service failure which is viewed as a rare event. Finally, 
‘controllability’ affects attribution as satisfaction can be affected if the consumer 
believes the provider had the capacity or control to perform to a higher level but 
chooses not to.  
 
The attribution theory appears to be relevant to satisfaction with the police 
service as, unlike equity theory, there are allowances which consider factors 
other than direct service provision. A victim’s view regarding ‘stability’ or 
‘controllability’ of the police on the service provided allows the influence of such 
factors as previous experience, word of mouth, service reputation, the media, 
communication by the service provider as well as the needs of the victim 
(Donovan et al 2001). This appears to provide a better fit in line with the views of 
Flanagan et al (2004). 
 
Finally, Performance theory states that customer satisfaction is directly related 
to the product or service’s perceived characteristics which, preferably, can be 
determined objectively. Therefore, should a provider increase the expectations 
of a consumer, then satisfaction would fall if these expectations were not 
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realised. A victim either confirming or disconfirming their expectations of a 
service by the police’s perceived performance would therefore produce either 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This appears to fit in with Skogan’s (2005) view 
that the major determinants of citizen satisfaction with police encounters can be 
found in the things that police do at the time, by officers being polite, fair, attentive 
and willing to explain what was going on. In line with performance theory, a 
victim’s perception of the officer’s actions would thereby establish their level of 
satisfaction.  
 
Public satisfaction with the police 
Holder (2015) questions the value of measuring satisfaction within the police 
since the term can hide as much as it reveals. She says that although it may be 
useful for policy purposes, the vague context says little about the detail an 
individual is being asked to assess, and ignores motivations and expectations. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the use of the satisfaction measure within 
the UK public sector is commonly viewed as arising from a widespread shift to 
marketisation and of NPM. Holder (2015) states there may be a connection that 
during this time there was a noticeable disenchantment with, and disengagement 
of, the public from the public sector. She says this resulted in both satisfaction 
and confidence in many public institutions rapidly falling. Indeed, Brain (2010), 
Rowe (2004) and Newburn (2003) all agree the police service has witnessed a 
considerable fall in public satisfaction for the past 35 years which, as discussed 
in chapter two, has been linked to the style and nature of policing. As discussed, 
this dissatisfaction gained momentum following the inner-city disturbances of the 
early to mid-1980s, along with the national Miners’ Strike and various high-profile 
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miscarriages of justice that resulted in questioning the fundamental integrity of 
the police (Brain 2010). 
  
Skogan (2005) states people who ask the police for help (citizen initiated) are 
generally more satisfied with the service provided than those who are 
approached by police (police initiated). This is, perhaps, because a member of 
public does not choose to enter into the police initiated contact and are therefore 
more likely to be adversarial in nature. It has been shown by Southgate and 
Ekblom (1984), Rowe (2004) and Brain (2010) that in the UK being stopped by 
police either on foot or in a vehicle generates considerable public annoyance and 
dissatisfaction with the police. The word ‘annoyance’ seems to imply it is the 
general inconvenience of being stopped which then results in negative views of 
the police, rather than the way in which they have been treated. However, 
research within the UK has shown that police-initiated contacts, completed in a 
fair and courteous manner, giving people explanations for the stop and 
explaining their rights, can actually contribute to satisfaction (Rowe 2004).  
 
Rosenbaum et al (2005) agrees with the importance of who initiates the police 
contact on levels of public satisfaction. However, they argue that citizen-initiated 
contact has a stronger influence on shaping the public’s attitudes towards the 
police than police-initiated. This appears to place great importance on the 
principle of improving victim satisfaction in order to improve the public’s overall 
opinion of the police service. Hinds (2009, p55 - 56) develops this by stating there 
are three factors, other than police contact, which are consistently linked to the 
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level of public satisfaction with the police. These are public perceptions of the 
police, neighbourhood conditions and police legitimacy.  
 
Public perception 
Hinds (2009) says people’s perceptions about how well the police are performing 
in their neighbourhood is a major factor which influences a person’s level of 
satisfaction. Hawdon (2008) expands on this by stating those who are disposed 
to doubting the honesty of the police are more likely to view an encounter with 
police as being ‘unjust’ and thus express dissatisfaction, regardless of the 
officer’s actual behaviour. A person’s previous attitude toward the police shapes 
whether he or she interprets police behaviour as just or unjust, or in other words 
knowledge of the police results in a level of trust which directly influences the 
level of satisfaction. This leads to Hawdon (2008) asking whether satisfaction is 
in fact a self-fulfilling prophecy, in that those who perceive the police as being 
trustworthy and legitimate are more likely to be treated fairly as they will act 
deferentially toward an officer during a police-initiated contact rather than 
someone who views the police with suspicion or hostility. 
 
Both Brandl et al (1994) and Keenan (2009) support this view. They say the effect 
of a person’s previous personal experience and their prior opinion of the police, 
which could be argued as being their level of trust, is a major factor to 
establishing an individual’s level of satisfaction. This, they say, is because a 
person will interpret a recent experience they have had with the police based on 
their pre-conceived ideas and opinions. Skogan (2005) also states that a 
person’s general view of the police can have a greater impact on their 
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interpretation of a recent police encounter rather than the actual performance of 
the officer(s) involved at the time. Individuals may read their experiences in the 
light of their prior expectations. Their level of trust, more than recent experiences, 
affect their expectations and therefore their level of satisfaction. Brandl et al 
(1994) states the public will stereotype the police and selectively perceive their 
own experiences, looking to confirm any biases they carry when having contact 
with them. From this it could be concluded that providing a quality service does 
not matter as much to a person’s levels of satisfaction as does their individual 
views of the police. It suggests that to improve satisfaction police should focus 
on the public’s perception of them, their trust and confidence, rather than just on 
the quality of service being delivered.   
 
Neighbourhood conditions 
Hinds (2009) says people’s assessment of crime in their neighbourhood 
influence their levels of satisfaction with the police. Dukes and Portillos (2009) 
add to this by stating that satisfaction with the police is shaped by the type of 
neighbourhood and community in which people live. They propose that residents 
of ‘socially disorganised communities’ are less likely to experience community 
involvement in policing and are, thus, less likely to be satisfied. However, Rowe 
(2004) and Hawdon (2008) strongly disagree with this as they say there is, in 
fact, no consensus as to why attitudes toward the police can vary by 
neighbourhood.  
 
Dukes and Portillos (2009) agree with Hinds’ (2009) initial assessment, and 
highlight the impact that fear of crime and community safety can have on levels 
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of satisfaction with the police. They state satisfaction is shaped by citizen’s 
victimisation experiences, feelings of safety, estimates of the ability of police to 
reduce crime and response to calls for service. However, an increase in policing 
may have a negative effect, as they state the introduction of extra police 
resources often produces an increased media coverage of crime. This results in 
people becoming more concerned about their safety and thereby increasing their 
fear and decreasing their satisfaction.  
 
Reisig and Park (2000) state lower levels of satisfaction with police were reported 
in neighbourhoods of concentrated poverty and disadvantage. Within these 
communities, mistrust of the police was associated with higher levels of crime 
and disorder. Murphy (2009) states that examining differences of opinion with 
the police along demographic lines such as race, age and social class, provides 
useful information about who may view the police in a positive or negative light. 
However, Wells (2007) points out that this evidence by itself is limited, as it does 
not provide explanations with regards to why the differences exist. 
 
So, people’s assessment of crime in their neighbourhood influences their 
satisfaction levels with the police (Hinds 2009). This appears to support Donovan 
et al (2003) performance theory in that satisfaction is directly linked to the police’s 
perceived performance within a certain neighbourhood. However, the way in 
which local conditions may affect the victim also appears to support attribution 
theory. While victims try to search for reasons to explain why their experience 
with the police turned out the way it did, some of it is attributed to the manner in 
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which their neighbourhood is being policed and the perceived success the police 
are having.  
 
Police legitimacy 
Hinds (2009) says that the third factor contributing to levels of public satisfaction 
with the police is the degree to which the public view the police as a legitimate 
authority. This is the extent to which people’s judgements about the police 
induces an obligation to defer to and comply with police directives and decisions 
(Tyler 2006). Legitimacy is considered by some as the foundation of police 
authority and demonstrates to people why the police’s access to and exercise of 
power is rightful, and why people have a corresponding duty to obey (Tyler 2006). 
Under these principles, people obey the law not because they should, or due to 
fear of sanction or personal morality regarding the law. Instead, they do so 
because they believe it is the right thing to do. 
 
Hinds and Murphy (2007) say legitimacy is a key aspect to policing by consent, 
which then increases trust in the police, and thus cooperation and voluntary 
compliance with the law. They say institutional legitimacy as a basic social value, 
learned during childhood, is evidenced by the extent to which people are willing 
to accept the authority of individual police officers. As people grow older both 
direct and indirect experiences shape individual’s judgements of police 
legitimacy. The actions of individual officers therefore have a direct impact on 
increasing or lowering a person’s judgement of police legitimacy.  
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It is interesting to note that Tyler (2006) found people’s satisfaction with police 
was not primarily related to the outcome of an encounter but, rather, whether 
they perceived that police treated them correctly, with procedural justice. He 
states treating people with dignity and respect are key aspects to positive 
procedural justice which thus improves legitimacy. Murphy (2009) develops this 
view by picking up on Rosenbaum’s et al (2005) point regarding who initiates the 
contact. She states that with regards to police initiated contact, procedural justice 
is more important than police performance, whilst police performance was found 
to be more important to people than procedural justice in relation to citizen 
initiated contacts. It could therefore be concluded that Murphy (2009) would say 
a victim of crime will be more satisfied with a successful investigation into their 
crime, rather than how they were treated.  
 
It can be argued there is a connection between procedural justice and attribution 
theory. A person appears to be giving the service provider, the police, either 
credit or blame for the service received by means of how procedures were 
perceived to have been followed. However, Murphy (2009) is clear this is more 
relevant to police initiated contact, whilst public initiated contact focuses on 
performance. So, aspects of procedural justice also appear to factor within 
Donovan’s et al (2003) performance theory, as a victim tries to confirm their 
expectations of a service by the provider’s perceived performance, which is 
directly related to officers being polite, attentive and willing to explain what is 
going on.  
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Summary 
How does this impact on the police and the way they measure victim satisfaction? 
Cao (2015) says the practice of using confidence, trust and satisfaction in the 
police as interchangeable concepts is more than irritating, it reflects a penchant 
for imprecision in terminology and carelessness in conceptualisation. Fleming 
and McLaughlin (2012) warn that ‘public confidence’ and ‘public trust’ are 
complicated and demanding concepts that are connected to a variety of other 
psycho-social concepts, namely, opinions, perceptions, sentiments, 
expectations, judgment and satisfaction. Thus, both ‘confidence’ and ‘trust’ tend 
to be used in an inter-changeable manner because of the difficulties associated 
with the two concepts.  
 
The BRM satisfaction gap was intended to indicate the levels of trust and 
confidence amongst ‘minority ethnic communities’ (Macpherson 1999). 
However, this chapter has shown there is indeed a great deal of difference 
between confidence, trust and satisfaction and an apparent need to heed Cao’s 
(2015) warning and acknowledge their individual uniqueness to ensure 
appropriate policy design within the police. The chapter also described how 
legitimacy and procedural justice appear to have obvious links to victim 
satisfaction and trust. As Sunshine and Tyler (2003) state, the police use of unfair 
procedures, when exercising their authority, can lead to alienation, 
dissatisfaction, defiance and non-cooperation from the public. However, having 
examined the factors of public perception, neighbourhood conditions and 
legitimacy, the improvement of victim satisfaction appears to involve more issues 
than just the quality of service provided at a specific time. This appears to be 
 79 
supported by the examination of trust. There is a strong view presented that 
individual’s needs differ, depending on their culture or neighbourhood. This 
suggests a police policy of using a ‘one size fits all’ approach towards a victim of 
crime may not be a viable way to improve confidence, trust and satisfaction within 
BRM communities. 
 
Chapter four will examine how the BRM satisfaction gap was implemented by 
the Home Office and Merseyside Police. It will highlight that the Merseyside 
Police policy of providing a ‘gold service’, which was introduced as a way of 
narrowing the gap, did indeed appear to use a ‘one size fits all’ approach for BRM 
victims of crime.  
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Chapter 4. How was it implemented? 
 
Introduction 
Chapter two explained how the Macpherson enquiry built upon a legacy of 
dissatisfaction with the police, from some commentators, regarding the way in 
which BRM communities were being policed.  The report departed from the 
accepted notion of the ‘rotten apple’ by expressing concerns of institutional 
racism within the people, policies and practices that enabled the business of 
policing to be done (Macpherson 1999). However, Bartkowiak-Theron and 
Asquith (2014) point out that the subsequent silo approach to diversity and 
cultural awareness, along with the quota models that emerged from the 
Macpherson recommendations, proved inadequate for the increasing 
differentiation of modern societies. Instead it, arguably, led to a practice 
whereby the important but hard issues were ignored by police organisations in 
favour of trivial but achievable ones (Reiner 2010). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how Merseyside Police implemented 
the recommendations to reduce the BRM satisfaction gap set by the Home 
Office (2008a, 2008b). It will first look at how trust, confidence and satisfaction 
can be surveyed in the police and specifically examine the issue of victim 
satisfaction and the guidelines provided by the Home Office. These aspired to 
set a national common standard to enable data comparability for all police 
forces.  
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The chapter will then examine some of the policies and working practices 
implemented by Merseyside Police to narrow their BRM satisfaction gap. It will 
show that a policy of providing a ‘gold service’ to BRM victims of crime was 
introduced, even though there was opinion that such a practice may not work. 
It will further describe the Customer Service Recovery Opportunity (CSRO) 
which was used with the intention of addressing poor service that had been 
provided, thereby positively impact on performance data. Finally, the chapter 
will consider whether the performance management processes introduced by 
Merseyside Police produced a working practice that allowed them to positively 
influence performance data by way of ‘reactive subversion’ or ‘gaming’ (Bevan 
and Hood, 2006) or whether it was just an example of robust implementation of 
Home Office guidelines. 
 
Measuring trust, confidence and satisfaction 
 
Duffy et al (2008) state that measuring levels of satisfaction is important and 
relevant to the police service as public satisfaction and confidence in the police 
is the main driver for the public’s overall view of the criminal justice system, as 
measured by the UK Government. However, they say there is a problem as 
recorded levels of confidence and satisfaction with the police tend to fall when 
the public have personal contact with them. This means that, according to their 
research, victims are less favourably disposed to the police once they have had 
contact with them. Duffy et al (2008) expresses concern as this pattern tends not 
to be the case when the public have contact with other Government departments 
and may suggest the police service is less effective than people expect or believe 
it to be. 
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As explained in chapter three, if satisfaction with the police service is assessed 
by establishing a person’s opinion about how police deal with a subject specific 
problem (i.e. burglary, domestic violence, drugs etc.) then instrumental 
concerns, such as police integrity, will contribute more to an expression of their 
confidence with the police than views based on their immediate experience, or 
satisfaction, of the service provided to them (Hinds and Murphy 2007). More 
importantly, with regard to the BRM satisfaction gap, they propose that some 
BRM groups will make more negative judgements about the police than others. 
Although this could be explained by Fukuyama’s (1995) proposal in chapter 
three of high and low trust communities, it could also be due to suspicion of the 
police due to historical problems as raised by Scarman (1981) and Macpherson 
(1999). Regardless, this does appear to mirror Brandl et al (1994) views on 
conformation biases of judging the quality of police contact. It indeed questions 
what is actually being measured when a person is questioned or surveyed, is it 
trust, confidence or satisfaction with the police? 
 
Different ways to measure trust, confidence and satisfaction 
Jackson et al (2013) state there are three general approaches to the 
measurement of trust, confidence and satisfaction with the police. The first treats 
public confidence as unproblematically related to simple concepts of satisfaction 
with service, general support and personal statements of confidence. This 
approach, as used by the, then, British Crime Survey (BCS), assumes that 
attitudes can be summed up by a single question around the principle of ‘how 
good a job are they doing’.  
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Hough et al (2007) state that the BCS has been an invaluable source of data for 
research and policy development since 1982. Whilst it has served the purpose 
in establishing a measure of crime, which includes unreported crime, it has also 
incorporated a number of innovative features including the measurement of 
public perception with the police (Thorpe and Hall. 2009). These questions have 
varied over time, ranging from ratings of the local police in terms of the simplistic 
‘how good a job are they doing’ to perceptions of specific aspects of policing. But, 
they say, in recent years these questions have allowed statistics to be published 
which show whether the public’s level of confidence in the police was improving 
or declining year on year. However, Skogan (2007) warns that surveys which try 
to monitor public confidence in police performance are often based on the 
participant’s perception rather than opinion acquired by personal experience. 
Although it is acknowledged that perceptions are important and real in their 
consequence, there is still an issue of the validity of such a question to the point 
that Skogan (2007) questions whether surveys examining the quality of policing, 
measure what they claim to. 
 
Jackson et al (2013) say the second approach to measuring trust, confidence 
and satisfaction shares similar aims to the first, but tends to use a more complex 
set of measures. For example, constructing a level of satisfaction from a variety 
of items, such as police engagement with the local neighbourhood, effectiveness 
in dealing with crime and disorder, and response to crime victims. This approach 
appears to mirror what was proposed by recommendation 2 of the Macpherson 
Report when it set 10 performance indicators to monitor and assess the new 
Ministerial Priority (Macpherson 1999). 
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The third approach proposed by Jackson et al (2013) is, they say, a more 
comprehensive and theoretically informed exploration of what trust, confidence 
and satisfaction means. This is most strongly associated with the work of Tom 
Tyler under the principle of police legitimacy, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Tyler (2006, 2011) says that legitimacy is the foundation of police 
authority and demonstrates to people why the police’s access to and exercise of 
power is rightful, and why people have a corresponding duty to obey this. As 
previously explained, under these principles people obey the law not because 
they feel they have to, but because they believe it is the right thing to do. It is the 
level of this that indicates the amount of trust and confidence the community has 
with the police. Tyler (2006) states there are two approaches used to measure 
police legitimacy. The first measures overall public judgments about the police 
and the law. These judgments reflect the key issues of obligation to obey, trust 
and confidence, and feelings. The second approach measures the public’s views 
about aspects of the police and police behaviour that are potentially related to 
police legitimacy in a community setting. However, Tyler (2006) states that any 
survey would first need a validation survey where links between legitimacy and 
the behavior of a community are established to produce accurate data. 
 
The importance of police legitimacy is a principle widely accepted by many to 
explain why the public obey the law (Tyler 2011, Brain 2010, Hough and Roberts 
2007). However, even though this may indeed be a more comprehensive and 
theoretically informed exploration of what trust, confidence and satisfaction 
means, as proposed by Jackson et al (2013), data collection is still reliant on a 
survey style methodology and therefore Brandl et al (1994) would argue that the 
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problem of confirmation bias remains. However, conversely it could also be 
argued that it is this bias and negative judgment of the police, which some BRM 
communities hold (Hinds and Murphy 2007), that police legitimacy would 
measure. 
 
Public confidence surveys 
Regardless of this debate, the Home Office still preferred to use Jackson et al 
(2013) first approach, of asking a single question, when measuring public 
confidence. In 2009, they introduced a single confidence target for all police 
organisations, with a challenge for there to be an overall national increase in the 
confidence rating of 12% (Brain 2010). This was intended, in part, to make the 
performance management process leaner by reducing the number of 
performance indicators to just this one. However, the confusion over what 
confidence is, as discussed in chapter three, appeared to question what was 
being measured. The data informing the performance indicator was obtained 
from the BCS question “How much would you agree or disagree that the police 
and local council are dealing with anti-social behaviour and crime issue that 
matter in this area?” (Hough and Roberts 2007). It is unclear whether this general 
question accepts the participant’s perception or bias of the police as part of public 
confidence or ignores it as unimportant. However, this survey question presented 
other data collection problems. The data collected was used to measure general 
‘confidence’ in the police, but it was argued that as the question combined ’police’ 
with ‘local authority’ it was questionable as to which agency the data related to. 
Indeed, how would a person answer if they possessed a high level of confidence 
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towards the police but strongly disagreed with the political views of the local 
authority (Brain 2010)?  
 
Victim surveys 
Types of victims: Structurally neutral / structurally informed 
Walklate (2007) states there are two not mutually exclusive but nevertheless 
competing images of the victim of crime which inform the policy process. One 
is a structurally neutral image of the victim that may well apply to all. The other 
is a structurally informed one, which implies there are certain groups or sections 
of society for whom the harm done by criminal victimisation is a differential 
experience and has a different impact when compared to others. This image 
proposes that not all of those sharing the same levels of vulnerability will deal 
with a similar victimising event in the same way. Their needs will vary according 
to their own personal coping skills and those of people around them, meaning, 
even in the case of the vulnerable, they are not fixed entities. However, 
matching service delivery to an individual’s needs, in any service delivery 
context, is fraught with difficulties, and the same is true for victims of crime. 
 
The notion of the structurally informed victim appears to question the standard 
victim survey methodology where each participant is asked the same set of 
questions and the same inference is taken from the answers provided. Two 
different victims receiving the same service may judge it differently depending 
on their needs and the impact their victimisation experience has had on them. 
Thus, although matching a police service to a victim’s needs may be difficult, it 
might be a better option than providing the same service to all and thereby 
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ignoring the individual victim’s fears and judgements. This was the stated aim 
of the New Labour government when they introduced Citizen Focus policing in 
2006. 
 
Home Office guidance and Citizen Focus policing 
As discussed in chapter two, the Citizen Focus Good Practice Guide (Home 
Office 2006) states citizen focus policing means reflecting the needs and 
expectations of individuals and local communities in decision-making, service 
delivery and practice. The objectives were to improve public confidence, 
increase satisfaction of service users and to increase public involvement in 
policing. Success, as to whether individual police organisations achieved a 
satisfactory level of service, was measured by the Policing Performance 
Assessment Framework (PPAF) with the data obtained largely from user 
satisfaction surveys of victims of crime along with public confidence in policing 
(Home Office 2006). The guide went on to detail how PPAF would group the 
survey data obtained: 
 
• User satisfaction 
➢ Ease of contacting the police 
➢ The initial action taken 
➢ Being kept informed of progress 
➢ Treatment by staff 
➢ The overall experience 
 
• Confidence 
➢ The percentage of people who think their local police are doing a 
good job (data extracted from the British Crime Survey) 
 
• Fairness and equality 
➢ Satisfaction of victims of racist incidents with overall service 
➢ Satisfaction of black and minority ethnic groups compared to 
white population with overall service 
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➢ Percentage of Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 
searches that lead to arrest by ethnicity 
➢ Comparison of sanction detection rates for violence against the 
person offences, by ethnicity of victim. 
 
Home Office (2006) p4 
 
 
This set of measurements appear to be an example of Jackson’s et al (2013) 
second approach to the measurement of trust, confidence and satisfaction, and 
had already been used as performance indicators when the Home Office 
published performance assessments for all police forces in October 2005 
(Home Office 2006). This had the benefit of the headings being familiar to the 
police service, which increased the possibility of police forces having the 
necessary policies in place. 
 
The guide clearly stated it would be victim satisfaction surveys which provided 
the data to populate the satisfaction element of the PPAF indicator. To assist 
with this, it provided advice on those activities it considered could make a 
difference to user satisfaction and public confidence. It explained that previous 
in-depth, quantitative analysis of user satisfaction survey data had been 
completed in four police forces, which had confirmed what the ‘drivers of 
satisfaction’ for a victim were (Home Office 2006). The guide went on to say 
that they had found relatively little evidence of individual police forces 
successfully focusing on closing the BRM satisfaction gap. It then encourages 
each police force to take a structurally informed view of the BRM victim in 
highlighting work by the Metropolitan Police. Focus groups had been 
undertaken by them within specific BRM communities which, they said, had 
produced a number of priorities for the force, at both a strategic and tactical 
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level, that was specifically important to each of the communities. This research 
suggested that the following components should be focused on to deliver a 
high-quality service to victims of racially aggravated crimes: 
 
• A clear and consistent definition of a racist crime and a religious 
crime; 
 
• Prompt response to reports of racist crimes and the victim to be 
informed in the event of any delay; 
 
• Regular updates, using a method of communication chosen by the 
victim; 
 
• Considering the use of designated trained officers to deal with the 
victims of racist crimes; 
 
• A continuous programme of diversity training for all officers; and 
 
• Appropriate rewards and sanctions for officers and systems that 
support cultural change linked to diversity 
 
Home Office (2006) p39 
 
Whilst this does appear to be a list of actions to ensure victims of racially 
aggravated crimes are not treated in a structurally neutral way, it does appear 
to be an almost random list of police activities and policy. However, the notion 
of compliance against a list of quantitative activities and policies, produced by 
a proposed empirical process, figured as a common theme over the coming 
years as the police service tried to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap.  
 
Victim Satisfaction Surveys 
In March 2008, the Home Office published Guidance on Statutory Performance 
Indicators for Policing and Community safety 2008/09 (Home Office 2008a). 
This provided technical guidance and relevant advice in respect of Police 
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Authority statutory performance indicators (SPI) published in The Police 
Authorities (Best Value) Performance Indicators Order 2008 (Home Office 
2008). SPI 1.2 was stated as being: 
 
“Comparison of satisfaction between white users and users from minority ethnic 
groups with the overall service provided by the service” 
(Home Office 2008a p9) 
 
In June 2008, the Home Office further published Definitions and Survey 
Guidance for APACS Measures of User Satisfaction Surveys (Home Office 
2008b). This was intended to assist the replacement of PPAF with the 
Assessments of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) that used the data 
provided by SPI’s to populate the new performance assessment framework for 
policing and community safety. It promised that APACS would simplify the 
performance landscape for the police and would align with other performance 
frameworks. More importantly, it emphasised that user satisfaction surveys 
would be the method used to measure the improvement of satisfaction within 
the police and criminal justice system. It said it would be achieved by comparing 
individual force performance with peers, identifying weak areas, highlighting the 
causes through the use of diagnostic questions, and providing service recovery 
through dialogue with dissatisfied users. To this end it highlighted three 
performance indicators which would measure this, with SPI 1.2 clearly showing 
the BRM satisfaction gap would remain important to the service police: 
 
• SPI 1.1 Percentage of users that are satisfied with the overall 
service provided by the police 
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• SPI1.2 Comparison of satisfaction between white users and users 
from minority ethnic groups with the overall service 
provided by the police 
 
• SPI 1.3 Satisfaction of victims of racist incidents with the overall 
service provided by the police 
 
Home Office (2008b p3) 
Indeed, if the intention of APACS was to simplify the performance landscape 
for the police, this was not immediately apparent when it came to victim 
satisfaction and the survey process. 
 
User Groups to be Surveyed 
The guidance gives the requirement for each force to conduct user satisfaction 
surveys using the same methodology and mandatory interview script. This was 
to ensure consistency between forces in order to create comparable data for 
use in APACS (Home Office 2008b). It states the user satisfaction survey would 
consider the full service, from start to finish, that each participant had 
experienced and not just the initial stage of police involvement. To do this, 
questionnaires were to be structured around a mandatory framework, seeking 
responses across the five stages of service which has been previously listed as 
the PPAF user satisfaction measures.  
 
These were; 
1. Initial contact 
2. Actions 
3. Follow up 
4. Treatment  
5. Whole Experience 
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The guidance stated that victims of the following five categories would form the 
‘user groups’ to be surveyed (Home Office 2008b); 
 
1. Domestic Burglary 
2. Violent Crime 
3. Vehicle Crime 
4. Road Traffic Collisions (RTC) 
5. Racist Incidents 
 
The user satisfaction surveys would be conducted with victims between six and 
twelve weeks after they had reported the crime to the police. Each victim had 
to be at least 16 years old (Home Office 2008b).  
 
The issue of who was considered to be an eligible respondent for the survey 
received further detailed guidance from the Home Office. It was stated, where 
possible, police forces should exclude the following victims from any data set 
to be surveyed. 
 
Table 4.1: Excluded Victim Satisfaction Survey Victims 
 
• Where the offender was another family member e.g. sibling/parent/child 
 
• Those who have indicated that they are unwilling to be surveyed (where 
this is recorded) or where there is a note on the record that the case is 
unsuitable for research (where this is recorded). Some forces may choose 
to use “opposed publicity” as a proxy for cases unsuitable for survey 
contact. 
 
• The offender was a member of the police service or police authority 
 
• Forces and authorities retain the discretion to exclude other victims where 
a survey is likely to cause distress. Candidates for exclusion can usually 
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be gained from crime desk, crime reports, road traffic collisions (RTC) 
reports and call logs. 
 
• It is recommended the following are considered for exclusion: 
➢ Elderly victims who may be considered vulnerable 
➢ Victims who have made a formal complaint against police 
regarding this incident or crime 
➢ Victims who are considered vulnerable which could be for any 
logical and explainable reason i.e. victims with mental health 
problems, someone who has recently been a victim of domestic 
violence (not included in the existing sensitive exclusion) 
➢ Victims who have requested no further police action 
➢ Victims who will not co-operate with the police investigation 
➢ Victims already contacted several times in 12 months 
➢ When the incident is part of an ongoing neighbour dispute 
➢ When the crime involved very serious injury 
➢ When the burglary was of an unoccupied local authority 
property 
➢ When the victim of a vehicle crime was a business rather than 
an individual 
➢ RTC which involved police vehicle collisions or which were in 
any way due to the presence of a police vehicle 
➢ RTC where the vehicle was parked at the time of collision 
➢ RTC where no other vehicle was involved 
➢ RTC where the collision occurred in a private car park 
➢ RTC where the collision involved a stolen car 
 
Home Office (2008b p2) 
 
 
The guide also recommended that each force should keep a record of which 
victims were excluded from the sample and retain this for 12 months after the 
year end, for verification purposes. 
 
Although the guide initially states it is providing a robust methodology, with the 
intention of producing data of a common standard that could be compared 
nationally, the detailed list of victims for exclusion from the survey appears to 
contradict this. Once a victim of the correct type of crime and age has been 
identified, there is then a sifting process which gives numerous reasons why a 
victim should be excluded from participating in the survey. The fact that a force 
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retains the individual discretion to exclude a victim from a survey, for the stated 
reason that they themselves deem it would be a distressing process for the 
victim, appears questionable. No advice is given as to how this discretion may 
be applied, it therefore appears each police force are allowed to develop their 
own working practices. More importantly, the exclusion of victims who have 
made a complaint against the police, have requested no further police action or 
have failed to cooperate with the investigation, is even more troubling. Chapter 
two has highlighted the issue of why BRM communities can have a difficult 
relationship with police, perceive a poorer level of service and be suspicious of 
policing motives (Rowe 2004, Bowling and Philips 2002, 2003). By excluding 
victims who have immediately expressed dissatisfaction by making a complaint, 
or perhaps have such a low level of trust with the police they decline further 
assistance, or have no confidence so choose not to cooperate with the 
investigation, raises concerns. No reason is given as to why victims who fall 
into these categories should be ignored, leaving the reader to question the 
motives of this. 
 
Minimum Standards and Best Practice 
In order for the Home Office to ensure comparability and validity of results from 
the data produced by the victim satisfaction surveys, all forces were required to 
conduct them via the telephone (Home Office 2008b). These interviews were 
required to be carried out by either trained field workers or a recognised market 
research company. For those organisations who wished to use a research 
company, the Home Office circulated a list of private service suppliers and an 
agreed set of costs to provide a common delivery standard for all. Forces who 
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already had contracts in place for out-sourced surveys were not required to 
curtail them, but expected to move to the national standard at the end of that 
contractual period. The Home Office (2008b) stated the use of a coordinated 
approach provided the police service with the opportunity to work with the 
private sector in developing processes and standards, thereby reducing costs 
via economies of scale. The use of such language clearly shows the influence 
which the principles of NPM had on this policy.  
 
There was further guidance provided with regards to the questionnaire 
framework to be used for each interview by every police force to, again, ensure 
comparability of data. This was based around a set of mandatory core 
satisfaction questions (table 4.2), that mirrored the previous PPAF user 
satisfaction measures, with a victim’s response being measured against a 
standard response scale (table 4.3). It was stated these mandatory questions 
would give each force the information to act and change policy to improve the 
services delivered. 
 
Table 4.2: Standard Wording for Core Questions 
 
The following core questions, in the given order, should be asked of all users: 
 
 
INITIAL CONTACT 
Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with how easy it was to contact 
someone who could assist you? 
 
ACTIONS 
Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with the actions taken by the police? 
 
FOLLOW UP 
Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with how well you were kept informed 
of progress? 
 
TREATMENT 
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Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with the way you were treated by the 
police officers and staff who dealt with you? 
 
 
WHOLE EXPERIENCE 
Taking the whole experience into account, are you satisfied, dissatisfied, or 
neither with the service provided by the police in this case? 
 
Home Office (2008b p17) 
 
Table 4.3: Scale of measurement 
 
The core questions should have response options which use the 7 point scale 
(+ don’t know) listed below: 
 
Completely satisfied 
Very satisfied 
Fairly satisfied 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
Fairly dissatisfied 
Very dissatisfied 
Completely dissatisfied 
Don’t know 
 
The responses should be presented to respondents as follows: 
“Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither?” 
 
For those who say satisfied, follow-up with: 
“And is that completely, very or fairly satisfied?” 
 
For those who say dissatisfied, follow-up with: 
“And is that completely, very or fairly dissatisfied?” 
 
The telephone script will not offer the “don’t know” response, but any 
respondents not giving a response on the 7-point should be recorded as 
“don’t know.” 
Home Office (2008b p18) 
 
In addition, police forces were given the opportunity to supplement the core 
questions with further diagnostic questions. Also, they were allowed to ask 
further questions on unrelated areas, with the caveat that it had to be done after 
completion of the initial user satisfaction questionnaire. 
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The Home Office (2008b) presents, what appears to be, a detailed and 
considered methodology for the victim satisfaction surveys, clearly intended to 
produce data allowing individual force performance to be compared nationally. 
However, the methodology appears to ignore the warning of Hinds and Murphy 
(2007) who stated that by focusing on subject specific problems, as in domestic 
burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime, RTC and racist incidents, it may produce 
an expression of confidence rather than views based on immediate experience 
(satisfaction). Also, this prescribed methodology appeared to take a structurally 
neutral stance towards the victim by asking set questions with a fixed scale of 
measurement. The influence of confirmation bias (Brandl et al 1994) on a 
victim’s answer and the effect that mistrust within some BRM communities may 
have with the police (Hinds and Murphy 2007), do not appear to be factored 
into the methodology. This results in the reader questioning whether the 
guidance achieved the stated aim of providing a structure which obtained data 
of a common standard to allow comparison.   
 
The problems of measuring performance 
Bevan and Hood (2006) state the performance management of public services, 
which developed in the 2000s from the principles of NPM, contained a real 
element of terror. The regime was one of target setting against which 
performance was measured and then published to either reward or shame the 
person or organisation deemed accountable. Such a style of governance by 
targets assumes that the setting of targets will change the behaviour of the 
individual or organisation, whilst gaming, the reactive subversion of 
performance data, can be kept to an acceptably low level.  
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Eterno and Silverman (2012, p85 - 97) highlight similarities for the UK police 
service between this performance management style and that of Compare 
Statistic or ‘Compstat’, introduced by the New Your Police Department (NYPD) 
in the 2000s. Compstat was a managerial system of holding police 
commanders personally accountable, based on a four-part mantra of accurate 
and timely intelligence, effective tactics, rapid deployment and relentless follow-
up and measurement. It placed intense pressure on the commanders to show 
results, with an unwritten rule that if the number of crimes went up then careers 
would be finished whilst crime reduction would be rewarded with promotion. 
This, Eterno and Silverman (2012) says, led to an enormous temptation to 
examine all recorded crime reports closely and to then manipulate the data to 
the benefit of the organisation. 
 
However, Bevan and Hood (2006) propose that, to some level, manipulation 
and gaming is inevitable as actors tend to change their conduct when they know 
the data they produce will be used, in return, to control them. To that end, they 
highlight three known gaming problems which can influence performance data. 
Ratchet effects refer to the practice of basing the following year’s targets on the 
previous year’s performance. This may give managers, who expect to still be in 
post the following year, an incentive not to exceed targets even if it was easily 
achievable. Threshold effect refers to the influence of targets on the distribution 
of performance among a range of production units. Pressure is put on those 
performing below target to do better, whilst those who are out performing the 
target are allowed to let their performance slip. Finally output distortions result 
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from attempts to achieve the measured target at the cost of other significant but 
unmeasured aspects of performance, an example of what gets measured gets 
done. Foster, Newburn and Souhami (2005) suggested in chapter two that 
police forces have a tendency to focus attention on measured performance that 
is most obviously identifiable and achievable. This is an example of output 
distortions as highlighted by Bevan and Hood (2006), who conclude that the 
setting of targets and performance measurement invites such working practices 
within service-providing units. This will always be the case unless there is a 
large amount of transparency embedded in the performance management 
process. 
 
However, the extent to which manipulation and gaming may exist in an 
organisation depends on a mixture of motive and opportunity with four types of 
motivation being distinguished by Bevan and Hood (2006 p522-523). 
 
1. ‘Saints’: may not share all of the goals of the organisation but their public 
service ethos is so high they voluntarily disclose performance 
shortcomings. 
2. ‘Honest triers’: broadly share the goals of the organisation, do not 
voluntarily draw attention to their failures, but do not attempt to spin or 
fiddle data in their favour. 
3. ‘Reactive gamers’: broadly share the goals of the organisation but aim 
to game the target system if they have reason or opportunity to do so. 
4. ‘Rational maniacs’: do not share the goals of the organisation and aim 
to manipulate data to conceal their real performance. 
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LeGrand (2003) agrees with Bevan and Hood (2006) by stating that governance 
by targets, do indeed, change individuals behaviour. This may not be good for 
the organisation. Rewarding those who produce the right numbers for target 
achievement, as highlighted by Compstat, may turn honest triers into reactive 
gamers or even rational maniacs. Indeed, Eterno and Silverman (2012) warn 
that the champions of Compstat, NPM and governance by targets, tended to 
underestimate the ingenuity of individuals to engage in statistical chicanery, 
particularly when contracts and careers could be at stake. 
 
Merseyside Police response 
Victim Satisfaction Survey 
Due to the lack of available documentation from Merseyside Police, it is difficult 
to empirically reference how the victim satisfaction survey developed. However, 
as later chapters show, there had been a form of user satisfaction survey in 
place for several years prior to the introduction of the Citizen Focus agenda. By 
the end of 2008 Merseyside Police victim satisfaction survey, which was being 
completed on a monthly basis by a private company, was deemed to be 
compliant with the Home Office guidance (Merseyside Police, 2008). Detailed 
victim satisfaction survey data, published for each BCU, was broken down into 
the ‘stages of service’ for each victim. These mirrored the standard wording for 
core questions, as highlighted in table 4.2, (Home Office 2008b p17) of first 
contact, actions take, follow-up, treatment and whole experience.  
 
In line with Home Office guidance each stage of service was further broken 
down into ‘critical inputs’, where the victim was asked if specific actions or 
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activities had been completed by the reporting officer. The accepted answers 
were yes, no, not applicable, don’t know or refused.  For example, within the 
stage of service ‘actions taken’ a victim was specifically asked what the 
reporting officer had done: 
 
• Did they tell you what was going to happen next and why? 
• Did they make you feel reassured? 
• Did they give you practical help? 
• Did they give you a crime or reference number? 
• Did they give you contact details for someone who would be dealing with 
your case? 
• Did they offer contact details for Victim Support? 
• Did they offer advice? 
• Did they investigate the scene of the crime? 
(Merseyside Police 2008b p8 -9) 
 
Following these questions, the core question for ‘actions taken’ was asked 
which was then measured against the seven-point scale in table 4.3. 
 
“Thinking about what the police did after they had been given the initial details, 
are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with the actions taken by the police?”       
Merseyside Police (2008b p9). 
 
The victim satisfaction survey data was published monthly, with each BCU Area 
Commander being held to account for their performance on both a monthly and 
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quarterly basis by an Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) (Merseyside Police 
2008). In line with Eterno and Silverman’s (2012) description of Compstat, the 
review of a BCU’s performance was often completed in the presence of the 
other BCU Commanders, with detailed explanations being required to explain 
both good and poor performance. Within this performance management 
regime, data was looked at in detail and the issue of how to narrow the BRM 
satisfaction gap received increased focus. 
 
The BRM Satisfaction Gap 
Merseyside Police made BRM satisfaction, as measured by the victim 
satisfaction survey, one of the six themes forming part of the Citizen Focus 
Strategic Assessment for 2008 to 2009 (Merseyside Police 2008a). With the 
intention of improving performance, a BRM Satisfaction Action Plan was 
developed and a ‘Citizen Focus Champion’ appointed in each BCU. These 
‘champions’ were held responsible for the implementation of the action plan, 
with progress being monitored by the Citizen Focus Program Board, chaired by 
an ACC (Merseyside Police 2009). 
 
The BRM Satisfaction Action Plan picked up the direction set by the Home 
Office in the Citizen Focus guide (Home Office 2006) by targeting those 
individual activities which the chosen research had deemed important for BRM 
victims of crime. Merseyside Police believed previous analysis of the victim 
satisfaction data had highlighted several critical inputs which had a 
disproportionately positive influence on BRM satisfaction levels (Merseyside 
Police 2008a). These were: 
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Table 4.4: Critical inputs which had a positive influence on BRM 
satisfaction 
 
 
Stage of Service Critical Inputs 
Ease of Contact • Given advice while waiting 
• Dealt with in a reasonable time 
• First person polite 
• First person sympathetic 
Actions Taken • Carry out an investigation of the scene 
• Offer advice 
• Reassure victim 
• Satisfied with arrival time 
• Provided practical help 
Follow-up • Knew who to contact for updates 
• Police initiated further contact 
• Phone calls returned in a reasonable time 
• Inform victim what will be done 
Treatment • Appear to take the matter seriously 
Merseyside Police (2008a p8) 
 
 
This list shows that it had been decided, when dealing with a BRM victim of 
crime, if the reporting or investigating police officer complied with each critical 
input then the victim of crime was more likely to be satisfied, thereby narrowing 
the BRM satisfaction gap. However, this plan of action appears to ignore many 
concerns.  
 
Myhill (2007) found there were no obvious differences in expectations of the 
police service between white and BRM victims and non-victims of crime. When 
he had interviewed some BRM respondents he observed that cultural issues 
influenced the nature of contacts with the police as much as the service 
experienced. This would have come as no surprise to Fukuyama (1995). Myhill 
(2007) recommended forces should examine their user-satisfaction data to see 
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whether there are local issues, practical or cultural factors that may be 
responsible for some BRM victims experiencing a less satisfactory service.  
 
It may be argued that Merseyside Police were taking more of a structurally 
informed approach towards the BRM victim, as previously described by 
Walklate (2007). By establishing a list of activities, they stated were important 
to the satisfaction of BRM victims of crime, there was acknowledgement that 
victimisation was a differential experience to that section of society. However, 
the sweeping assumption that compliance with the critical inputs would improve 
satisfaction with all BRM victims, clearly nullifies this argument. Also, although 
the guidance states they have a positive influence on BRM satisfaction levels 
(Merseyside Police 2008a), it does not state what effect the inputs have on non-
BRM victims of crime, if this was the same then any satisfaction gap may not 
narrow. The recommendations appear to also ignore the issue of confirmation 
bias raised by Brandl et al (1994) or the negative opinions of some BRM 
communities as highlighted by Hinds and Murphy (2007). Thus, it can be 
concluded that a straight forward, structurally neutral, approach was taken to 
the victim, in order to narrow the satisfaction gap. However, in these 
circumstances it is difficult to understand how a better service for all victims 
would narrow the BRM satisfaction gap, unless BRM victims were receiving a 
service that was being perceived better compared to the white victim of crime. 
 
Gold service 
In February 2009, the BCU’s of Liverpool North and Liverpool South were 
tasked by Merseyside Police Assistant Chief Constable for Citizen Focus, to 
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identify a ‘premium service’ for BRM victims of crime that would assist in 
narrowing the BRM satisfaction gap. The subsequent proposal document 
acknowledged that a victim of crime, from any community, required a quality 
service to be able to express a high level of satisfaction. However, there were 
also proposals as to how a BRM victim of crime could receive an improved or 
‘gold service’ compared to white victim, and thereby narrow the satisfaction gap 
(Merseyside Police 2009). 
 
The recommendations appear to acknowledge the concerns of Hinds and 
Murphy (2007) and Rowe (2004) regarding the suspicion that certain BRM 
communities have towards the police. In line with Myhill’s (2007) views, it 
recommended that each BCU should closely monitor the police use of stop and 
search to ensure it was being used proportionality. It also encouraged the 
development of engagement opportunities within each policing neighbourhood, 
and recommended that there should be a detailed understanding developed of 
the BRM communities being policed. The purpose of the last recommendation 
was to establish what mattered to each community when an individual became 
a victim of crime. It was then intended to design a new crime reporting booklet 
to ensure reporting officers complied with the critical inputs highlighted as 
important. 
 
One of the final recommendations stated the Merseyside Police customer 
service recovery opportunity (CSRO) should be reviewed. This was with the 
intention of increasing the amount of ‘quality’ contacts with BRM victims to 
improve satisfaction. 
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Customer Service Recovery Opportunity 
The principle of service recovery was proposed by the Home Office (2008b) 
when it recommended police forces should consider establishing a service 
recovery protocol. This was to be offered to dissatisfied victims of crime who 
had been identified during the victim satisfaction survey. The protocol, they 
said, should provide a mechanism for reparation. An example of an interviewer 
having an agreed protocol to ensure a victim was quickly provided with an 
update of their case if the satisfaction survey had identified one was overdue, 
was provided. Merseyside Police developed this principle. 
 
CSRO was defined by Merseyside Police as a customer service call to a victim 
of crime, made at the initial stages of the investigation to ascertain how satisfied 
they had been with the service so far (Merseyside Police 2009a). This, they 
said, provided an opportunity to put back on track any bad or poor service 
received, or to explain the relevant procedures to enhance understanding in 
relation to actions taken. It was stated the CSRO process could be used to 
contact any victim of crime. However, it had been specifically designed to 
improve the service provided to BRM victims and victims of hate crime, as it 
said the CSRO process was to provide an opportunity to identify reasons why 
BRM victims were not satisfied with the service they had received.  
 
There were two stages in the CSRO process (Merseyside Police 2009a). Stage 
one took place within 48 hours of the crime being recorded so that any 
dissatisfaction could immediately be rectified. A stage two call took place 
between 4 to 8 weeks after the reporting of the crime. This was to establish how 
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the victim felt following further stages of service, with remedial action being 
taken should any dissatisfaction be expressed.   
 
However, the CSRO calls were to be made prior to the victim being contacted 
by the private research company who were completing the victim satisfaction 
survey (Merseyside Police 2009a). This, they said, would enable any poor 
service recognised to be corrected, and thereby improve the overall service 
delivery, prior to the victim satisfaction survey. These results directly impacted 
on Merseyside Police’s user satisfaction performance being measured 
nationally. However, when considering the concerns already discussed 
regarding how a victim may arrive at their level of satisfaction, the expectation 
by Merseyside Police that providing a good service on the day, or quickly 
repairing a poor service, would result in satisfied victims of crime, appears 
misplaced. 
 
The Merseyside Police CSRO process did not comply with the guidelines set 
out by the Home Office (2008b). The Home Office had recommended a 
recovery opportunity to provide the victim satisfaction survey interviewer with a 
course of action should poor service be identified by them. By Merseyside 
Police implementing a CSRO that required a victim, specifically a BRM victim, 
to be called twice, the second time just prior to the victim satisfaction survey 
appears to be an example of reactive gaming (Bevan and Hood 2006, LeGrand 
2003). The initial suggestion of a recovery opportunity by the Home Office gave 
Merseyside Police an opportunity to justify a process which gamed their target 
system. 
 108 
Summary 
This chapter has shown that the Home Office introduced a set of guidelines for 
how each police force should run their victim satisfaction surveys. The 
methodology informed on how the data set should be identified, which victims 
may be removed from the survey process, what questions should be asked and 
how it should all be collated. The explanation provided for this was the need to 
produce data of a similar standard, nationally, to allow performance to be 
compared by APACS (Home Office 2008b). However, the discretion allowed to 
each force, with regards to the removal of a victim from the survey process, 
appears to challenge this notion. 
 
This chapter also examined the process through which Merseyside Police tried 
to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap. It has been shown they clearly believed 
there were specific actions being omitted by reporting and investigating officers 
which were resulting in the dissatisfaction of BRM victims. By ensuring these 
‘critical inputs’ were delivered to each victim it was assumed this would lead to 
increased satisfaction, even though there was evidence available to suggest 
this may not be the case. Also, the way the CSRO was implemented within 
Merseyside Police, with Home Office guidelines being ignored, is questionable. 
The fact that CSRO was specifically made available to BRM victims suggests 
there was an element of gaming taking place with regards to the performance 
data, in an attempt to construct improved BRM victim satisfaction data. 
Therefore, it can be asked whether Merseyside Police’s actions were focused 
on the improvement of trust and confidence amongst BRM communities or 
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more concerned with the specific performance indictor they were being 
measured by?  
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5. Methodology 
 
Introduction 
The overall aim of this chapter is to present an account of the methods 
employed within my research. This research has sought to explore the impact 
Merseyside Police’s approach to narrowing the BRM satisfaction gap 
performance indicator had on both victims of crime and the police organisation. 
This has been undertaken by examining the service provided and managerial 
processes used, through the eyes of both Merseyside Police staff and victims 
of crime. The research provides an evaluation of the service provided and 
whether those policies employed by Merseyside Police resulted in an improved 
service for the victim or was more concerned with the performance data being 
produced. 
 
Other studies have explored the impact of police policies and actions on public 
satisfaction, trust and confidence in the police. However, Hinds (2009, p58 -
59), Weitzer and Tuch (2005, p284) and Skogan (2005, p301) all used a written 
or telephone survey of residents, selected at random, to collect their data, whilst 
Brandl et al (1994) obtained their data from a panel study. By nature of these 
data collection approaches their research has explored public satisfaction via 
any incidents of contact, both public or police initiated, with the police (Hinds 
2009). Therefore, their research was unable to specifically focus on the 
experience of the victim of crime and how that impacted on satisfaction.  
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The research for this thesis had direct access to the recorded interviews of 
victims of crime, completed by the monthly Merseyside Police victim 
satisfaction survey, along with further access to the officers and police staff 
implementing the policies. It has allowed for a unique examination of the level 
of victim satisfaction with a police service which had, according to Merseyside 
Police, been designed specifically to improve BRM victims level of satisfaction 
and thereby narrow their satisfaction gap.  
 
After much deliberating, the following research question was established. 
 
Why is Merseyside Police trying to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap? 
i) How have Merseyside Police tried to measure the gap?   
ii) How have Merseyside Police tried to reduce the gap?  
iii) What sense, if any, have police officers and ‘victims’ made of these 
processes? 
iv) Has there been improved levels of service that benefited the victim or 
was the performance data constructed by organisational processes? 
 
Research aim and background 
The research project was initially commenced with the intention of identifying 
issues and tactics which would assist Merseyside Police to narrow the BRM 
satisfaction gap. It was approved via a Bramshill Fellowship, by the National 
Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), who placed an expectation that it would 
contribute towards the improvement of public administration and the question 
of what works. As explained in the previous chapter, the BRM satisfaction gap 
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was considered an important performance indicator by Merseyside Police. This 
resulted in policies being implemented that were intended to narrow the gap 
and thereby improve performance in comparison to other police forces. The 
research initially examined these policies, however, it soon became apparent 
that a more critical approach towards the principle and survey methodology of 
the BRM satisfaction gap was required. This was explained to the NPIA, via the 
annual progress report which I had to submit to Bramshill Police College, and 
an agreement was obtained to allow the research to develop in the way deemed 
appropriate by myself, the researcher. However, at the end of 2012, the NPIA 
was disbanded as part of the austerity measures (NPIA 2013), with their 
responsibilities being transferred to the Home Office and the newly formed 
College of Policing. From that date on no further annual updates were 
requested from me and, even though contacted, the College of Policing 
expressed no interest with this research. Fortunately, Merseyside Police 
continued to provide support and allowed access to the necessary data. An 
annual update was provided to them, for partial funding purposes, up until my 
retirement in September 2015. These updates described the progress and 
direction the research was taking and highlighted any issues that needed 
addressing. However, there was no further evaluation, direction, or indeed 
interference, given by Merseyside Police to this research.  
 
Rosenbaum (2010) states there are two different approaches to research within 
the police organisation. The first is the critical police research approach, which 
has been conducted by outside institutions and academics looking inward to 
the organisation. This, Reiner (2010) says, can result in researchers 
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questioning police decision-making without having detailed knowledge of the 
internal and external constraints at play. The second approach is the policy 
police research tradition which gained support during NPM (Rosenbaum 2010). 
This is driven by a belief that science can, and should, improve public 
administration and allows researchers to increasingly apply scientific methods 
to answer the question of what works in policing. 
 
The NPIA initially requested the policy police research approach be applied to 
this research. However, following representations to Bramshill Police College I 
was able to take the, more appropriate, critical police research approach to 
complete this thesis.  
 
Social Constructivism 
Taylor (2000) says social constructionists argue there are no ‘real facts’ which 
exist independently of systems of ideas or discourse, whilst Delanty and 
Strydom (2003) state social constructivism advances the claim that science is 
constructed by social actors. This, they say, can focus on the internal practices 
of an enterprise in which transactions, competition, conflict and negotiations 
lead to emergent outcomes. Initial data collection for this research suggested 
that principles of social construction may be at play with regards to the BRM 
satisfaction gap. When Taylor’s (2000) conclusion that social constructionists 
focus on how certain systems of knowledge and practice can come to dominate 
others at times, it became apparent this research had to consider the principle 
of the construction of knowledge. When this was added to the views of Bevan 
and Hood (2006), discussed in chapter four, regarding the performance regime 
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resulting from NPM, it was concluded that it was a relevant consideration for 
this research. 
 
However, the issue of performance construction and whether there was gaming 
of performance figures taking place, described as inevitable by Bevan and 
Hood (2006), was only identified as an issue for this research once the data 
gathering process started.  
 
The researcher 
When I commenced this research, I was a serving police officer within 
Merseyside Police. Due to the critical research approach taken, it became 
apparent there was a need to carefully consider my position and relationship 
both as a researcher and as a police officer, before the appropriate research 
methods could be approved by both the University of Liverpool and Merseyside 
Police.  
 
Brown (1995) presents four relationships that a researcher can have with the 
organisation when researching the police. ‘Inside-insiders’ refer to in-house 
police research; ‘outside-insiders’ to former police officer academics; ‘inside-
outsiders’ are academically qualified support staff working within police 
organisations research departments, and ‘outside-outsiders’ are external 
commentators on matters of police and policing. Brown (1995) states that with 
regards to both critical police research and policy police research approaches, 
both positions have their strengths and weaknesses. However, there is a need 
to take care in matching the correct relationship with the type of research to 
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reduce problems when considering the purpose of a specific piece of police 
research.  
 
When considering these relationships, this research appears to have started in 
a somewhat unique position. As already mentioned, when the research 
proposal was submitted I was leading the ‘Citizen Focus’ team in the Liverpool 
North BCU of Merseyside Police. My initial proposal was connected to 
developing empirical evidence for increasing BRM victim satisfaction. This had 
been supported by the NPIA who considered the proposal of interest to them. 
Therefore, I was very much an insider. However, even at this stage it is 
questionable that the research could have been considered ‘in-house’ as it was 
being supervised by an outside academic institution. The loss of NPIA interest 
at the end of 2012 further supported this view. Likewise, the label of ‘outside-
insider’ appeared initially inappropriate since, up until retirement, I was a 
serving police officer who was completing a piece of academic research. 
However, once retired and with no further interest from the NPIA or Merseyside 
Police, this relationship became the dominating one. 
 
The lack of ability to initially pigeon-hole this research into one of Brown’s four 
categories now appears unimportant. However, it did highlight the position this 
research was in, a fact that needs to be remembered when considering the data 
collected processes. Punch (1989) states the police organisation is the most 
difficult part of the criminal justice system to complete academic research in, 
whilst Reiner (2010) adds that one of the biggest challenges for a researcher 
of the police is to understand and account for the organisational culture. He 
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suggests failure to do this will inevitably result in research producing criticism 
due to lack of understanding. Having been part of the police organisation for 30 
years it appears appropriate to assume some knowledge of police culture. 
However, I was aware care had to be taken to ensure inaccurate, reflexive 
assumptions, resulting from being exposed to this culture for 30 years, were not 
made to simplistically triangulate and confirm the data obtained. 
 
Ethics and access to data  
Consideration had to be given to the ethical position of this research due to the 
nature of the data being gathered and assessed. The use of recorded victim of 
crime interviews, obtained by a private survey company, had to be carefully 
thought through, along with the access I was given to police staff and policy 
and performance documentation.  
 
Brewer (2007) states research involving participants or subjects who are, or 
perceive themselves as being, in a less powerful position as the interviewer or 
in some cases are vulnerable and open to abuse, can prove difficult to deal with 
as an ethical issue. This research considered four of his principles to address 
these risks and ensure data was used ethically.  
 
1. Those who are particularly vulnerable should be treated with special 
care. 
The satisfaction survey conducted by Merseyside Police ensured that 
vulnerable victims did not participate. Victims under the age of 18 or with an 
identified mental disability were excluded from the survey. Also, victims of 
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domestic violence were omitted from the survey process due to the risks that 
subsequent police contact could put them under.  
 
2. Potential participants should be informed of the nature and purpose of 
the research and their consent should be obtained. 
Consent from all participants was obtained prior to an interview or focus group. 
The satisfaction surveys conducted for Merseyside Police asked the victim at 
the end of the interview if they were prepared to have their findings shared and 
to receive further contact. If a person declined, then all their personal details 
remained anonymous to Merseyside Police. Therefore, the initial survey 
process, used by the private survey company, obtained consent from the victim 
of crime for the use of this secondary data. 
 
3. If anonymity or confidentiality is offered or requested, then any such offer 
or request must be strictly honoured subject to any legal requirements 
that may enforce disclosure. 
All participants were required to sign participant consent and information sheets 
that guaranteed anonymity and explained that participation was voluntary. No 
person declined to take part. 
 
4. Research activity must be such that it will not damage the reputation of 
any institution, sponsor or supervisor. 
Although the research produced findings that are critical of Merseyside Police, 
this will not result in damage to the organisation but provide a learning 
opportunity. The fact that this research was initially approved under a Bramshill 
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Fellowship indicates the organisation was prepared to learn from such 
academic research which has been produced by a critical research approach. 
 
However, to ensure these issues were fully addressed I submitted a further 
research proposal to Merseyside Police once an initial methodology had been 
decided. This highlighted the access required to members of staff and 
documentation needed to complete the research. It was approved by the Area 
Commander of Liverpool North BCU, who further confirmed access to the victim 
satisfaction surveys was permitted, but stipulated the recordings were to remain 
on police premises with only pseudonyms written transcripts being removed. 
This was fully complied with. Once this agreement was in place, then ethical 
approval for this research was successfully obtained from the University of 
Liverpool. 
 
Westmarland (2001) raised the problem of the researcher identifying 
inappropriate behaviour whilst gathering data within the police organisation. 
Initially I had considered this not to be a dilemma as my role as a supervisor 
within the police would take precedence. However, when this was fully 
considered I decided this initial position was not tenable as it would have to be 
declared to all participants prior to the commencement of the focus group and 
interviews. The consequences of this, and the impact it may have had on the 
quality of data being obtained appeared too great to produce meaningful 
research. Indeed, when considering the issues raised by Macpherson (1999) in 
relation to institutional racism and the reason for the lack of trust and confidence 
in the police, I decided this initial stance could not be taken. The 
organisationally unacceptable attitudes and views, which I needed to access to 
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answer the research question, may not have been forthcoming from 
participants. Thus, participant anonymity had to be guaranteed to obtain both 
quality data and ethical approval from the University. 
 
Fortunately, any potential dilemma regarding the nature of the data being 
obtained never materialised with the integrity of this research being maintained. 
However, I acknowledge that as a police officer, disclosure of certain views and 
information by participants could have placed me in a difficult position. 
 
Research approaches 
Due to my place within the organisation and the type of data I had access to, 
the use of a case study approach was considered appropriate as it appeared 
to address the aims and overall requirements of the research question. Yin 
(2009) states the need for a case study arises out of the desire to understand 
complex social phenomena. It allows researchers to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events, such as individual life cycles, 
small group behaviour, organisational and managerial processes, 
neighbourhood change, organisational performance, international relations and 
the maturation of industries, whilst examining individual data. This appeared 
relevant when considering the research and the need to consider the impact of 
policy design and implementation, along with the impact this may have on 
police officers and victims of crime.  May (2001) supported this by stating that 
a case study allows for a mixture of methods which can provide a contemporary 
account of social life but make no claims to be representative, as they involve 
the detailed examination of a single example of something. However, case 
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studies can still be used to develop more general theoretical statements about 
regularities in social structure and process by falsifying a general theory about 
social life.  
 
The use of a case study approach appeared a particularly relevant way of 
analysing and presenting the individual victim satisfaction surveys. However, I 
was mindful that Brewer (2007) warns a case study may be used to construct 
a predetermined answer with results being presented more as a research diary 
than a piece of critical research. Again, I was aware that assumptions on 
service delivery and what the organisation believed a victim wanted were 
embedded within me which I needed to challenge on victim by victim process. 
I formed the opinion that a case study would allow me to do this.  
 
Yin (2009) proposes four broad research approaches to complete a case study, 
which all include the desire to analyse the contextual conditions in relation to 
the case. These are: 
 
1) Single-case holistic (single-unit of analysis) 
2) Single-case embedded (multiple units of analysis) 
3) Multiple-case holistic (single unit of analysis within each case) 
4) Multiple-case holistic (multiple units of analysis within each case) 
 
Having considered the research question, it was decided to adopt a single-case 
study approach to complete the research. This is in line with Yin’s (2009) views 
as Merseyside Police could be considered the main unit of research that 
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influenced the context which, in this case, had other smaller units involved, such 
as the policies and intentions of Merseyside Police, the interpretation of the 
officer and the opinions of the victim. Therefore Yin’s ‘Single-case embedded 
(multiple units of analysis) seemed the most appropriate approach for this 
research.  
 
Data Collection Process 
Chapter four described the process whereby Merseyside Police used a monthly 
victim satisfaction survey to obtain performance data to measure the BRM 
satisfaction gap. At the start of this research I established that, once victim 
confidentiality and data protection issues were satisfied, I would be allowed 
access, by Merseyside Police, to the individual recorded interviews of the 
victims. This presented a unique opportunity to respond to the research 
question. After identifying the other sources of information needed to contribute 
to the survey interviews, it was decided that a mixed method data collection 
approach was required. The methods used were semi-structured interviews, 
analysis of secondary data and focus groups. This permitted the triangulation 
of data to ensure comparison between the different elements of the research. 
Such an approach is supported by Gilbert (2008) who agrees with the principle 
of using mixed methods as a way of increasing accuracy of research findings 
and the level of confidence in them, and agrees that triangulation is a way of 
ensuring this.  
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Semi-structured interviews 
Initially I obtained copies of the policy and advisory Home Office documents, 
which were believed to inform Merseyside Police’s decision and policy making 
processes. These, along with other available literature produced by Merseyside 
Police, referred to in chapter four, were reviewed. However, there was clearly 
a need to understand the context of how and why Merseyside Police decided 
to take certain courses of action. This required information from those people 
who were present when policies and initiatives were first designed and 
implemented. However, this also identified a problem with regards to sourcing 
some documents that had produced policy decisions and actions. My position 
as an ‘insider’ and my closeness to the subject matter assisted with solving 
most of these issues. My requests for copies of documents were complied with 
once it was explained why they were needed. However, a further review of this 
literature highlighted that the reasons why certain decisions were made had not 
been documented within them. Therefore, the need to conduct a series of face-
to-face interviews, with the key people involved in policy making and 
implementation of the BRM satisfaction gap, was identified.  
 
The interview subjects 
Due to my involvement with the Citizen Focus agenda within Merseyside Police, 
I was aware of some individuals who had been involved with policy design and 
implementation. However, due to the ethical requirement of anonymity for this 
research, it is not possible to include too many details of the interviewees who 
took part. They were members of relatively small teams within Merseyside 
Police, comprising police officers and support staff, who obtained high profiles 
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within the organisation due to the work they were completing. I was concerned 
that due to my position within the Citizen Focus agenda, my lack of anonymity 
may restrict the interviewee’s honesty, as warned by May (2001), during any 
face-to-face interview. Consideration was given to using a more appropriate 
third party to complete them. However, this was quickly dismissed as any ability 
to probe and develop answers given by the interviewee would have been 
removed. Therefore, with this concern in mind, a semi-structured interview 
approach was decided to be the most appropriate method to obtain the required 
data as it would allow the flexibility to ask follow-up questions to develop the 
necessary lines of investigation.  
 
Those police officers and members of police staff initially interviewed are 
described in the following table. As mentioned previously, the description of 
their role is limited to maintain anonymity: 
 
Table 5.1: List of initial one to one interviews 
 
 
 
Position 
 
Role 
Supt 1 Superintendent 
 
Responsible for designing and 
implementing corporate policies intended 
to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap. At 
the time of the interview the subject was 
retired. 
 
Supt 2 Superintendent 
 
Responsible for the Citizen Focus 
performance within a BCU and for 
implementing the policies set by the 
corporate team. At the time of the 
interview the subject was still a serving 
officer. 
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Interviewee 
4 
 
 
Support Staff 
 
Responsible for analysing the victim 
satisfaction survey data, challenging the 
quality of the data and ensuring the way it 
was being used complied with 
organisational policy and Home Office 
guidelines. 
  
 
Interviewee 
5 
Support Staff 
 
Responsible for obtaining the victim 
satisfaction survey data from the private 
company. This is gathered in line with 
Home Office guidelines. 
 
 
 
However, during each of the four interviews the name of another person was 
mentioned as being influential with policy design. Therefore, a fifth interview 
was completed. 
 
Table 5.2: Subsequent one to one interview 
 
 
Position 
 
Role 
 
Supt 3 
 
Superintendent 
 
Responsible for the Citizen Focus 
performance within a BCU prior to the 
interview. At the time of the interview the 
subject was still a serving police officer but 
had moved on from Citizen Focus. 
 
 
 
The specific key areas to be covered was decided prior to each interview, with 
the interviewee being asked further questions depending on the data they 
provided. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992) suggest that a major 
advantage of this semi-structured approach is to allow greater control over data 
gathering than a general conversation of the subject matter would. However, it 
still allows for a broader data gathering process than a fully structured interview. 
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The semi-structured interview allowed me to ensure respondents provided 
answers to questions in the appropriate sequence as it provided the opportunity 
to probe those answers which I believed to be insufficient. This probing ensured 
May’s (2001) concerns regarding an interviewee’s honesty was never an overt 
issue during the subsequent triangulation process of data analysis.  However, 
concern was recorded during the interview of Supt 3 regarding the data he was 
providing me. This will be further discussed later in this chapter when the issue 
of reflexivity is considered. 
 
Analysis of secondary data 
Merseyside Police were interviewing approximately 240 victims of crime each 
month via the private market research company. Each interview was recorded, 
with the knowledge of the participant, by the survey company and personal 
details were only then passed onto Merseyside Police if the victim expressed 
permission. Once a monthly dataset had been received from the company by 
the corporate marketing team, the data was circulated to each BCU who were 
required to research their dissatisfied victims. This was to account for poor 
performance by identifying mistakes made by officers, and provide 
explanations, to the performance management process. 
 
At that time, Liverpool North BCU was receiving approximately 12 dissatisfied 
BRM victims of crime every 6 months. This appeared to be both a meaningful, 
but realistic, number of victims to analyse over an acceptable period of time. 
Therefore, the date of 1st January 2013 was set from which all dissatisfied BRM 
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victims, who had agreed for the details to be disclosed to Merseyside Police, 
were selected until 12 victims were obtained. This took until June 2013.  
 
Initially a baseline for the dataset was established that allowed ethnicity, age, 
sex and the type of crime they were the victim to be established. Table 5.4 
refers to this and shows which stage of service each victim was particularly 
dissatisfied with. This has been graded against the scale of measurement as 
listed in table 5.3: 
 
Table 5.3 List of VSS abbreviations  
 
Completely satisfied CS Completely dissatisfied CD 
Very satisfied VS Very dissatisfied VD 
Fairly satisfied FS Fairly dissatisfied FD 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied N Don’t know DK 
 
 
Table 5.4 List of surveyed dissatisfied BRM victims 
 
 
 
Once a list of dissatisfied victims had been established, then 12 satisfied victims 
were identified to provide a comparison. Again, the date of 1st January 2013 
was selected and from there victims, with as similar demographics as possible, 
No Ethnicity Age Sex Crime E of C Actions Follow Invest Treat Whole 
1 Black or Black British 16 to 24 M Racist Skipped FD FS FD CS FS 
2 Black or Black British 25 to 34 M Racist Skipped CD CD CD CS CD 
3 Asian or Asian British 16 to 24 F Racist CS CD FD VD DK VD 
4 Black or Black British 25 to 34 F Racist FS N VD VD VS FD 
5 Asian or Asian British 35 to 44 M Racist FS CD CD VD CS CD 
6 Black or Black British 25 to 34 M Racist CS CD CD CD FS CD 
7 Black or Black British 25 to 34 M Racist VD VD CD VD N VD 
8 Black or Black British 25 to 34 M Violence Skipped FD CD VD FS VD 
9 Black or Black British 25 to 34 M Burglary CD FD FD FD CS FD 
10 Black or Black British Refused M Racist CD CD CD CD FD FD 
11 Black or Black British 45 to 54 M Racist FS FS FD DK FS FS 
12 Asian or Asian British 45 to 54 M Racist Skipped CD VD CD CS CD 
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were selected. There were more satisfied victims to select from and thus the 
dataset was completed within the first three months of 2013. 
 
 
Table 5.5 List of surveyed satisfied BRM victims 
 
 
 
Once all 24 victims were identified and individual transcripts were made of each 
taped interview, based on the set Home Office script (appendix 1), I prepared 
a summary explaining the details behind the crime, the survey results, the victim 
survey experience and any issues which had been identified. Finally, once this 
was completed the issues that each victim had highlighted were listed and 
tracked across all victim surveys to establish if there were any common themes. 
These are presented in table 5.6 with the issues grouped into three emerging 
problems: the private company’s survey methodology (Survey), concerns 
highlighted by the victim (Victim), and finally issues with the service provided 
(Service). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No Ethnicity Age Sex Crime E of C Actions Follow Invest Treat Whole 
1 Asian or Asian British 45 to 54 M Racist CS CS FS FS CS CS 
2 Black or Black British 55 to 65 M Racist CS CS VS VS VS CS 
3 Black or Black British 16 to 24 M Racist FS CS CS CS CS CS 
4 Black or Black British 16 to 24 F Racist VS CS VS VS CS VS 
5 Black or Black British 25 to 34 F Racist VS VS VS VS VS CS 
6 Black or Black British 25 to 34 M Racist Skipped CS CS CS CS CS 
7 Mixed White & Asian 16 to 24 M Racist VS FS CS VS CS VS 
8 Mixed and other Mixed 25 to 34 F Racist FS FS FS N VS VS 
9 Asian or Asian British 25 to 34 M Violence Skipped VS CS CS CS CS 
10 Asian or Asian British 25 to 34 M Burglary VS CS VS VS CS VS 
11 Black or Black British 25 to 34 M Violence Skipped CS VS CS VS VS 
12 Black or Black British 35 to 44 M Vehicle VS CS VS CS CS CS 
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Table 5.6 Emerging themes from VSS transcripts 
 
Issue Theme V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 Total 
Speed of interview Survey Y  Y     Y  Y  Y 5 
Interviewer reflexivity Survey   Y         Y 2 
Not reporting what was said Survey   Y     Y Y Y  Y 5 
Interviewing the wrong subject Survey      Y       1 
Interviewer leads the subject Survey Y  Y          2 
Crime not fitting the survey 
script 
Survey       Y   Y  Y 3 
Attitude of the interviewee Victim   Y          1 
Would not report a similar 
offence again 
Victim  Y   Y     Y   3 
Previous low opinion of police Victim  Y     Y   Y   3 
Interviewee does not 
understand the process 
Victim Y    Y Y    Y   4 
Interviewee wanted to talk Victim   Y  Y  Y Y  Y   5 
Interviewee talking about 
different offence 
Victim  Y           1 
Need of the subject / language Victim Y    Y   Y  Y   4 
Poor police attendance Service  Y  Y   Y  Y    4 
Not keeping victim informed / 
updated 
Service   Y  Y Y  Y  Y Y Y 7 
Police not keeping promises Service  Y     Y  Y    3 
CRSO process from SIGMA Service      Y      Y 2 
Police not taking the matter 
seriously 
Service    Y  Y       2 
Good individual treatment but 
poor general 
Service    Y     Y    2 
Expectations of CCTV Service Y    Y Y  Y    Y 5 
General policing issues Service     Y        1 
 
 
Focus groups 
Face-to-face interviews, with the key members of staff, provided data explaining 
how policy was designed and implemented. It also provided a narrative for the 
subsequent performance management process and the way in which the 
gaming of performance figures occurred. The victim satisfaction surveys 
provided data regarding how the policies had impacted on the victim of crime. 
However, to fully answer the research question there was a need to obtain the 
views of those officers who were tasked with the direct delivery of service to the 
BRM victim of crime. 
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However, to gather this data the use of the previous semi-structured interview 
method did not appear appropriate. To examine how police officers had 
delivered the stages of services, as measured by the Home Office (2008b), 
there were separate police departments, responsible for service delivery, which 
required separate research. Invariably, it was the uniformed officer who 
provided the initial response to a report of crime and was therefore more 
responsible for the ‘initial response’ and ‘actions taken’ stage of service, 
whereas ‘follow-up’ was more likely to be delivered by the Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID). Also, it was important to garner the views of the police 
officers’ first line managers, Sergeants, who were responsible for ensuring 
policy and direction was turned into meaningful service for the BRM victim of 
crime.  
 
  
Rowe (2004), Brain (2010) and Jackson et al (2013) all comment on police 
officer culture and how this can impact on the way victims of crime are treated. 
Likewise, Macpherson (1999) referred to institutional racism as a collective 
issue within the organisation. This suggested a need for this research to 
canvass more than an individual’s view from each of the three groups in order 
to obtain representative data. Therefore, the research method to be used had 
to establish the general opinion of each group to provide comment on the 
service being provided. May (2001) states a focus group method can 
experience ‘group think’ whereby the group arrives at a consensus with 
individual contrary views being stifled. Although this can be presented as a 
weakness of the method, within this research context the consensus view was 
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the required narrative. Therefore, I decided to use focus groups to gather this 
third element of data, with the following sessions being conducted. 
 
Table 5.7 Focus group participation 
 
Type of focus groups  Number of participants 
Constables: Response Officers 8 
Sergeants: Neighbourhood Teams 3 
CID: Investigation 6 
 
 
 
The number of participants who took part was a result of those officers who 
were available and willing to take part at the given time of the focus group. I 
had decided there was a need for minimum figures to ensure sufficient views 
were obtained. I considered these to be four for the Constables and CID groups 
and two for the Sergeants. The actual attendance exceeded this requirement. 
 
Data Analysis 
Once the interviews and focus groups had been completed, consideration was 
given to how the data would be analysed. To do this a five-step process, which 
had been suggested by McCracken (1988) and Krueger and Casey (2008) was 
used. This resulted in; 
 
1. Familiarisation: Each interview and focus group recording was 
transcribed and read through at least two times so I become familiar 
with the text. 
2. Identifying a thematic framework: I then noted ideas and concepts in 
the margin of each transcript to develop possible categories. 
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3. Indexing: The ideas and concepts from the interviews and focus 
groups were separately grouped under headings and compared. This 
resulted in three categories being identified. 
4. Charting: I then lifted the quotes from the original text and re-
arranged them under three themes which had been identified. 
5. Analysis: The quotes were then compared against the key issues 
discussed within the literature review, and the three themes 
highlighted by the victim satisfaction survey data, to identify specific 
themes or groupings which would contribute to answering the 
research question. 
 
The three themes identified by this process were: knowledge which related to 
that of the individual officer and organisation; performance which highlighted 
how the focus on performance within the organisation influenced policy; and 
tactics and attitude of those dealing with victims of crime and service; which is 
related to how the police organisational activity impacted on the victim and 
whether it lead to an improvement in trust and confidence. These stood along-
side the three themes of survey, victim and service which had been identified 
by analysis of the victim satisfaction survey and all six contributed to the three 
analysis chapters of this thesis. 
 
 Reflexivity 
Throughout the data collection process, the issue of my own reflexivity needed 
to be considered. Delanty and Strydom (2003) warn that reflexivity is a concern 
for the social scientist as it can greatly taint the data which is gathered. As a 
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serving police officer, this warning appeared relevant as the research involved 
interviewing staff of both higher and lower rank to myself. To address this, at 
the start of each interview and focus group I emphasised the research was 
being completed for academic purposes and, although initially it had been 
sponsored by a Bramshill Fellowship, there was no requirement for the data to 
be shared with Merseyside Police. Each participant was also supplied with a 
participant consent form and information sheet which explained the voluntary 
nature of their participation and guaranteed anonymity. However, I remained 
aware that the rank structure of the police organisation could still have an 
influence on the quality of the data gathered from each participant. 
 
On reflection, some issues did arise during the data gathering stage. The 
Sergeants focus group appeared to start as a job interview process, with those 
present trying to impress or compete by providing all of their knowledge on the 
subject matter. This resulted in the group making errors on key principles of the 
BRM satisfaction gap. However, the nature of the focus group method allowed 
me to ask further questions which clarified some of the confusion they initially 
created. Likewise, the interviews with the three Superintendents highlighted 
another reflexive issue. I was aware that in these interviews I was the junior 
officer, even though at the time of the first interview the participant had recently 
retired. However, two of the three interviews created an impression of an 
expectation for me to accept the information they provided without question. I 
noted this may not have been the case had the participants been interviewed 
by an independent researcher. The interview with the final Superintendent 
commenced with a sense of an assumption on their part that I lacked 
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knowledge regarding the subject matter compared to them, and resulted in a 
feeling being talked down to. However, this did change as the interview 
developed and will be commented on again in chapter six. 
 
Thus, although reflexivity was a constant consideration during these two 
aspects of data collection, it did not prove to be a big problem. Adkins (2002) 
questions the proposed importance of certain aspects of reflexivity as concern 
for this can destabilise the relations between text and reader, author and text 
and researcher and social life. Thus, although accounted for, the question of 
reflexivity did not hinder the data gathering process for this research. 
 
Summary 
This chapter has looked at the methods used to carry out this research and 
explained how it was completed as a single-case study with multiple units of 
analysis. These units were face-to-face semi structured interviews, focus 
groups and the analysis of secondary data and were selected as being deemed 
the most appropriate way of obtaining the necessary data to answer the 
research question. 
 
The chapter has further described the consideration given to problems of 
conducting research within the police organisation and the position I found 
myself in when completing this piece of critical research whilst still being part of 
the police organisation. The careful consideration given to the ethical issues 
involved in the research were further discussed, along with the unique 
opportunity of completing the research by accessing both victim satisfaction 
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surveys and serving police officers. The chapter also considered the dilemma 
which a serving police officer may have whilst completing academic research 
and the necessity to provide anonymity for the participants was highlighted. 
Finally, this chapter considered the problem of reflexivity and concluded that an 
awareness of, and personal reflection on, reflexivity addressed those concerns 
which were present. 
 
Chapter six will now look at how the BRM satisfaction gap became an important 
performance indicator for Merseyside Police. It will question whether this was 
as result of the Macpherson Report (1999) or whether the focus came from 
other organisational requirements. It will conclude that the warnings received 
regarding the validity of the performance indicator were ignored, thereby 
allowing for the implementation of questionable policies for the BRM victim of 
crime. 
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Chapter 6: Delivering ‘satisfaction’ or the ticking of 
boxes? 
 
Introduction 
Previous chapters have shown that it is possible to track the development of 
the BRM satisfaction gap performance indicator (PI) via Home Office 
Secretary’s Action Plans (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002a), National Policing Plans 
(Home Office 2002, 2003, 2004a) and the Citizen Focus good practice guide 
(Home Office 2006) back to the Macpherson report (1999). Such an apparent 
clear line of policy development would suggest that a similar process should be 
identifiable within Merseyside Police’s policy design and implementation. This 
chapter will consider whether Merseyside Police policy was driven by 
knowledge, evidence and governmental direction or whether other motivations 
were evident. It will further examine how Home Office guidance produced a 
victim satisfaction survey which did not necessarily deliver quality data which 
measured the BRM satisfaction gap. The chapter will conclude that it was the 
improvement of performance figures rather than a desire to improve victim 
satisfaction which was the motivating factor for Merseyside Police. 
 
Why did Merseyside Police focus on the BRM satisfaction gap? 
Chapter two pointed out that Bowling and Philips (2003) labelled the 
recommendations contained within the Macpherson Report as the most 
extensive program of reform in the history of relationships between police and 
BRM communities. Likewise, Rowe (2004) described the Macpherson Report 
as a seminal moment in British race relations which produced a collective 
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response that showed reform would no longer be stifled, with a raft of targets, 
pledges, and activity. This then pointed to a process by which public trust and 
confidence could be secured (Rowe 2004). The apparent enormity of these 
recommendations were added to by former Prime Minister Tony Blair when 
during Prime Minister’s Questions, he stated the Government’s sincerity as law 
makers was not how well sympathy to the Lawrence family could be expressed, 
but how well they implemented the recommendations to make sure such a 
crime never happened again (Mayberry 2008). Such strong words from both 
academics and politicians would suggest there was clear direction given to 
each police force as to when and how the recommendations should be 
implemented. Indeed, as table 6.1 shows, a clear time line can be developed 
to illustrate how the BRM satisfaction gap performance indicator was developed 
as policy and came to the attention of Merseyside Police. When considering 
this along with the guidance provided by “The Citizen Focus Good Practice 
Guide” (Home Office 2006) regarding how the individual citizen or victim, and 
the increase in their confidence, would be a focus for the police, an assumption 
can be made that policy design and implementation was carefully planned.  
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Table 6.1  
Key events for the BRM Satisfaction Gap Performance Indicator 
Year Event 
Feb 1999 Publication of the Macpherson report 
March 1999 Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Home Secretary’s Action Plan 
1999 / 2000 
The Ministerial Priority is added to the 3 statutory objectives 
for the police 
2000 
Home Secretary Action Plan progress report published stating 
the Ministerial Priority was set 
2001 
Home Secretary Action Plan progress report published which 
stated that increasing trust and confidence in policing amongst 
BRM communities would be one of only two Ministerial 
priorities 
2002 
Home Secretary Action Plan progress report published and 
proposed the group should change and work thematically in an 
“audit and inspection” style 
2002 
National Policing Plan 2003-06 published containing the Home 
Office Public Service agreement to improve confidence with 
the Criminal Justice System including that of BRM 
communities 
2003 
Home Secretary Action Plan progress report published which 
decided not to focus on what had been achieved but to ‘look 
forward’ 
2003 
National Policing Plan 2004-07 introduced PPAF and 
proposed a statutory indicator of user satisfaction from BRM 
victims of racist incidents 
2004 
Statutory instruments No 644: Police Authorities (Best Value) 
Performance Indicators set a comparison of satisfaction for 
white users and users from visible minority ethnic groups 
2004 
National Policing Plan 2005-08 stated work to increase 
satisfaction of victims and witnesses would have a significant 
impact on targets relating to confidence in the Criminal Justice 
System 
November 
2004 
Building Communities, Beating Crime. A better police service 
for the 21st Century is published by the Home Office 
April 2006 
Citizen Focus Good Practice Guide published stating the need 
of individuals and communities would be reflected in policing 
March 2008 
Statutory Instruments No 659: Police Authorities (Best Value) 
Performance Indicators established SPI 1.2 form 2008 /09 
March 2008 
Guidance on Statutory Performance Indicators for Policing and 
Community Safety: 2008 / 09 published 
June 2008 
Definitions & Survey Guidance for APACS Measures of User 
Satisfaction 2008 / 09 published 
July 2008 
Policing Pledge introduced intending to build on the principles 
of Citizen Focus Policing 
2009 Introduction of single confidence figure 
2010 Introduction of austerity and abolition of Policing Pledge 
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Merseyside Police Citizen Focus Team 
In 2005, the report from Her Majesty Inspectorate of Constabularies, A Review 
on the ‘Fitness for purpose’ of the Current Structure of policing in England and 
Wales (O’Connor 2005), was published to examine the feasibility of merging 
police forces across the United Kingdom. The intention of the report was to 
ensure the UK police service was ‘fit for purpose’ in the 21st century.  Many of 
the principles contained within it were then adopted by the New Labour 
government, which tasked every police force to examine the possibility of 
organisational mergers with suitable neighbouring forces (Brain 2010, pp 364 - 
373).  
 
To progress this, Merseyside Police formed a project team, led by an Assistant 
Chief Constable (ACC), to examine the options available to the organisation. 
However, due to certain failings with the initial report and a change in political 
appetite, the programme was cancelled in the summer of 2006 making the 
Merseyside Police project team, along with the ACC, without a meaningful role. 
As Supt 1 explained, this proved important in Merseyside Police for the 
subsequent BRM satisfaction gap: 
 
“This force mergers fell off the perch and there was this team of people there 
who had nothing to do. You had an ACC who basically didn’t have a portfolio 
and (at a Merseyside Police ACPO away day) the ACC said one of the areas 
that they thought we were vulnerable was looking at victims, victim satisfaction 
isn’t good. They fought their corner, cause there were people there who were 
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against it, but in the end they persuaded (the Chief Constable) to say right you 
can have a Citizen Focus portfolio.”                                                                      
(Supt 1) 
 
If the proposals by the ACC were as a result of knowledge of government 
direction then it seems strange why other ACC’s were against the proposal. 
This interview placed this meeting at some stage during 2006 and as table 6.1 
shows, the Citizen Focus Good Practice Guide was published in April 2006. 
Therefore, regardless of Supt 1 citing the term ‘Citizen Focus portfolio’ it is not 
possible to definitively say whether the ACC’s suggestion was a personal 
opinion or driven by knowledge of future government direction. The described 
reaction of other ACPO members may suggest it was the former. Supt 1 
explained the ACC had become aware that for several years previously, 
Merseyside Police had been producing and collating victim satisfaction survey 
data in response to the requirements of the ACPO Quality of Service committee 
and the then government’s Citizens’ Charter of 1991 (Brain 2010, p188). 
However, although this survey data was still being circulated on a regular basis 
across the organisation, Supt 1 stated it was not generating any meaningful 
activity to improve service delivery. Supt 1 also pointed out that the ACC had 
formed an opinion there was no visible work being completed by any police 
organisation on a national level to address the specific subject of improving 
victim satisfaction. Therefore, this resulted in the disbandment of the ‘force 
mergers team’ being viewed as an opportunity for Merseyside Police to take a 
national lead on the subject of victim satisfaction. However, when Citizen Focus 
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policing was introduced, was there clear direction provided by the Home Office 
to implement this policy within Merseyside Police? Supt 1 admits: 
 
“We stumbled across it and what happened was that it was more by good 
fortune that we had a dedicated ACC, that was the key, having a dedicated 
ACC who had a dedicated team of people” 
(Supt 1) 
 
Supt 2 expressed the view that the ACC who introduced Citizen Focus policing 
had a real desire to understand the issues involved with victim satisfaction and 
improve the service being provided. Interviewee 5 agreed and acknowledged 
that no one was taking any interest in the victim satisfaction survey until this 
ACC did. However, the above narrative questions the way the subject was 
introduced. The previous Home Office publications “Building Communities, 
Beating Crime” (Home Office 2004a) and “Citizen Focus Good Practice Guide” 
(Home Office 2006) suggests the issue of citizen focus policing, and that of 
victim satisfaction, would have some profile amongst the senior officers in 
Merseyside Police. However, the narrative provided suggests this was not the 
case, but instead was reliant on good fortune and an individual ACC seizing an 
opportunity. So how did Merseyside Police develop their policy design and 
implementation? 
 
How did Merseyside Police respond? 
It is apparent from the interviews completed with the three Superintendents that 
once it was decided to invest in Citizen Focus policing there was a need 
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identified, within the organisation, to develop an understanding and improve 
knowledge of the principles of citizen focus and victim satisfaction. It was 
accepted that Merseyside Police were starting from a position of ignorance. The 
new Citizen Focus department completed a ‘strategic analysis’ which identified 
six key areas that could hinder the improvement of victim satisfaction. These 
were Traffic, Anti-Social Behaviour, Actions Taken, Further Contact, Call 
Handling and finally the BRM Satisfaction Gap. Supt 1 explained that each area 
was allocated a lead, with the BRM satisfaction gap being given to Supt 3, who 
had already introduced a ‘customer service recovery opportunity’ (CSRO) 
process for victims of crime in their own BCU. The principles behind this will be 
discussed at length in chapter six, however Supt 3 stated that they were unsure 
about how the task related to victim satisfaction: 
 
“The thing (BRM satisfaction) was to manage disproportionately if one accepts 
the premise that the BRM person is always going to be less satisfied or likely 
to be less satisfied than a white person because of history of racism, 
discrimination in society, and I am not just talking about the police, a feeling of 
being less.” 
Supt 3 
 
Supt 3 view seems to agree with Rowe (2004), Hinds and Murphy (2007) and 
Skogan (2005) who suggest satisfaction amongst BRM communities is 
produced by influences other than the service provided as a consequence of 
being a victim. However, Supt 3 did not go so far as to agree with Keenan’s 
(2009) view that the satisfaction gap amongst BRM communities may become 
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acceptable for the police service due to the underlying causes being wider than 
a policing remit. Even though, Supt 3 still had concerns that were not formally 
expressed within the organisation. Therefore, policy activity relating to victim 
satisfaction in general continued to focus only on the immediately deliverable 
service to the victim. This resulted in Merseyside Police being solely reliant on 
the performance figures produced by the monthly VSS, and thus had to trust 
the accuracy of the methodology provided by the Home Office (2008b), to 
provide them with a measure of victim satisfaction.  
 
A performance regime was introduced in Merseyside for the Basic Command 
Units (BCU) which focused on the whole Citizen Focus agenda, with victim 
satisfaction performance forming a major part. This will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter seven, however it should be noted that during 2008 and 2009, 
victim satisfaction performance, as measured by Merseyside Police, improved 
across all crime types and stages of service to the point where everything was 
in fact on target, ‘in the green’ (Supt 1). Except for the BRM satisfaction gap.  
 
During this time, Interviewee 5 describes how it was Merseyside Police’s 
marketing team who took ownership of the victim satisfaction data being 
collected by the private customer survey company. Work was completed with 
their current processes being reviewed. This resulted in the monthly 
performance reports, that were informing individual BCU’s of their performance 
levels, being adjusted to make them more understandable and ‘interactive’ for 
the general police constable. The aim was to ensure all staff could understand 
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the stages of service and critical inputs as stipulated by the Home Office 
(2008b). 
 
There then followed a period of intense activity within Merseyside Police, 
resulting in the setting of policies and working practices that continued up until 
the end of the research’s data gathering phase. All three Superintendents 
described force wide operations being implemented to address poor 
performance within the ‘actions taken’ and ‘follow-up’ stages of service. The 
details of these will be discussed in chapter eight. However, it was agreed by 
the Superintendents that these operations set the tone for how victim 
satisfaction would be dealt with in Merseyside. 
 
In 2010, Supt 1 explained there was a reshuffle of Merseyside Police’s ACC 
portfolios and a new ACC, with a different approach to victim satisfaction, took 
over the Citizen Focus department. This apparently resulted in a change of 
focus for the team and the performance regime, from overall victim satisfaction 
towards a focus solely on the BRM satisfaction gap. It was said that this became 
the team’s one and only concern, to the apparent cost of all other Citizen Focus 
performance measures. An opinion formed within the department that the new 
ACC did not fully understand the organisational processes used to measure 
victim satisfaction, confidence or other citizen focus matters and thus the stated 
strategic direction was flawed. However, these concerns were not openly 
expressed as this change of direction appeared to produce the intended results 
for the BRM satisfaction gap. Supt 1 stated that by December 2011 this 
performance indicator was on target for the first time. However, this was to the 
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detriment of all the other victim satisfaction performance indicators which failed 
to hit their targets.  
 
Supt 1 stated the change of ACC and subsequent change of focus had resulted 
in a complete turnaround in organisational performance. This view is important 
to note. Chapter three proposed an opinion that BRM victim satisfaction is 
driven by factors other than the service provided by the police at the time of 
reporting and investigation of the crime (Brandl et al 1994, Skogan 2005, Hinds 
and Murphy 2007, Hinds 2009). However, all Superintendents described 
activity within Merseyside Police that focused solely on the stages of service of 
a crime victim to improve their level of satisfaction. Regardless of the 
operational or ethical implications of this focused approach, the change in victim 
satisfaction performance, as described by Supt 1, appears to challenge the 
view that other factors are at play. How could the performance indicator be 
turned around if this was not the case? This view will be challenged in chapter 
seven.  
 
Austerity 
The introduction of austerity measures saw Merseyside Police having to 
implement budget cuts of £64 million between 2010 and 2014 (Liverpool Echo 
2014). This resulted in the Citizen Focus department being disbanded in 2012 
and victim satisfaction being centralised within the organisation. Both 
Interviewee 4 and 5 described a process whereby the focus on performance 
remained, with management processes being adjusted to allow for these 
changes. The data produced by the victim satisfaction survey continued to be 
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gathered. However, each BCU was no longer able to rely on central direction 
from a Citizen Focus department, instead they were required to develop their 
own tactics in response to the monthly performance figures being produced by 
the Marketing Department. However, Supt 2 describes this as a period where 
the BRM satisfaction gap remained as a PI for Merseyside Police but working 
practices and policies failed to respond and develop from those which had been 
previously implemented. With the subsequent retirements of several people 
within the Citizen Focus department and redeployment of others to more ‘front 
line’ roles, the Citizen Focus subject knowledge, that Supt 1 stated they had 
worked hard to obtain, appeared to have been lost. 
 
Merseyside Police and the BRM satisfaction gap 
This chapter has so far described how Citizen Focus policing was introduced 
and implemented within Merseyside Police, and how a change of ACC then 
produced a dramatic change in recorded performance for the BRM satisfaction 
gap. However, prior to this, it had been problematic for Merseyside Police. 
According to Supt 2, this resulted in the BRM satisfaction gap becoming a high-
profile performance indicator for the organisation even prior to the change of 
ACC portfolio in 2010. 
 
Supt 1 explained that in 2008 Merseyside Police Citizen Focus team entered 
the National Customer Service Awards and won ‘Customer Service Team of 
the Year – Public Service and Education’. The ACC was able to present the 
award to the Chief Constable at the ‘Strategic Leaders’, for all of Merseyside 
Police, the following day. Supt 1 stated the Chief Constable was “gobsmacked” 
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they had won the award as they were the only police organisation to enter. The 
ACC then used this opportunity to present organisational data to the Chief 
Constable that showed performance in relation to all victim satisfaction was, in 
fact, not good: 
 
“To say the Chief was not a happy chicken is a big under statement and what 
he said to (Named; Citizen Focus ACC and Force Operations ACC) was I want 
this sorted.” 
(Supt 1) 
 
“Remember his mantra (The Chief Constable) was that we would be the best 
police force in the country. Well actually if we say we are 6 out of 6 (with regards 
to victim satisfaction) in our most similar family (of police forces) that flies right 
in the face of what he was trying to achieve.” 
(Supt 1) 
 
Supt 1 further explained that during the planning phase of trying to turn this 
‘mantra’ into policy it was identified that Merseyside Police’s performance 
regarding the BRM satisfaction gap was deemed to be extremely poor and in 
effect ‘in the red’. This further threatened the Chief Constable’s aim which could 
not be realised until the gap was addressed. Thus, the Citizen Focus 
department was tasked with narrowing the BRM satisfaction gap as a 
contribution to making Merseyside Police the best force in the country.  
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This narrative presents a view that the BRM satisfaction gap became an 
important performance indicator, subsequently receiving a great deal of 
management performance focus, not due to any strategic direction regarding 
improving the trust and confidence of BRM communities but because it was a 
performance indicator that was ‘in the red’ and needed to be turned ‘green’ in 
order to be ‘the best police force in the country’. Supt 1 agreed with this 
assessment. 
 
“But that’s all we were interested in. We were only interested in the performance 
survey…. it was never about trust and confidence.”   
Supt 1 
 
But regardless of this the Citizen Focus department experienced difficulties 
 
“The BRM satisfaction gap was one that we just couldn’t make any impression 
on. At the end of, I think 2008 to 2009, we hit all of our targets apart from the 
BRM satisfaction gap….so we realised that we had to have a focus on that, we 
had more or less done the others but we had to have a focus on that.” 
 (Supt 1) 
 
The Citizen Focus Good Practice Guide (Home Office 2006) had proposed 
drivers of satisfaction for victims following, what they described as, an in-depth 
quantitative analysis of user satisfaction survey data in four police forces. They 
stated that forces wishing to improve overall satisfaction should focus efforts 
and attention on: 
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• Reassuring the victim; 
• Adequately answering the victim’s questions; 
• Providing any information that is asked for quickly; 
• Appearing interested in what the victim says; and 
• Returning telephone calls within a reasonable time 
 
Merseyside Police agreed that the principle of targeting ‘actions taken’ and 
‘follow up’ stages of service, previously discussed as the way of improving 
overall victim satisfaction, was the appropriate tactic to narrow the BRM 
satisfaction gap. To assist with this Supt 1, Supt 2 and Interviewee 4 state it 
was proposed that all BRM victims should receive a ‘gold service’ from the 
reporting and investigating officers. Chapter eight will discuss this in detail but, 
suffice to say, this principle was one of taking a structurally neutral view of the 
BRM victim, who would then receive a service in relation to ‘actions taken’ and 
‘follow-up’ which was deemed by the service provider as being faultless and of 
a ‘gold’ standard.  
 
Concerns that were ignored 
In an effort to further understand their business, Supt 1 explained that in 2009 
the Citizen Focus department sought advice from people outside of the 
organisation; 
 
“(Named academic) who at the time was a Doctor who worked at (Named 
University) …and we also bought in (Named) from (national market research 
organisation) both of which said, the BRM satisfaction gap is a complete and 
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utter waste of time, don’t even bother with it, it doesn’t have any statistical 
significance what so ever. How can you compare victim levels in Merseyside 
with Northumbria, when Northumbria has hardly got a BRM community?” 
(Supt 1) 
 
Supt 1 went on to explain that they further advised him; 
 
“it’s just a Government tool to be able to use as part of their spin process. It has 
no statistical significance what so ever. All the effort that you are putting into 
this is a waste of time. Why focus on the BRM community when you are doing 
all this work around victim satisfaction? 
(Supt 1) 
 
Their visit was intended to be more of a reassurance process regarding the 
policies and tactics already implemented, as the Citizen Focus department 
believed they had followed the correct course of action by basing them on 
Home Office guidance. However, it resulted in both parties warning that, in their 
opinion, the BRM satisfaction gap was a government tool being used to deliver 
a political message. However, these warnings went unheeded, by both the ACC 
and the Citizen Focus department, and no consideration was given to any 
change in policy, even though there was an acceptance of the point being 
made.  
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However, other concerns regarding the BRM satisfaction gap and how 
Merseyside Police tried to narrow it were present and expressed during all of 
the interviews: 
“The Home Office say, it’s a load of bull most of the time, but that’s what they 
said to me and so my understanding was, ok we are never going to have parity, 
and I still don’t believe we are going to have parity”               
 (Supt 3) 
 
“My fear is, and was at the time, that it became more about where we were in 
league table terms visa vis other forces, rather than really making a difference.”   
(Supt 2) 
 
“. it’s (the way the BRM satisfaction gap is measured) biased, it’s trying to make 
the figures, it’s fudging figures, I understand that completely.” 
(Interviewee 5) 
 
“.to me is it because they are ticking a box, not trying to tackle the underlying 
issues, so are we ticking a box so when it comes back that your BRM gap is 
this wide, yeah but these people are getting more calls (from the police), what’s 
that proving, we are not identifying, we are not investigating and identifying the 
problem, all we are doing is putting things in place which haven’t stopped it.” 
(Interviewee 4) 
 
That being said, no interviewee could provide an example of when they 
escalated their concerns to line managers. Instead there appears to have been 
 151 
a general acceptance that it was their job to ensure the performance indicator 
appeared healthy and to ignore their concerns, regardless of how grounded 
they were with regards to the difference they would make for victims. Indeed, a 
quote from a focus group appears to sum up the general attitude: 
 
“(What) the Command Team want is the same thing as doing the job properly. 
The Command Team have their instructions and what they deem is doing it 
properly is what the Command Team want so it’s the same thing.” 
(Sergeant’s Focus Group)  
 
So, the BRM satisfaction gap became an important performance indicator for 
Merseyside Police. When reading the recommendations contained in the 
Macpherson Report (1999) along with the tone of the Home Secretary’s action 
plan (1999) and considering the performance management direction the 
National Policing Plans (Home Office 2002, 2003, 2004b) and Best Value 
Performance Indicators (Home Office 2008) took the police service in, this 
should have been no surprise to the observer. However, the interviews 
presented a narrative whereby the profile of the performance indicator was 
increased due to the performance threatening the Chief Constable’s aim of 
making Merseyside Police the best police force in the country. This is an 
understandable and admirable goal, which surely every Chief Constable should 
set. However, when considering the interview content, it appears that a caveat 
should be added to the end of his aim of “as measured by Home Office 
performance statistics”. This may seem acceptable to some, and indeed the 
Sergeant’s focus group presented such a view. However, when the 
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interviewees are unanimously presenting previously identified concern, but 
declining to express it to their managers, then the actual effectiveness of those 
policies being implemented for the victim of crime need to be questioned. 
 
The need to produce quality data 
It can be argued that it does not matter how or why the BRM satisfaction gap 
became important, so long as this was being narrowed and the impact was 
improving trust and confidence then the outcomes were acceptable. Chapter 
four explained that the Home Office needed to set common standards nationally 
to ensure the data being obtained from the victim satisfaction surveys were 
compatible. This was to enable a national comparison of individual police 
organisation’s performance in line with NPM principles. The ‘Guidance on 
Statutory Performance Indicators for Policing and Community Safety’ (Home 
Office 2008b) provided a methodology for each organisation to follow. This 
established the user groups to be surveyed, the timing and reporting of each 
survey, the questionnaire framework and how data should be analysed. The 
data obtained by each police force would then populate the new APACS, which 
had replaced PPAF, with the intention of simplifying the performance landscape 
and aligning the key performance frameworks of community safety partners 
such as local government and the health service (Home Office 2008b). 
 
Both Interviewee 4 and Interviewee 5 described a process in which there was 
compliance with Home Officer guidelines. Monthly surveys would be completed 
on victims of violence, burglary, vehicle crime, racial incidents and, initially, road 
traffic collisions. From initial data supplied by Merseyside Police, the private 
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market research company would identify suitable survey participants after 
ensuring stated Home Office reasons to exclude a victim were applied (Table 
4.1). All results were categorised into crime types and stages of services. The 
marketing department then filtered these into individual BCU performance 
which populated the monthly report, which was circulated across the 
organisation.  
 
The Home Office (2006) had stated that this approach provided the police 
service with the opportunity to work with the private sector in developing 
processes and standards and reducing costs via economies of scale. However, 
this appears to ignore the warning provided by Eterno and Silverman (2012) 
when they state that the desire to be efficient and effective, in a business-like 
manner, does not always match the victim’s vision of success. 
 
Indeed, Interviewee 5 questioned the opportunity provided by the Home Office 
direction that private sector market research companies should be used; 
 
“There has been issues with every research company that we have had…. from 
basically not checking the data...not having the correct data parameters…when 
I have gone in and done spot checks (I have) realised that there have been 
questions missing…. instead of getting a month’s worth of data, maybe I have 
got 7 weeks of data, fields not filled in. There have been various issues.   
(Interviewee 5) 
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This challenges the view that the survey process was producing data of a 
standard which could be compared nationally, unless all police forces were 
using the same company which they were not. Interviewee 5 expressed further 
concern with regards to the initial tendering process used to identify the suitable 
private sector company to fulfil the contract: 
 
“When we put it (the contract) out to tender, because the survey is worth X 
amount of money, we have to put it out to tender. So, when they come in and 
we decide it’s based, more heavily weighted on cost. So, for instance (the 
current survey company) were the cheapest at the time. They are based down 
the south so quite a lot of the accents are southern. Obviously, we are based 
in the North West, so there is an issue with an accent there.” 
(Interviewee 5) 
 
Interviewee 5 went on to say that the previous company used by Merseyside 
Police had been based in Wales. The regional accent of the interviewers was 
a major issue, resulting in victims not understanding what was being asked. 
However, as a contract had been correctly tendered for there was no possible 
way of cancelling it. Therefore, confidence in the accuracy of the data being 
obtained was reduced, but Merseyside Police had to accept it as the measure 
of their victim satisfaction performance. 
 
Such problems with the quality of data being obtained from the victim 
satisfaction survey was apparent within many of the 24 victim interviews 
analysed. Regardless of whether the victim expressed satisfaction or 
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dissatisfaction, the delivery and communication skills of the interviewee 
appeared incredibly important to obtaining accurate data from which the BRM 
satisfaction gap could be measured.  
 
Table 5.6 showed 8 out of the 12 dissatisfied victims analysed appeared to have 
some issue with the survey process. This included the speed that the 
interviewer asked their questions, reflexivity of the interviewer, not reporting 
what was being said or the crime not fitting the set interview script. This resulted 
with some interviews being rushed and the interviewer looking for an 
appropriate brief answer that could be placed in the respective ‘drop down box,’ 
which needed to be completed before moving onto the next question. It was 
observed that one interviewer, who completed 7 of the 24 interviews sampled, 
had a very strong regional accent not from the North West. This hindered the 
interview process with the delivery appearing rushed with the script, provided 
by the Home Office via Merseyside Police, being rigidly followed. The following 
victim story highlights some of these points; 
 
Satisfied Victim 11: 
The victim was walking in Liverpool city centre late in the evening after 
finishing work when he was approached by two men who asked if they could 
borrow his mobile phone. On being refused one male head butted the victim. 
The victim was taken to hospital and the matter reported to the police. CCTV 
was examined but no witnesses or suspects were identified. The victim was 
kept updated but the crime was filed as undetected pending further 
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investigation. The VSS stated the victim was either very or completely 
satisfied with every stage of service. 
The interviewer’s style sounds rushed and impatient. She appears to have 
poor listening skills and often interrupted the victim. This appears to result in 
the listener struggling to keep up with the interviewer and the victim sounding 
confused and needing regular recaps of questions.  
 
Some of the data recorded appears questionable. The victim stated that he 
was ‘completely satisfied’ with actions taken by the officers. The following 
exchange then took place between the interviewer (I) and the victim (V): 
(I) “Why do you say that?” 
(V) “Because I am still waiting for (pause), the police has called and they 
say they want to get the picture from this fella and I am going to ring 
you but no one ring me.” 
(I) “You’re still waiting for what, sorry?” 
(V) “I am waiting for CCTV, I don’t know, I am still waiting, I don’t know?” 
(I) “Sorry?” 
(V) “Till now nothing is happening, the Police send me letter at my 
home….” 
(I) “But they have sent me a letter.” 
 
 
The last comment was spoken by the interviewer as she is typing the answer, 
which was recorded on the data for Merseyside Police’s attention as, “I am 
still waiting for CCTV and until now nothing is happening but they have sent 
a letter.”  
 
Whilst it could well be argued that the summary was factually correct, the 
listener is left wondering how satisfied the victim actually was, what was his 
understanding of what satisfaction is and what really were his concerns with 
the service provided.  
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This victim survey highlights an issue that was apparent in many of the 
interviews with victims. Any narrative had to be condensed to a maximum 
number of words due to limits set in the contract between Merseyside Police 
and the survey company. 
 
“The problem with the report, because they are in an Excel format, and again 
it’s money that’s the issue, the characters can only offer 250 characters. So 
quite often you get a taste of what they (the victim) are saying.”  
(Interviewee 5) 
 
Again, this questions’ the benefit of using a private market research company, 
who work to a set contract, to produce qualitative data that a police organisation 
is then measured by. It was noted that in all the 24 interviews analysed, 
narrative and information provided by the victim was omitted from the survey 
company’s monthly report supplied to Merseyside Police. This also appeared 
to highlight a reflexivity issue as the interviewer added their own interpretation 
of what the victim had said for brevity and speed.  
 
Dissatisfied Victim 12: 
The victim was working as a sub-post master and was serving a customer 
who was making a withdrawal. The victim had to interrupt their service due 
to a phone call. This resulted in the customer becoming annoyed and 
subjecting the victim to racial abuse. The matter was reported to the police 
and, although there was CCTV evidence, enquiries established that the 
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person making the withdrawal was not the named account holder. After 6 
months, the crime was filed stating there were no further lines of investigation. 
 
When surveyed the victim expressed dissatisfaction with all stages of service 
apart from arrival times.  
 
Throughout the whole survey the interviewer is rushed and appears to 
interpret the victim’s words to summarise what is being said: 
(I) “Did they investigate the scene of the crime, e.g. look for fingerprints 
or other evidence? 
(V) “There was no fingerprinting, no. 
(I) “Oh, they didn’t need to”. 
The interviewer recorded the answer for Merseyside Police as “They didn’t 
need to.” Also, when asked why he was completely dissatisfied with the 
service provided the victim says: 
(V) “Because they told it was a racist incident and they have a unit called 
Sigma which should be dealing with the case, but having dealt with 
this Sigma, this section I would say is not fit for the purpose. 
 
 After some typing the interviewer says: 
 
(I) “And you say I do not see the purpose of it?” 
 
(V) ”It is not fit for purpose, yes of course. I think they are trying to fool the 
person to say they are doing this and that and in fact they are doing 
nothing.” 
This was recorded in the data sent back to Merseyside Police as “They dealt 
with Sigma and I do not see the purpose of it.” 
 
Due to the nature of the contract in place there is a requirement for the 
interviewer to condense the information provided. This creates the need for 
interpretation of the survey answers. In the above case, it resulted with the 
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message provided by the victim regarding the Sigma Unit, which may have 
been the real cause of dissatisfaction, being lost. There is concern expressed 
about this Merseyside Police hate crime unit, but this is never received by the 
organisation. Likewise, it would appear the victim is saying that no fingerprinting 
took place, which may or may not be an issue, however again this fact is not 
accurately reported in the write-up of the data. 
 
It was highlighted by Interviewee 5 that each interviewer of the private company 
had to complete a certain number of interviews each day. It was their opinion 
this resulted in many interviews being rushed. From the interviews analysed 
this again was an issue which impacted on the quality of the data being obtained 
and recorded. 
 
Dissatisfied Victim 1: 
The victim was in a Liverpool nightclub when he was ‘violently ejected by door 
staff. During this he was subjected to racial abuse. Two suspects were 
identified and interviewed by the CID. An evidence file was submitted to the 
CPS who instructed ‘no further action’. 
 
There is a sense that the whole survey is a rushed process. Once an answer 
of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ was provided then the interviewer moved onto the next 
question, ignoring any further qualitative data the victim wanted to provide. 
When asked if the reporting officer provided ‘practical help’ the victim asked 
what was actually meant by this. The interviewer stated, “like getting you 
home.” The victim, who in fact lived more than 200 miles away from 
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Merseyside, then focused on the issue of transport home. He replied that he 
did not get practical help and when the follow up question of “do you think 
they should have” is asked, he replies that as he has only been living away 
for seven months then the police should have assisted with transport home. 
It would appear the interviewer influenced this answer by providing an 
example of ‘transport home’. 
 
The methodology set by Merseyside Police followed the interview script 
provided by the Home Office. This required an interviewer to ask the question 
and record  the answer. However, the interviewers who complied with the script 
rigidly did not necessarily produce the quickest interview. More importantly the 
recording of each answer separately, without the interviewer referring to 
previous answers, contributed to the production of questionable data, with 
contradictory answers being left unchallenged. However, when an interviewer 
was prepared to venture from the script then accuracy was improved. 
 
Satisfied Victim 10: 
The victim was subject of a burglary at his home whereby entry was gained 
by smashing a window and his laptop and television were stolen. Police 
attended and fingerprints obtained at the scene resulted in a person being 
arrested and convicted at Crown Court.  
 
The victim’s initial response to the question “since the initial police response, 
have the police contacted you in any way, including latter, in relation to this 
incident?” was answered with “No”. Due to various comments, the victim had 
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already made, this appeared to be an incorrect answer. On this occasion, the 
interviewer took time to probe and repeat the question resulting in the victim 
changing the answer and allowed the recoding of accurate data.  
 
The way Merseyside Police obtained this victim satisfaction data from a phone 
survey was questioned during both interviews and focus groups. 
 
“The way the questions were phrased was creating confusion. The length of the 
questionnaire as well (interviews analysed lasted between 18 and 31 minutes), 
people were just answering yes and no probably still thinking about the previous 
question when the next ones on…to a certain extent the gap may well have 
been slightly artificial, artificial because of the survey method”. 
(Interviewee 4) 
 
“It all depends on what you ask and how you ask the questions…if you ring 
someone up and say are you happy with the police, the likelihood answer is no, 
cause they have been a victim of crime and they are not happy, and it’s not so 
much a reflection of the police, it’s a reflection that they are unhappy because 
they are a victim. If you ask the right questions, did the officer tell you about 
this, yes, and this, yeah. Then you say you are satisfied with the way the officer 
behaved and what happened.”  
(Sergeant’s Focus Group). 
 
Indeed, concern was expressed by four out of the five people interviewed 
regarding the accuracy of the Home Office guideline regarding how the PI 
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should be measured (Home Office 2008a) and the quality of the data produced 
by the victim satisfaction survey. However, regardless of this there was still a 
willingness to accept the data produced as a valid reason to change working 
practices and organisational policy. The apparent questionable nature of the 
survey data appears to only be considered for a short while before policy and 
direction was complied with. When questioned over their concerns, they were 
willing to express them with an apparent assumption that the issue was 
commonly known. However, these concerns are quickly forgotten when the 
survey data was presented as the benchmark for performance improvement. 
 
It is perhaps not surprising that no one in the Constable’s focus group 
expressed any concern over the accuracy of the methodology of the victim 
satisfaction survey. As mentioned, the Sergeants did pass comment over the 
way questions were asked of the victim; however, there was an apparent 
acceptance across all three groups that the data produced was accurate. 
Regardless of any representations they could have made, the organisation itself 
was accepting the quality of the data and thus there developed an apparent 
focus of ensuring performance data results, produced by the market research 
company, improved. However, in contrast Supt 2 stated he was still totally 
unconvinced by the methodology used by the victim satisfaction survey. But 
this concern was dismissed with an apparent shrug and an explanation that any 
survey method will have flaws. However, it is interesting to note the reply of 
Interviewee 5 when asked what they believed their work with the victim 
satisfaction survey had achieved: 
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“Complying with Home Office requirements. If I’m honest I don’t think anything, 
it all became performance led and (Data Analyst) will agree with me, it’s 
become about figures and it shouldn’t be about figures. The survey was never 
designed about figures, it was about addressing the problems and people are 
just getting ticks in boxes” 
(Interviewee 5) 
 
Summary 
This chapter has described how the BRM satisfaction gap became an important 
performance indicator for Merseyside Police. Although previous chapters have 
explained this was grounded in the Macpherson Report (1999), and intend as 
one of ten measures to assess the improvement of trust and confidence within 
BRM communities, this chapter suggests this was not the case for Merseyside 
Police. It has been said the focus came from a goal for Merseyside Police Chief 
Constable to be the best police service in the country. However, this begs the 
question “according to whom?” The provision of a set survey methodology by 
the Home Office was provided with the intention of obtaining data that could be 
comparable and used to make this assessment. However, regardless of 
warnings received from outside of the organisation this was accepted as 
accurate and, although concerns were expressed privately, no one interviewed 
appeared to have had the motivation to challenge it in a meaningful way. This 
resulted in the data obtained being used to influence policy for those officers 
dealing with victims of crime and acting as the parameter from within which the 
challenge of narrowing the BRM satisfaction gap was required to be made. 
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Indeed, this does then question whether the Macpherson Report did transpire 
to be such a seminal monument, as stated by Rowe (2004). Supt 1 explained: 
 
“Our focus (within the Citizen Focus department) was on the performance 
indicators, it was driven by the PI’s, it was not driven by the content of the 
Macpherson report…. the links through to the Macpherson report and levels of 
satisfaction and confidence weren’t there. The whole focus was on the 
performance indicator.”  
(Supt 1) 
 
The next chapter will consider how the direction given by the Chief Constable, 
to focus on the performance indicator developed into a performance 
management regime of the BRM satisfaction gap for Merseyside Police. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 165 
Chapter 7: Turning red to green: Performance 
Construction? 
 
 
Introduction 
Chapter six considered how Citizen Focus Policing came to prominence within 
Merseyside Police and thereby resulted in the BRM satisfaction gap 
performance indicator gaining a high profile. As indicated in that chapter, the 
motivation for this was not to improve trust and confidence within BRM 
communities, but instead to assist Merseyside Police in achieving the goal, set 
by the Chief Constable, of becoming the best police force in the country. The 
chapter concluded that the activities employed by Merseyside Police to narrow 
the satisfaction gap focused on the performance figures and missed the larger 
picture that had been proposed by the Macpherson Report (1999). 
 
This chapter considers the issue of performance management and how it 
influenced the way in which Merseyside Police tried to narrow the satisfaction 
gap. It will consider this in three sections. The initial discussion focuses on the 
performance management regime used and will consider those parallels which 
can be drawn with Compstat (Eterno and Silverman, 2012). The chapter will 
then examine the principles of the ‘Customer Service Recovery Opportunity’ 
(CSRO), which was initially proposed by the Home Office (2008b), and how 
Merseyside Police developed this to directly influence the data being obtained 
by the victim satisfaction survey. Finally, the chapter examines the issue of 
gaming, as previously highlighted by LeGrand (2003) and Bevan and Hood 
(2006), and concludes that although there was improvement recorded in the 
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BRM satisfaction gap, this could be attributed to activity other than the quality 
of service being delivered to the victim. 
 
Performance Management 
Chapter four showed how Merseyside Police developed a performance 
structure that used ‘Citizen Focus Champions’, within each BCU, who were 
held responsible for implementing the actions set by the Citizen Focus 
department. The progress of these actions were then monitored by the Citizen 
Focus Programme Board, which was chaired by the ACC Citizen Focus 
(Merseyside Police 2009). However, this structure was designed and 
implemented by the Citizen Focus department to ensure their initiatives and 
directions were being complied with across the force area. As chapter six then 
explained, there was a further performance regime introduced in Merseyside 
Police, because of Chief Constable direction, which focused on the whole 
Citizen Focus agenda within the BCU. Victim satisfaction performance formed 
a major part of this with the performance regime intended to hold Area 
Commanders to account and ensure there was sufficient performance 
improvement to enable positive national comparisons. 
 
However, Supt 1 confirmed it was the performance focus, which the Home 
Office placed on the BRM satisfaction gap being one of the measures they 
would use to assess efficiency and effectiveness, that resulted in this 
organisational attention. This presented the Citizen Focus department with a 
challenge when competing with the performance management regime that the 
ACC Operations was using to reduce crime and increase crime detection rates. 
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“You have got to remember that the organisation was steeped in this 
performance culture, driven by Crimefighters, driven in this brutal and 
humiliating regime and we (Citizen Focus department) had to get on a par with 
it, we had to get people to think about (it). Well, if you recall (the Chief 
Constable) introduced Total Policing. Total Care for Victims; Total War on 
Crime; Total Professionalism. We had to get Total Care for Victims on a par 
with Total War on Crime to garner any interest at all. And we never managed 
it, never ever managed it.” 
(Supt 1) 
 
Crimefighters 
It was explained, by all three Superintendents interviewed, that ‘Crimefighters’ 
was Merseyside Police’s quarterly to monthly performance meeting. The 
format, style and frequency changed over the years but it always required the 
Area Commander and members of the Command Team, from each BCU, to 
attend a meeting where the ACC Operations would question them over their 
previous month’s performance. This mirrored the ‘Compstat’ style, as described 
by Eterno and Silverman (2012), where police commanders were held 
personally accountable for their area’s performance. Supt 1 description of a 
brutal and humiliating regime appears to agree with the view of Bevan and 
Hood (2006) that these performance management processes contained an 
element of real terror. 
 
Once the Chief Constable had instructed the ACC’s for Citizen Focus and 
Operations to ensure performance improved for victim satisfaction and the 
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BRM satisfaction gap, as explained in chapter four, ‘Crimefighters’ became the 
main way of tracking this. However, Supt 1 explained the Citizen Focus 
department experienced difficulties with designing a performance structure for 
the meeting process. The victim satisfaction survey was completed for victims 
whose crimes were around eight to twelve weeks old, with the performance 
figures being published a further three to four weeks later. This time lag did not 
dovetail naturally into the ‘Crimefighters’ monthly performance review style, 
being used at that time, therefore Supt 1 says they were always set to fail. 
 
“Our data only comes out monthly; the rest of the stuff (for Crimefighters) comes 
out daily. But not only does it come out monthly, its two months behind….so to 
garner any interest it was really, really difficult”. 
 (Supt 1) 
 
Therefore, to support the monthly performance process it was decided the 
BCU’s needed support from the Citizen Focus department to improve the 
Command Team’s knowledge and develop interest. To do this a series of 
workshops were arranged. 
 
“We showed them that this is what victim satisfaction is, this is what you can 
do. The Marketing team did some analysis and identified that there are two key 
things. One within ‘Actions Taken’ and one within ‘Further Contact’. If you just 
do those two things it has a disproportionate impact on the levels of victim 
satisfaction as measured by the company.” 
(Supt 1) 
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This confirms the approach, initially described in chapter four, of targeting 
specific stages of service for the victim, with the expectation it would then have 
a positive impact on performance. However, this approach appears to ignore 
the wider issue of how legitimacy, as raised by Tyler (2005, 2006), can impact 
on a victim’s satisfaction level. However, Foster, Newburn and Souhami’s 
(2005) have already stated that police forces will tend to focus attention on 
performance most obviously identifiable and achievable. The data produced 
from the victim satisfaction survey allowed the Citizen Focus department to 
graphically track each BCU’s stage of service performance, for each crime 
type. The data was also broken down into the individual ‘critical inputs’ that 
made up each of the stages. A fall in a stage of service performance could then 
be explained by a failure to deliver a specific critical input, within that stage of 
service, to the victim of crime. This then allowed the Citizen Focus department 
to highlight where the officers were going wrong and action plan the BCU with 
the required improvement. However, this again appears to also highlight 
Foster, Newburn and Souhami’s (2005) concerns. Such an approach can 
cause problems with routine working practices focusing on the service delivery 
which delivers quick wins. This in turn encourages police to ignore the more 
difficult issues which require a victim to be considered in a more structurally 
informed fashion and thereby need a tailored made service, delivered for 
specific victims and communities, to increase trust and confidence. 
 
Problems of priority 
Supt 1 explained that due to the management structure of Merseyside Police, 
the ACC Citizen Focus was always struggling to obtain full cooperation and 
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compliance from each BCU. To try and address this, a quarterly inspection 
process for each BCU was introduced whereby citizen focus “mimicked” the 
process used by the ACC Operations to drive performance. For this, the Citizen 
Focus department researched each BCU’s performance from the previous 
quarter and compiled a portfolio which they would then audit and inspect each 
BCU with. 
 
“The ACC (Citizen Focus) is trying to influence a whole organisation….and (the 
ACC) is not their (the BCU) boss. The (ACC) wasn’t in charge of the BCU’s, 
that came under (ACC) Ops (Operations) so they had to influence them 
somehow. So, the option was we can either go there and shout and ball and 
say this, that and the other, like (ACC Operations) did, (that) regime was 
described to me as brutal. Or we can go and we can convince them (The BCU 
command team) that it’s the right thing to do and use powers of persuasion in 
order to get them to do it” 
(Supt 1) 
 
Although this appears to acknowledge the application of the ‘Compstat’ style of 
performance management to Citizen Focus and the BRM satisfaction gap was 
not necessarily the right approach, the motive for this change is unclear. Was 
this done as a result of a critique of the performance management process 
questioned by Eterno and Silverman (2012) and Bevan and Hood (2006)? Supt 
1 said this was not the case. Instead, it was a desire to present the BCU’s with 
an alternative, compassionate approach in the hope it would result in 
compliance and better performance for the Citizen Focus portfolio. 
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This research has been unable to ascertain how successful this approach was. 
However, Supt 2 does describe a more supportive quarterly inspection style 
being adopted by ACC Citizen Focus, but again it is not clear how this 
influenced the support of the BCU for the Citizen Focus agenda. Instead, Supt 
1 described further problems the Citizen Focus department experienced at the 
monthly Crimefighters when trying to hold the BCU’s to account within that 
forum. The meeting was chaired and run by the ACC Operations, and they 
often found there was a fight for time and priority with regards to their portfolio. 
 
“ACC Citizen Focus wasn’t there, one famous one, something like two and a 
half, three-hour meeting…. I was representing (ACC Citizen Focus) I got seven 
minutes at the end. I had a lot of slides to go through and I got seven minutes 
at the end. That was the focus of victim satisfaction that was coming from (ACC 
Operations). 
(Supt 1) 
 
How successful was the performance management approach? 
The Citizen Focus department failed in raising the profile on a par with ACC 
Operation’s focus on crime reduction and detection rates within Crimefighters. 
However, their quarterly inspections provided a captive audience within each 
BCU to enable a focus on performance management. That being said, Supt 3 
questioned how successful the whole performance management process was 
in producing an increase in victim satisfaction and narrowing the BRM 
satisfaction gap. Indeed, he appears to believe it encouraged a process 
inconsistent with service delivery. 
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“I don’t think there’s that many people, police officers that actually; one, 
understand it completely and two, constantly think about it. I just think that they 
are so busy trying to do the right thing, hopefully…. it’s only when senior officers 
kind of ask them, and when your graph in the BCU, the gaps’ widening that 
pressure is put on police officers, that they even pay attention to be honest…. 
when you get an inspection coming, a quarterly inspection and they would say 
your gap’s too big, close it. I would then go on parades and people would say, 
“oh it’s difficult to actually close and blah, blah blah. I don’t think there’s much 
attention paid to it to be honest.”  
(Supt 3)   
 
Likewise, Supt 2 expressed concerns and felt the approach was to negate 
Merseyside Police from being highlighted by the Home Office as a poor 
performer, which then resulted in Merseyside Police never fully investing in the 
principles surrounding the BRM satisfaction gap. 
 
“It was almost like a nod to the fact well we’ve got to do this and to keep away 
any wider scrutiny from like HMIC (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabularies) 
or whatever, cos you knew that if you showed out in the league table, as in 
below the line in terms of your most similar forces, you know there would be 
loads of questions being asked and you will get snap inspections etc. So, I think 
some of that, some of what we did was motivated towards keeping that away.” 
(Supt 2) 
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Supt 1 disagreed with this sentiment as he was clear that performance 
management was employed to establish improvement and thereby become the 
best police force in the country. However, it appears questionable as to whether 
this message was cascaded to those delivering the service. The Constables 
questioned the whole performance management process used by Merseyside 
Police. 
 
“Somebody had identified something and its changes for changes in the police 
as you well know. This month’s flavour of the month will be this and next month 
it will be that. And next month you won’t hear anything about this month’s, and 
what was six months ago, you will never hear about that again, and next month 
it’s something else.” 
(Constable’s Focus Group) 
 
To support this, the Constables confirmed that in their experience the BRM 
satisfaction gap had been focused on a few years previously when there were 
presentations given to them and visible marketing material, such as posters, 
displayed at the police station. However, since then there was a consensus 
that there had been no further update on performance or reminders as to what 
they should be doing to narrow the gap. One Constable supported the view 
previously provided by Supt 3. 
 
“Only if it went horrifically bad, and someone said right this has gone horrifically 
bad, would there be a push.” 
(Constable’s Focus Group) 
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The Sergeants took a slightly more managerially supportive view to the 
performance process. 
 
“I know we look at red and greens, but we try and reduce problems but we still 
encourage everyone to report crime. And it’s not just the BRM groups cause 
we need to establish what your (the victim) problems are.” 
(Sergeant’s Focus Group) 
 
The term ‘red and greens’ refer to how the performance data was presented in 
the monthly performance management charts. If a performance indicator was 
on target then it was shown with a green background. If not, then red was used. 
This phrase appears to be stated whenever someone wanted to imply that 
performance management took the quantitative approach of ensuring all 
performance indicators were on target, rather than giving consideration for 
qualitative matters. 
 
So, following on from the direction given by the Chief Constable, the Citizen 
Focus department introduced a performance management process that they 
believed would deliver the required performance. However, as mentioned in 
the previous chapter, it was acknowledged these measures were designed 
purely to improve the published performance figures. There was no 
consideration of the possible influences on victim satisfaction other than ways 
of positively influencing the data produced by the survey.   
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At that time, it was said by participants that, Merseyside Police had an 
embedded performance culture that focused on the quick, obviously identifiable 
and achievable, monthly wins, as predicted by Foster, Newburn and Souhami 
(2005). However, this performance culture appears to have hindered the 
Citizen Focus department as their ACC jockeyed for position with the ACC Ops 
for BCU priority. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the BRM 
satisfaction gap performance did improve. Either the performance 
management process was delivering what it was intended to do or other tactics 
were being used by Merseyside Police to influence the data. 
 
Customer Service Recovery Opportunity 
Chapter four explained that the principle of service recovery was proposed by 
the Home Office (2008b) when it recommended that police forces should 
consider establishing a service recovery protocol. This was to be offered to 
suitable dissatisfied victims of crime by the interviewers of the victim satisfaction 
survey. The protocol, they said, should provide a mechanism for reparation, 
however, Merseyside Police developed this principle.  
 
Merseyside Police used the Customer Service Recovery Opportunity (CSRO) 
to call a victim of crime at the initial stages of an investigation to ascertain how 
satisfied they currently were with the service provided (Merseyside Police 
2009a) and then “put back on track” any bad or poor service received. This, 
they believed, would lead to a victim being more likely to express satisfaction 
when surveyed. It was further said that the CSRO process could be used to 
provide an opportunity to identify reasons why BRM victims were not satisfied 
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with the service provided. This appears to be a fundamentally different process 
to the one suggested by the Home Office.  
 
CSRO the Merseyside way 
Chapter five explained that it was not the initial intention to interview Supt 3. 
However, having been cited by all the interviewees as being the person who 
introduced the CSRO process within Merseyside Police, it appeared important 
to gather their view. Supt 3 provided the following explanation. 
 
“It wasn’t borrowed from somewhere else. It came from professional experience 
that BRM victims, I wasn’t convinced, and to a degree still aren’t. Wasn’t 
convinced at the time that their needs were adequately being considered and 
taken care of… we would ring back initially racist crimes, but then I would look 
and there are very few BRM victims in general actually, so I said actually let’s 
do more.” 
  (Supt 3) 
 
But Supt 3 went on to explain that the idea came from a phone call received 
from a garage, after a car had been repaired, which asked if the service 
provided had been satisfactory. This formed the belief that adopting a similar 
approach for crime victims would allow for dissatisfaction to be identified and 
addressed at an early stage. 
 
This new Merseyside Police approach proactively sought out dissatisfied 
victims, whilst the Home Office (2008b) recommended a need for a reactive 
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process if dissatisfaction was identified as part of the victim satisfaction survey. 
Supt 1 explained that ACC Citizen Focus became aware of the system and 
requested each BCU to replicated it for their BRM victims. However, this 
practice was then developed even further. 
 
Chapter four explained that CSRO calls were to be made prior to the victim 
being contacted by the private research company conducting the victim 
satisfaction survey (Merseyside Police, 2009a). It was said this was to enable 
poor service to be corrected and thus improve overall service delivery prior to 
the victim satisfaction survey. However, Supt 3 confirms this was carefully 
designed to have maximum impact on the data collection of the victim 
satisfaction survey. 
 
“It (the CSRO call) was set at 9 or 12, 6 and 12? Whatever, I followed the 
(survey company) model for the CSRO.” 
(Supt 3) 
 
Supt 2 stated that another important part of the CSRO was for the person 
updating the victim to run through the actions that had already been completed 
during the investigation. It had been highlighted by the Marketing Department 
that often the victim was unaware of a lot of detail of their crime, whether CCTV 
had been checked or house to house enquiries had been completed. 
Therefore, it was believed that when asked the direct question, during the victim 
satisfaction survey, a negative answer was creating further dissatisfaction. A 
 178 
reminder to the victim, just prior to the possible victim satisfaction survey, was 
thought to increase the chances of a positive view being expressed. 
 
The reality of the CSRO 
Merseyside Police, then implemented a policy whereby every BRM victim of 
crime would get a phone call, not necessarily from the reporting or investigating 
officer, a week after reporting the crime and again prior to week nine. This was 
intended to put right any poor service identified and to remind the victim what 
actions had so far been completed as part of the investigation. It was concluded 
that this would result in higher levels of satisfaction. 
 
However, analysis of dissatisfied victims appears to question how well the 
CSRO policy was complied with. Table 5.6, which tracks the emerging themes 
of the twelve dissatisfied victims analysed, shows that seven out of the twelve 
victims state they were not kept informed of their investigation, whilst two 
directly questioned the call back process of the CSRO, as highlighted below. 
 
Dissatisfied Victim 6 
The victim was crossing the road with her young child when a taxi drove past 
her. The driver shouted, “You black bastard, where have you came from”. 
The victim stated she was very distressed and went home as quickly as 
possible where she called the police. 
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An investigating officer was allocated to the crime. He initially contacted the 
victim five days after the incident was reported. However, Victim Support then 
phoned the officer two days later, in an attempt to get an update for the victim. 
 
The investigation revolved around CCTV evidence, which ultimately proved 
unsuccessful. However, it this enquiry took 6 weeks to progress, whilst the 
victim had no documented update. When the crime was finally filed 
undetected, the contact phone call to the victim informing her of this went 
unanswered. There were no further attempts made to inform the victim. 
 
When surveyed the respondent was completely dissatisfied with the actions 
taken, follow-up and whole experience of the service provided. 
 
“No one rang me back, I had to ring them back every single time to see where 
they are up to. All I got was a phone call asking for a survey. I got a letter 
saying they looked at CCTV and found nothing. It was not worth me reporting 
it because no one took it seriously” 
 
 
“When I reported it and the way it was dealt with I did not get a good service 
from the police. I do not think they took it seriously and I had to phone them 
to check if they had looked at CCTV”. 
 
The victim further describes an experience of never being able to speak to 
the investigating officer and always being put through to an answer phone 
which then took two to three days for an officer to respond to. This resulted 
in a feeling that the police did not take the matter seriously. When asked if 
they would report a similar incident he states, “Not anymore after today cause 
I lost confidence”. 
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About six weeks after reporting the incident, the victim states they had a call 
from police, which was described as a survey. This was the CSRO but it 
would appear the victim did not appreciate the call and stated that feedback 
was not good as he had not been given any updates. It appears that at that 
stage it was too late to recover the poor service that had already been 
provided.  
 
It is interesting to note that the interviewer did not recognise they were not 
speaking to the victim, who was a woman, but instead was speaking to the 
victim’s husband. He answered the questions as the victim and states ‘I 
showed them were the incident took place, I told them where the CCTV is, I 
told them what time it was’. 
 
It is not possible to establish why this happened. Throughout the crime 
investigation the Investigating Officer was only able to provide updates to 
the husband who would appear to have been the point of contact. From 
the husband’s point of view, it is impossible to say if his dissatisfaction is 
also that of his wife’s or not. However, the issues he raised were valid, 
whilst the listener can only speculate as to whether it was due to culture 
or other reasons as to why this took place.  
 
The above example appears to question the effectiveness of the CSRO. The 
victim viewed it as another survey which questions the way in which the call was 
being made. Although it would appear policy was complied with and the CSRO 
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call was made in time, it is apparent that at that stage the victim was already 
dissatisfied with the service provided and no general calls could recover it. The 
cause for the dissatisfaction appears to agree with Skogan’s (2005) view that a 
major determinant of satisfaction with police encounters are found in the things 
that police do at the time, by officers being polite, fair attentive and willing to 
explain what was going on. This then questions the validity of the Merseyside 
CSRO and its ability to recover dissatisfaction once embedded. 
 
However, there were also examples of the CSRO apparently contributing 
towards satisfaction. 
 
Satisfied Victim 5 
The victim was in her house when she heard a bang against a window. She 
immediately checked and could see it was cracked and two men were 
walking away. She believed she was being targeted due to her ethnicity and 
so the crime was recorded as racially motivated. 
 
There were few lines for the investigation to follow and after initial contact the 
victim was not re-contacted for a month until a CSRO call was made. This 
noted that the victim was never informed that the crime had been effectively 
closed and filed. 
 
When surveyed the victim stated she was very satisfied with actions taken, 
follow-up and whole experience.  
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“I am happy with the way the Police dealt with the incident and they are still 
dealing with things now”. 
 
“The Police have been coming back to us and letting us know what is 
happening”. 
 
Throughout the interview there is a sense that the victim is confused as to the 
purpose of the satisfaction survey. It appears that the CSRO process assisted 
in providing them with a feeling that some activity was taking place as a result 
of the crime report. However, it is interesting to note that when asked the 
question “did you expect to be contacted by the Police” the victim replied 
“No”. 17 of the 24 victims stated this. 
 
Although this appears to provide an example of where the CSRO has improved 
a victim’s satisfaction, it does also raise a question of how high the victim’s 
expectations were in the first place. This issue will be explored more in the next 
chapter. 
 
Merseyside Police (2009a) stated every BRM victim would get a CSRO call. 
This was intended to be above and beyond any update provided by the 
investigating officer. However, the victims included in this research, question 
how well this guideline was complied with. Seven of the twelve dissatisfied 
victims stated they had not been kept informed of progress with their 
investigation. How could this be if there was a CSRO process in place? Some 
victim’s stories question whether this was indeed the case. 
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Dissatisfied Victim 10 
The victim was working as a security guard in a supermarket when he saw a 
man hide meat in his coat and try to leave without paying. The security guard 
stopped the man outside the shop and was subjected to a barrage of abuse, 
including being called a “Nigerian monkey” and “You black monkey, you 
fucking Nigerian”. He was able to persuade the man to go back into the store 
where the police were called. Whilst waiting the man become more abusive 
and punched the guard in the face.  
 
The man was arrested and after initially being bailed for further enquiries, he 
was charged with theft and racially aggravated common assault. He 
subsequently pleaded guilty at court and amongst other things received a 
three-year restraining order to stay away from the victim and the 
supermarket.  
 
Police say the victim was provided with two updates via email. However, it is 
unclear if the victim provided an email address for this purpose and remained 
dissatisfied with the service provided. He said; 
 
“They told me they would do something about it, but I did not hear anything”. 
 
“They never did keep their promises or contact me”. 
 
“They never did take it seriously”. 
 
It is interesting to note the victim further stated; 
 
“He punched me in the face, and the manager there told me that the police 
would never take it seriously….and the police come, you explain everything 
and they write everything down, they never take it serious, never”.  
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This crime resulted in an arrest, a guilty plea at court with a three-year 
restraining order. This appears to be a positive result, yet the victim is 
dissatisfied as the police failed to keep him updated at any stage. It appears 
the warning given to him by his manager had a major impact as he repeated 
it on several occasions throughout the survey. 
 
This story supports the view of Merseyside Police that providing victims with 
updates is vital to securing satisfaction. However, it also questions the 
robustness of the CSRO process. The victim worked in several stores across 
Merseyside, however neither the investigating officer nor the person 
completing the CSRO took the time to find out where he was working. Instead 
they contacted the store where the crime took place and recorded that the 
victim was unavailable. This resulted in the victim never being informed of the 
positive result of the police actions and confirming the opinions placed in him 
by his manager. 
 
Skogan (2005) stated that a person’s view of the police can have a greater 
impact on their interpretation of a recent police encounter than the actual 
performance of the officer. When considering this, the expectation of 
Merseyside Police that providing a good service on the day or quickly repairing 
a poor service with a phone call would result in satisfied victims appears 
misplaced. However, there were opinions that this approach was a success; 
 
 “There was less CSRO bought to our attention because we were getting it right, 
the initial actions at scene, the ease of contact. So, because we were 
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concentrating on the key stages of service delivery then we had less and less 
recovery opportunities.” 
(CID Focus Group) 
 
Others also considered the CSRO an effective tactic to improve satisfaction. 
 
 “There you’ve got an opportunity to do your Customer Service Recovery 
Opportunity at the point of contact. So, you’re immediately getting better 
answers to our questions.” 
(Supt 1) 
 
Although Merseyside Police’s CSRO process did not comply with the guidelines 
set out by the Home Office (2008b), this matter was overlooked in the interests 
of improving performance. The CSRO process required a BRM victim to be 
called twice, with the second call taking place just prior to when the victim 
satisfaction survey was likely to make contact. This, therefore, appears to allow 
for an allegation that reactive gaming was taking place. Merseyside Police 
broadly shared the goals of the Home Office but used the CSRO as an 
opportunity to game the target system (Bevan and Hood 2006, LeGrand 2003). 
This poses the question that if this was the case, then what other measures 
were being used? 
 
Gaming 
In chapter four it was highlighted how Bevan and Hood (2006) consider the 
manipulation and gaming of performance figures to be, at some level, 
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inevitable. This, they said, was because the setting of targets and performance 
measurement invites such working practices within service-providing units. This 
will always be the case unless there is a large amount of transparency 
embedded in the performance management process. 
 
It has already been shown by Supt 1 that the working practices employed by 
Merseyside Police to gain a narrowing of the satisfaction gap was always 
focused on the quick win of changing performance data rather than the, 
apparently, more complicated issue of improving trust and confidence. This can 
be evidenced by the way the CSRO was developed to directly influence the 
victim satisfaction survey results by making calls to victims between six to eight 
weeks after the crime had been reported. It should be noted there was no 
evidence presented to show that a CSRO call was ever made to a victim after 
this time, even though many crimes were still being investigated. Once there 
was no further likelihood of a victim being surveyed, there was a distinct lack of 
interest in keeping the victim of crime informed. However, Supt 1 is very clear 
about this; 
 
“But that’s all we were interested in. It was never about trust and confidence, 
we were only interested in the performance on the survey.” 
(Supt 1) 
 
Unintentional screening process 
The Home Office (2008b) provided each force with a draft user satisfaction 
questionnaire that their survey process was expected to implement. This 
 187 
provided a preamble for the interviewer to follow that informed the victim of the 
purpose of the call, the identity of the caller and how the victim could confirm, 
with Merseyside Police, that the call was legitimate. At the end of this process 
the victim was asked if they were prepared to take part in the survey. 
Interviewee 5 highlighted a problem with this; 
 
“With different ethnicities the less trust, some of them are less trusting of the 
police so you might find quite often you might not have had enough victims to 
interview (within the raw data of victims supplied to the survey company) as 
they refused to take part in the survey. When they have cleansed the sample, 
validated the sample, they didn’t want to be interviewed. So, you need to take 
that into account. What we use to have coming back from the Crimefighters 
was, well there was twenty victims, why did you only interview three?” 
(Interviewee 5) 
 
Asking a victim if they are prepared to take part in a survey is an appropriate 
question. However, the nature of trust within BRM communities towards the 
police appears to make this a little more complex. Interviewee 5 proposed the 
satisfaction questionnaire provided an initial screening process that benefited 
Merseyside Police. If a victim is so distrustful of the police, they may well refuse 
to take part in the victim satisfaction survey. Thereby they never express their 
dissatisfaction which then went unreported in the monthly data. Indeed, chapter 
three has shown that Fukuyama (1995) would agree with this conclusion. A 
victim from a low trust community, with strong families but relatively weak 
bonds of trust amongst people unrelated, who are reluctant to place trust in an 
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organisation, may be less willing to take part in the victim satisfaction survey 
for the police organisation, which they do not trust. However, a victim from a 
high trust community that develop strong bonds of association and trust beyond 
the family may well be more likely, as they are more likely to trust the police. 
When considering this in tandem with Brandl et al (1994) and Keenan’s (2009) 
view that prior opinion contributes greatly in forming a person’s view of 
satisfaction, it is possible to conclude that the satisfaction questionnaire 
provided an unintentional screening out process of, potentially, the most 
dissatisfied victims. A person with low trust in the police would be more likely 
to express dissatisfaction about the service provided compared to a victim with 
high trust. 
 
It would be unfair to present this ‘screening process’ as an example of gaming 
by Merseyside Police, but it does appear to have been an identified issue that 
was not addressed. Indeed, when considering the numbers proposed by the 
Marketing Officer, this screening may have removed a substantial number of 
dissatisfied victims from the victim satisfaction survey process and thereby 
incorrectly narrowed the BRM satisfaction gap for Merseyside Police. 
 
The removal process 
The Home Office (2008b) provided a list of victims they said should be excluded 
from the victim satisfaction survey (Table 4.1). Chapter four has expressed 
concern that this allowed a police force to retain their individual discretion as to 
when a victim should be excluded from a survey, whilst no advice was given as 
to how this discretion should be applied. The guidelines also allowed a police 
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force to exclude victims who had immediately expressed dissatisfaction by 
making a complaint against the police or showed a lack of confidence so did 
not cooperate with the investigation. However, Interviewee 4 suggested 
Merseyside Police developed this removal process to the benefit of their 
performance figures with little regard to Home Office guidance; 
 
“Now the removals can be if they don’t understand the questionnaire…. I will 
look to see what they have answered to one question say they are very satisfied 
and the next they totally contradict themselves or they haven’t understood the 
question, they are generalising…we are asking them about the service on this 
occasion…. The fact that we have it removed is because, you know, it’s not a 
true reflection of what we are asking, all be it we should do something about it.” 
(Interviewee 4) 
 
Interviewee 4 described a working practice whereby each BCU was 
encouraged by the Citizen Focus department to investigate every one of their 
dissatisfied victims, on a monthly basis, to understand why they were so 
dissatisfied. However, part of this process involved a consideration of whether 
the dissatisfied victim’s response could be removed from the data, under the 
pretext of complying with one of the Home Office guidelines as in table 4.1 
(Home Office 2008b). This resulted in the BCUs proactively using the removal 
process to benefit their performance data. The fact that both Interviewee 4 and 
Interviewee 5 confirmed this was never applied to any surveys which related to 
satisfied victims, supports this view. Such a process appears to be a clear 
example of reactive gaming, as highlighted by LeGrand (2003) and Bevan and 
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Hood (2006). The removal process, as outlined by the Home Office, was used 
as an opportunity to unfairly improve performance data. However, when 
questioned further, Interviewee 4 justified the practice; 
 
“Yes, but that’s what the survey is for. The survey is for on this occasion do you 
think the actions that the Police took, and if they start talking about treatment, 
how I was treated, well we are not talking about actions. You are not listening.” 
(Interviewee 4) 
 
This is the participant’s interpretation of the guidelines. Interviewee 4 saw the 
victim satisfaction survey purely as measuring performance of a specific crime 
report, with the surveyed dissatisfied victim having to provide information in the 
exact order for their views to be included. It was not viewed as a way of 
measuring the wider issues of trust and confidence and those diverse 
contributing factors which have already been discussed at length. Indeed, if a 
victim expressed such a view unconnected to that crime being surveyed, then 
Interviewee 4 would deem this a reason to remove the survey from the 
database, but of course only if they were dissatisfied. 
 
“You have got a set of questions in actions taken and they (the victim) say yes 
to all the questions. We have got a positive answer and it gets to the satisfaction 
level question, well are you satisfied and you are expecting someone who has 
said ‘yes’ all the way through that section to be satisfied, and they go completely 
dissatisfied. Why do you say that? Oh, they didn’t go and check CCTV so it 
 191 
was lost. Well that questions not on the survey. So, all those question to me 
are made redundant…” 
(Interviewee 4) 
 
However, it would appear at times the BCU’s tried to apply the removal process 
too broadly for the organisation to accept. 
 
Dissatisfied Victim 7 
The victim was walking through a park with his girlfriend when a group of up 
to 20 young people shouted abuse at him including the words “Jaffa” and 
“Gay”. He believed this was due to his ethnicity. Police were called, but he 
did not want to make a formal crime report as he stated police could not do 
anything to help. This was, however, recorded as a hate incident and 
allocated an investigating officer who after three days stated there were no 
lines of investigation. The victim was informed of this via letter after phone 
calls went unanswered. 
 
“Mainly it just turns out to be like when I reported the first incident, nothing 
was done this time round. I was promised a personal alarm and they were 
not sent to me, I had to go and collect them. There are not any patrols around 
as they promised and there are still violent people around”. 
 
“In both cases of me reporting hate crime, they have not taken enough 
evasive action. They did not keep their promises of patrolling the area and 
monitoring the area”. 
 
After the victim was surveyed and it was established he was dissatisfied with 
all the stages of service, the investigating officer’s supervisor reviewed the 
case. He requested that the survey be removed from the performance figures 
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as all the points the victim stated he was dissatisfied with had been covered 
during the investigation. On this occasion, this apparently cynical attempt to 
remove the survey was unsuccessful.  
 
However, it should be noted the victim’s dissatisfaction stemmed from a 
previous incident which, he said, resulted in him having an extremely low 
opinion of Merseyside Police. On that occasion, he made a statement of 
complaint which, in his opinion, resulted in no action. This perception was 
reinforced during this second incident as he had previously been 
promised extra patrols in the park during key times. The fact that he had 
seen no visible evidence of this taking place resulted in him concluding 
that these ‘broken promises’ showed the police was not taking the matter 
seriously. This appears to be an example of confirmation bias (Brandl et 
al 1994) influencing satisfaction. 
 
Even though the above example shows the removal process was not an 
apparent ‘free for all’ to remove any dissatisfied victim, it appears to be a clear 
example of how people within Merseyside Police were trying to construct 
performance for the benefit of their own BCU. Such working practices appear 
to have been commonly accepted. Both Supt 2 and Supt 3 were aware of the 
practice but believed it to be a way of ensuring only appropriate data populated 
performance tables.  However, Interviewee 5 had a different view; 
 
“It’s biased, it’s trying to make the figures, it’s fudging the figures, I understand 
completely.”           (Interviewee 5) 
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Summary 
Chapter two stated the impact that NPM had on the BRM satisfaction 
performance indicator, and thereby trust and confidence, has never been 
examined. When considering Bevan and Hood’s (2006) point that the 
performance management aspects of NPM provided a regime of target setting 
against which performance was published, then it is possible for this research 
to comment on the possible impact. 
 
Chapter six described how the change of ACC Citizen Focus in 2010 resulted 
in a new focus for the team, from overall victim satisfaction to one looking solely 
at the BRM satisfaction gap. This resulted with it being on target for the first 
time, but to the apparent detriment of all other victim satisfaction performance 
indicators which were still being measured. 
 
This research has been unable to identify a connection between this change of 
focus towards the BRM satisfaction gap and the use of the removal process or 
CSRO to influence the recorded levels of performance. However, the timeline 
of when the CSRO became embedded within the organisation, as described by 
Supt 1 and Supt 3, and the development of the removal process does correlate 
with the improvement of performance. To that end chapter six suggested the 
success of Merseyside Police purely focusing on the BRM satisfaction gap 
challenged the views of Brandl et al (1994), Skogan (2005) and Hinds and 
Murphy (2009) that satisfaction is driven by factors other than service delivery. 
However, it is this chapter’s conclusion that such a view cannot be drawn by 
the change in performance due to the apparent influence of corrupted 
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performance data. Bevan and Hoods (2006) explained that one type of gaming 
is output distortion, where the measured target is achieved at the cost of other 
significant but unmeasured aspects of performance. In this case victim 
satisfaction was still being measured but it was decided to distort performance 
to the benefit of the BRM satisfaction gap, as it had been decided this was the 
priority. It would appear that gaming, to a lesser or greater extent, contributed 
to this. 
 
The Macpherson Report (1999) stated trust and confidence needed to improve 
between BRM communities and the police. Even though chapter six and seven 
questions the motives for implementation and tactics used, if it still resulted in 
a service which benefited victims then it can be argued these actions were 
appropriate. Chapter eight will examine this from the victim’s point of view and 
see what sense they and the officers providing the service made of the BRM 
satisfaction gap process. 
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Chapter 8: What about the victim: ‘Never mind the 
quality, feel the width’ 
 
 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters have explained why the BRM satisfaction gap 
became an important performance indicator for Merseyside Police, along 
with the performance management structure and tactics used to improve 
the measured performance. Chapter seven described how the Citizen 
Focus department tried to use the established performance management 
process of ‘Crimefighters’ to deliver this change. However, this proved 
challenging due to publishing times of the victim satisfaction data, along with 
the embedded performance culture installed by the ACC Operations. 
Therefore, the Citizen Focus department introduced a quarterly inspection 
process which afforded them the undivided attention of each BCU. Again, 
they borrowed an established process that was being used by the ACC 
Operations in the hope that familiarity would garner support.  
 
Throughout this process, it was apparent the Citizen Focus department was 
looking for a way of delivering the results the organisation required, in the 
quickest and most straight forward way possible. However, it should be 
noted that Eterno and Silverman (2012) stated the desire to be efficient and 
effective, in a business-like manner, does not always match the victim’s 
vision of success. This chapter will examine how those measures introduced 
by Merseyside Police to narrow the satisfaction gap impacted on the victim 
of crime. It will also consider the sense Constables and Sergeants, the 
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people directly responsible for delivering the service, made of the process. 
It will conclude that the victim satisfaction survey was far removed from the 
principles of citizen focus policing and left the victim of crime often confused 
and frustrated. 
 
Critical Inputs on the service provided 
The Home Office (2008b) provided a questionnaire framework for each police 
organisation to use. This allowed for the victim survey to divide the service 
provided to each victim into stages of service from initial contact, actions taken, 
follow-up, treatment to whole experience. Within these stages the survey then 
asked the victim about those ‘critical inputs’ delivered by the individual officer 
(Merseyside Police 2008b). Table 4.4 highlighted those ‘critical inputs’ believed 
by the Citizen Focus department to have a positive influence on BRM 
satisfaction (Merseyside 2008a).  
 
These inputs highlighted activities such as carrying out an investigation at the 
scene, offering advice, initiating further contact and informing the victim of what 
would be done. Some may consider this as a standard service, which should 
be provided to all victims. However, this approach of purely concentrating on 
the service delivery to improve satisfaction ignored the views of Brandl et al 
(1994) and Hawdon (2008) who suggested that to improve satisfaction, police 
should focus on the public’s perception as well as the quality of service being 
delivered.   
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Regardless of this, both chapter six and seven explained how the Citizen Focus 
department used the structure of stages of service and critical inputs as a way 
of measuring how well police officers were delivering the service to the victim. 
Supt 1 previously explained that research, completed by Merseyside Police 
marketing department, highlighted the ‘actions taken’ and ‘follow-up’ stages of 
service had a disproportionate impact on the levels of victim satisfaction as 
measured by the survey company.  
 
Due to this, Merseyside Police introduced two force wide operations to raise 
the importance of these critical inputs. Supt 2 explained that Operation 
Morewood was designed to improve ‘follow up’. It required each BCU to provide 
an investigation update to as many victims of crime as possible within a set 
period of time. Each BCU’s performance was measured against the number of 
updates provided, to establish success. However, Operation Morewood was 
never benchmarked against the subsequent victim satisfaction surveys that 
were completed and therefore the ultimate success of it was never fully 
established. 
 
Operation Dauphine was intended to improve the actions, taken by the 
reporting officer, by measuring the compliance with the officer issuing a ‘victim 
contact sheet’. This sheet was a carbonated form which was to be completed 
at the time of reporting a crime and required the officer to tick off certain ‘critical 
inputs’ which had been completed. The form included the relevant reference 
numbers with a carbonated copy being left with the victim, intended to act as a 
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reminder of the actions which had been taken. However, again the motives for 
this appear to be organisational performance rather than victim needs driven. 
 
So, if they (the victim) had the slip of paper in front of them they could go ‘did 
the officer conduct a crime prevention survey of your premises?’, yes they’ve 
ticked the box, yes they did. Are you happy with that? Yes. So, we were 
introducing the wording from that used by the (survey) company into the front-
line policing.” 
(Supt 1) 
 
The success of this operation was measured by compliance with the form being 
scanned onto the computer record of the crime and not against the subsequent 
satisfaction data. Again, success with regards to how it influenced the victim 
satisfaction survey was not established by the Citizen Focus department. 
 
These operations tried to take a qualitative approach, to victim satisfaction and 
the BRM satisfaction gap, by appearing to focus on the service being delivered. 
But did they improve the actions taken and follow up which was being delivered 
to the victim? The following victim’s story would question this. 
 
Dissatisfied victim 2 
The victim was walking in a street when a car drove passed him and he heard 
someone shout “Hey, Nigger”. Two men then approached him from the car, 
grabbed and punched him, after which they took some of his belongings. The 
victim went home before reporting the incident to the police. However, it then 
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took over five days for police to attend and take the initial report. It was stated 
to him that no officers were available and the victim expressed complete 
dissatisfaction with actions taken, follow-up and the whole experience.   
The victim said; 
 
” I reported the incident and the police never came to investigate or to look 
for my belongings that were stolen. They have not till even now come to see 
me or to check the CCTV. They just never came”. 
 
“They never kept to their promises. They said someone would come to see 
me at least twice and they never even came out to the scene even up until 
now”. 
 
“I am dissatisfied with the way they responded to the matter. I was robbed 
and they took my jacket and passport and they never came out to help me 
look for it. They did not take it seriously. They did not even come to view 
CCTV” 
 
“I do not like the way they responded to the issue and maybe it was not an 
emergency, but it was serious. I was robbed before and I reported everything 
and last time they came after 5 days. This time they did not attend”. 
 
 
The main cause for dissatisfaction is due to police failing to attend when they 
said they would. However, it is only at the end of the interview it becomes 
apparent that the victim may well be talking about a more recent incident than 
the crime he was being surveyed for. The surveyed crime did indeed take the 
police five days to report and, it appears, this is the crime that the victim refers 
to at the end of the survey as an example of another time the police failed to 
attend on time. This issue is not picked up by the interviewer, who should 
have either started the interview again or reflected these issues in the 
narrative box available. 
 
From the victim’s survey, it appears he had been robbed twice in a matter of 
weeks, after which on both occasions the police provided either a poor or 
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non-existent response. He stated the police were unhelpful by not keeping 
their promises and did not take the matter seriously. The listener is left 
wondering how much of an influence the first incident had on his judgement 
of the second.  
 
At the end of the survey the victim states that if a similar thing happened 
again he would definitely not report it to the police. It would appear that 
he had lost trust in the police.  
 
The victim’s experience highlights several issues and questions the success 
that Operation Morewood and Operation Dauphine had on the service being 
delivered. The victim’s story also questions the ability of the satisfaction survey 
process to produce data of an acceptable standard, as it was not able to pick 
up on the individual characteristics of the case. This will be considered further 
at the end of the chapter.  
 
The narrative describes a victim experience which appears unacceptable to 
most. It is clear the dissatisfaction stemmed from a poor police response to 
report the crime. The guidance at that time, from the Citizen Focus department, 
was for BCU’s to focus on the stages of service their research had stated would 
have a disproportionate impact on performance. However, the fact that the 
victim has been victimised in a similar way on a recent occasion, and 
experienced a poor response to both, appears to put his dissatisfaction beyond 
the recovery of either Operation Dauphine or a CSRO. Indeed, the poor 
 201 
response times resulted in critical inputs within ‘actions taken’, such as 
investigating the scene or taking the matter seriously, becoming unachievable.  
 
Even more concerning is the language used by the offenders towards the 
victim. Comparing this to the murder of Stephen Lawrence (Macpherson 1999), 
it questions whether much had changed for the BRM victim. It has already been 
established in chapter six and seven that Merseyside Police was performance 
driven, with the amount of focus on improving trust and confidence being 
questioned. The fact it took this research half the time to identify the data set 
for satisfied victims of crime, January to March, compared to January to June 
for dissatisfied victims, may suggest there was some quality service being 
delivered to the BRM communities. However, the subsequent description of 
performance management, and the gaming which took place, casts doubt on 
the ability of the victim satisfaction survey to highlight any quality in the service 
that were a product of the policies from the Citizen Focus department. As can 
be seen from the below victim, satisfaction was sometimes present even when 
the service provided was questionable. 
 
Satisfied Victim 6  
The victim was working as a security guard in a supermarket when he 
stopped a person leaving the store suspected of stealing. As he escorted the 
man back to the shop’s office, his girlfriend approached him, called him a 
“Black cunt” and kicked him in the leg. She was detained and police attended 
and arrested her. 
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The woman was bailed for CCTV enquiries to be made. The victim was 
informed of this but did not receive a further call until a month later when he 
was told there were difficulties in obtaining a copy of the CCTV. The victim 
received two further updates; however, it is unclear whether he was informed 
of the final result. The suspect was subsequently charged after the survey 
had been completed and found guilty at court. The victim stated he was 
completely satisfied with all stages of services. 
 
“They reassured me that the way I had been dealt with was not acceptable 
and they gave me a contact number if I needed anything”. 
 
“They have been updating me they must have contacted me at least three 
times. They have done more than enough”. 
 
The victim appears a supporter of the police and gives the impression it 
would take a great deal of poor service to change his opinion. However, it 
should be noted that although there was a positive outcome to the 
investigation, at the time of the interview this had not yet been resulted. Thus, 
the listener is left wondering whether the victim’s assessment is totally 
reflective of the service provided at that stage. 
 
The satisfaction within the above example does not appear to reflect the service 
provided. There was a month’s delay in providing an update, even then this 
was to say difficulties were being experienced. The survey questions whether 
victim satisfaction reflects the service provided or is driven by opinion, previous 
experience and confirmation bias (Skogan 2005). 
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The Gold Service 
Chapter four explained that Merseyside Police introduced a ‘Gold Service’ for 
BRM victims of crime with the intention that it would narrow the BRM 
satisfaction gap. This was done even though there was an acknowledgement 
that a victim of crime, from any community, required a quality service to be able 
to express a high level of satisfaction (Merseyside Police 2009). Yet again the 
Citizen Focus department focused this initiative on the principles of stages of 
service and critical inputs. 
 
“It was introduced on the back of two things. One was actions taken, our 
performance wasn’t good…I sat in a meeting in (named BCU) and I asked them 
to show me the letters they sent to victims when their crimes were being written 
off. They gave me two different letters, they had different force crests, different 
content, different telephone numbers…we also recognised through a series of 
focus groups that the bobbies had no idea of the process that happens in crime 
investigation.” 
(Supt 1) 
 
From this it was decided that all BRM victims should receive a ‘Gold Service’ 
from the initial reporting officer, to address ‘actions taken’ stage of service, and 
the investigating officer, to address ‘follow up’, to secure their satisfaction. 
However, there was never a definition provided by Supt 1 of what a ‘Gold 
Service’ would look like and, more importantly, what it would include above and 
beyond the normal service provided to any victim of crime. Regardless the 
principle attracted support; 
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“We need to make sure that we give a good a service to the person of colour 
or protected characteristic person as possible.” 
(Supt 3) 
 
However, there was also concern expressed within Merseyside Police. Chapter 
six highlighted the views of a visiting academic and a representative of a 
national market research company with regards to the waste of police 
resources by focusing attention purely on the BRM community. There were also 
other concerns expressed with regards to the consequences of the ‘Gold 
Service’.  
 
“I think there was almost a backlash (from Police Constables), but in a subtle 
way of saying, ‘well why should we have to do something different for BRM 
victims. You know I am not being discriminatory, I’m giving the same service to 
all victims’ and I think this is where the lack of understanding will come.” 
(Supt 2) 
 
However, the Constables did not support this but instead provided a view that 
questions whether the ‘Gold Service’ ever existed other than in a name or the 
minds of more senior officers; 
 
“I think what you find is you go to a job and everyone gets what they need. If 
you go to an assault…. regardless of his BRM group and he was like ‘no I’m 
alright, I have had a bit of a kicking but I’m alright’...he gets that level of care. 
But if you went there and a victim is like ’Oh I’m traumatized by this assault’ but 
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it was the same level of assault then they might get a bit more in relation 
to…what do you think we can do for you. But if someone is ‘I have been 
assaulted, I’m not bothered. I don’t want to do anything’ then they get a certain 
level of care…. it’s got to be nothing to do with what sort of ethnic or BRM…you 
just go and you see to what they need.” 
(Constable’s Focus Group) 
 
Initially, the Constables appear to have taken a structurally informed view of the 
victim. There seems to be an agreement that certain groups or sections of 
society, for whom the harm done by criminal victimization, is a differential 
experience with not all sharing the same levels of vulnerability (Walklate 2007). 
However, when considering the issue of trust, as explained by Fukuyama 
(1995), the Constables’ approach may present a problem. Unlike, Supt 3 there 
appears to be no acceptance that the organisation needs assurances that a 
BRM victim of crime is given a good service. Rather, the victims’ attitude to the 
police will dictate the service provided to them. If there is an unwillingness to 
cooperate or a dismissive attitude shown for whatever reason, this appears to 
be judged on face value by the officers and their service tailored accordingly. 
However, such an attitude could be displayed due to the victim having a lack of 
trust in the police (Fukuyama 1995) or failing to view the police as a legitimate 
organisation (Tyler 2005). Indeed, if a victim had a similar experience as 
dissatisfied victim two, previously referred to in this chapter, then such an 
approach by the Constables could have fueled a feeling of dissatisfaction and 
lack of trust. 
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However, the Constable’s comments do question whether a ‘Gold Service’ 
existed in practical terms. This is further highlighted by the following victim. 
 
Dissatisfied victim 4 
The victim was at work in the city centre during her lunch break and having a 
cigarette in a public area. She was approached by a man who asked her for 
a cigarette. When she said no she was subjected to racial abuse of ‘Go back 
to your own country, go back on the banana boat, you’re over here taking all 
our jobs’. The police were contacted by another woman but the man had left 
before they arrived. 
 
A report was taken and an investigating officer allocated. He contacted the 
victim and checked CCTV. However, after a couple of weeks it was decided 
there were no further lines of investigation and the crime was filed as being 
undetected. The victim was then informed of this. 
 
The victim said; 
 
“I have seen the person that committed the crime against me on numerous 
occasions. When this happens, I have called the police but it has not been 
taken as a high priority”. 
 
I thought the police would take the case more seriously as they told me of the 
actions they would take. Since then I don’t think the incident has been taken 
seriously or followed up”. 
 
 
The grounds for the dissatisfaction stems from the police failing to respond 
whenever the victim phoned up to provide the location of the suspect. This 
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impacted on her views of the investigation, the follow up service and her 
whole experience.  
 
The victim is more than happy with how she was initially treated and states 
the officers communicated well, were sympathetic and treated her with 
respect. This could be a good service. However, the explanations and 
promises made at the time of reporting appear to be a source of the 
subsequent dissatisfaction; 
 
“I thought they would take it more seriously as they explained to me before 
the actions they would do. From the actions after I had contacted them, I don’t 
feel it’s been taken seriously or followed up completely”. 
 
The victim’s experience does suggest that a good service was initially provided. 
However, this may have raised expectations of the service which resulted in the 
subsequent poor contact producing even more dissatisfaction. 
 
The principles of providing a ‘Gold Service’ to BRM victims could be considered 
appropriate when reflecting on the views of Supt 3, regarding the need to 
provide a good service to the person of colour or protected characteristic. 
However, this appears to pose the question of whether it is achievable? What 
is different or added to the ‘Gold Service’ which ensures it is better than a 
service provided to other victims? Perhaps, more importantly, what is missing 
from the service provided to other victims? It is interesting to reflect on this 
whilst considering another point Supt 3 made. On discussing how the BRM 
 208 
satisfaction gap was measured, it was noted that one way of narrowing the gap 
was to ‘just make white victims less satisfied’. Whilst this was said somewhat 
tongue in cheek, this may have been a principle behind the ‘Gold Service’. 
However, Supt 2 raised other concern as to why the ‘Gold Service’ was needed 
and in turn why it may fail; 
 
“Racism or racist views is extreme, but I think along that spectrum towards 
racism. I think there will be officers with certainly strong prejudices, I would say, 
against BRM and prejudiced on resistance to what we were trying to do 
(introducing the ‘Gold Service’) as being seen as making BRM victims special 
really. ‘Why should they get special treatment’ you know, and I have heard that 
said.” 
(Supt 2) 
 
Who gets the ‘Gold Service? 
Like the Constables, the Sergeants also presented a view that questions 
whether the ‘Gold Service’ existed in practical terms: 
 
“Some of the crime(s) don’t warrant anything further than a phone call cause 
they don’t want to co-operate with the police, and some of it (the requirement 
for a ‘Gold Service’) is not relevant. The victims don’t want anything more cause 
the nature of the crime, whatever. But those who are relevant will get, will 
potentially get a reassurance visit, or target hardening, whatever is needed 
really.” 
(Sergeant’s Focus Group) 
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The Sergeants went on with regards to the application of a ‘Gold Service’; 
 
“We get a lot of crimes, not just BRM, we get a lot of crimes where you look on 
the history, they are an offender more than they are a victim and they would 
never, they are not interested in the police. They are not interested in 
confidence in the police, they hate the police because we are the opposition 
and you get the same …but your genuine victim…I believe yes we do improve 
on theirs (quality of service provided).” 
(Sergeant’s Focus Group) 
They continued: 
 
“We do the minimum premium (Gold) service of a call back to establish that, 
but it then depends on the individual’s circumstances when we ring up as to 
what they get next.” 
(Sergeant’s Focus Group) 
 
However, the Sergeants went on to explain that BRM victims may not be the 
sole beneficiaries of the ‘Gold Service.’ 
  
“There are only certain victims of crime that get that service, where it doesn’t 
matter what crime you are a victim of you get, you’re from a BRM group you get 
the same service. Which others would only get if they are an ASB or a burglary 
victim or like a robbery victim. Like SAC (Serious Acquisitive Crime) offences, 
we will go round and sort of.”                                        (Sergeant’s Focus Group) 
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The principle of ensuring a victim was provided with a quality or ‘Gold Service’ 
had also been introduced for victims of other crimes, such as burglary, robbery 
and SAC. This was not connected to the citizen focus agenda, but instead 
introduced when each crime presented itself as a performance issue for 
Merseyside Police. However, like the Constables, their reply questions what the 
term ‘Gold Service’ means. They introduced a notion of ‘minimum premium’ 
which amounts to a phone call to allow the officer to make an assessment on 
the victim needs. When considering this in context with the term ‘proper victim’ 
there appears to be a concerning issue that the person making the contact call 
is the one who decides what service the victim will receive based on their own 
opinion. Chapter two stated that the Home Office (2006) said Citizen Focus 
policing reflected the needs and expectations of individuals and local 
communities in decisions-making, service delivery and practice. The service 
described by the Sergeants appears to be far removed from these principles, 
with the victim potentially receiving anything but a ‘Gold Service’. The possible 
implications of the term ‘genuine victim’ will be further considered in the 
concluding chapter, however was there a ‘Gold Service’ being provided? They 
next victim’s story would question this. 
 
Dissatisfied victim 9 
The victim lived in a bed-sit with some shared, communal areas. During late 
evening, he heard a bang on the front door and thought nothing of this until 
he saw his door handle move. The door was locked from the inside so a short 
while later he went out into the corridor where he confronted a burglar. The 
man ran off and the victim chased him for a short while but stopped when the 
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burglar indicated that he had a weapon. The victim stated that he would 
recognise him again. 
 
The matter was reported immediately to the police and house-to-house 
enquiries, along with a forensic examination were initially completed. 
However, it took a month before an investigating officer was allocated the 
crime, after which a statement was taken from the victim. During this, it was 
established that the victim could identify the burglar. The investigating officer 
explored the possibility of the victim completing an e-fit impression of the 
burglar but was informed it was no longer a viable option due to the time 
delay.  
 
During the survey, the victim stated he was fairly dissatisfied with the actions 
taken, follow-up, investigations and the whole experience. He said: 
 
“The police always said they would send someone when I was off and nobody 
came, it kept being put off”. 
 
“The police are taking too much time in keeping me informed. It takes like two 
weeks or more before I get another call about what is happening”. 
 
“It seems like the police are not taking it seriously”. 
 
There are two areas of dissatisfaction. Initially it took four days for Merseyside 
Police to formally report the crime. They continued to ‘Keep Person Informed’ 
(KPI) whenever an appointment was broken. This was in line with policy and 
intended to improve communication regarding promises being made and 
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thereby improve satisfaction. However, in this case it would appear the 
number of times the victim was put off resulted in dissatisfaction. 
 
The victim was also dissatisfied with the fact he was unable to provide an e-
fit, even though officers had promised this would happen. He appears to be 
unaware that the delay in the investigation resulted in the evidential worth of 
the e-fit no longer being valid. The victim’s experience clearly questions the 
existence of a ‘Gold Service’. 
 
Chapter two stated that police concern with community and race relations, prior 
to the Macpherson Report, was generally focused on ensuring BRM groups 
received an equal level of service (Rowe 2004). However, recognition that 
needs of individual BRM groups differ resulted in the acceptance that a 
structurally neutral view of the BRM victim was no longer valid to improve levels 
of trust and confidence. However, the above description of the supposed ‘Gold 
Service’ does not provide reassurance that this was the case. The policy implies 
all BRM victims require or deserve the best service possible, but this ignores 
the principles of Citizen Focus policing (Home Office 2006) which says the 
needs of the individual should be considered. The Constable’s focus group 
initially gave an impression that organisational policy was being ignored in order 
to provide an individual service as required by each victim. However, when 
considering the general assumptions made by them towards the possible 
behaviour of a victim, this becomes questionable. Likewise, the views 
presented by the Sergeants regarding how they decided on the quality of 
service to be provided to a victim, also casts doubt on whether the ‘Gold 
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Service’ ever existed other than in policy form or in the minds of senior officers 
within Merseyside Police.  
 
Victim Satisfaction Survey 
As explained by Supt 1, the policies and practices employed to narrow the BRM 
satisfaction gap were directed at the victim satisfaction survey and to 
influencing the data being produced by it. However, the methodology was set 
by the Home Office (2008b), as was the survey questionnaire structure and 
wording. Chapter seven has highlighted some ways in which Merseyside Police 
tried to game the data being produced, for their own benefit. However, this did 
not address those problems identified with the data being produced by the 
private customer service company that resulted from their working practices. 
Chapter six highlighted that the regional accents of the interviewer could have 
an impact on the quality of data being produced. These concerns appear valid 
and question the Home Office (2008b) stated benefits of using private sector 
companies. This is, in part, due to the restrictions placed by the tendering 
process, as described by Interviewee 5, that required Merseyside Police to 
accept the more cost effective, rather than the most fit for purpose. 
 
There were further issues identified with the victim satisfaction survey process. 
The Sergeants were clear that the structure of the questionnaire was 
responsible for creating both satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Others agreed 
with this; 
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“Does the gap actually exist, or have we in a way manufactured it, because we 
are doing the phone backs and surveying satisfaction? And the way that the 
questions were phrased was creating confusion, the length of the questionnaire 
as well. People were just answering ‘yes’ and ‘no, probably still thinking about 
the previous question when the next ones on….to a certain extent the gap may 
well have been slightly artificial, artificial because of the survey method.” 
(Supt 2) 
 
There were further issues highlighted; 
 
“People (victims) didn’t make a connection because of the language that was 
used in the survey. So, the Bobbie might go and say, ‘I have checked your 
doors and your windows, everything seems to be ok’. And then they would be 
asked (during the victim survey) did the officer conduct a crime prevention 
survey of your premises, and they (the victim) would go, ‘well no’ so you’re not 
satisfied.” 
(Supt 1)  
 
“I phoned them (dissatisfied victim) ….’no we weren’t, we weren’t dissatisfied, 
we just didn’t understand the process of something. We didn’t tell (survey 
company) that we weren’t, we just didn’t understand the process. (The survey 
company) ticked that as dissatisfied. What’s that all about..... I would question 
sometimes the validity of (the survey company). 
(Supt 3) 
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These views question the validity of the victim satisfaction survey to produce 
data which accurately indicates a victim’s satisfaction level. They also highlight 
further practical problems experienced with data quality. It is probably 
unsurprising, due to the performance management focus, that these concerns 
are directed to the data being produced. There was no concern expressed with 
regards to the impact that such a poor satisfaction survey process may have 
on the victim involved. It appeared that so long as satisfied data was being 
produced, then no further examination was warranted. 
  
The victim’s experience 
Interviewee 5 has already highlighted problems that some victims experienced, 
as a result of the private company’s working practice. The emerging themes 
from the victim satisfaction survey transcripts (Table 5.6) show that five out of 
the twelve victims experienced problems with the interviewer speaking too 
quickly. There were also five examples of the interviewer not recording what 
was said and a further two examples of the interviewer directly influencing the 
data being recorded. As highlighted with the next victim’s story, this resulted in 
apparently questionable and frustrating experiences for the victim whilst being 
surveyed; 
 
Dissatisfied Victim 3 
 
The victim was in the female toilet of a Liverpool nightclub in the early hours 
when she was approached by a man who had tried to attract her attention 
earlier in the evening. He put his arm around her at which point she pushed 
him away. She left the toilet and told security staff in the premises what had 
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happened. Later, when she left the nightclub, the male was waiting for her 
after apparently been ejected. He called her a ‘Paki grass’ and stated 
‘Everybody hates Pakis’ and as she turned away he pulled her hair back 
causing her to fall to the floor. He then stole her mobile phone. Police were 
called who took her home and reported the matter. It took over a week for the 
victim to be contacted by the investigating officer.  
 
The victim expressed dissatisfaction with the actions taken, follow up, 
investigation and whole experience. 
 
“Instead of asking me how I was he asked me if I was on drugs”. 
“It happened 7 weeks ago and I do not know if they have found the culprit”. 
 
The interviewer speaks fast and gives the impression that they are rushing 
the victim. When the victim points out that she is on her lunch break and later 
asks how much longer the interview will take, the interviewer ignores this and 
carries on with the survey. At one stage, the victim appears to be ordering 
food but there is no acknowledgement from the interviewer that it might be a 
poor time to complete the survey. As the interview progresses so there is a 
sense that the victim becomes impatient. She quickly answers ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
to some questions and gives the impression that she has not really heard 
them but wants the interview to finish.  
 
However, the victim appears to have a story she wishes to tell, but due to the 
speed of the interviewer and the victims desire to speak much detail is lost. 
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Answers provided by the victim are not in the order the interviewer needs to 
record them in, so the interview becomes disjointed with several questions 
having to be asked twice. For example, the question “Did the police do 
anything to dissuade you from reporting the incident” is asked during the 
initial reporting stage. The question is an attempt to identify if the victim may 
be dissuaded by police from making an initial report. The victim expresses a 
view that they did when a reporting officer said, “Well stuff like this happens 
all of the time”. However, the interviewer only appears interested in what was 
said to the victim on the phone as they were then in the ‘follow-up’ section of 
the survey. When she confirms no attempt to dissuade her was made over 
the phone the interviewer moves onto the next question. It is also apparent 
that the victim is not happy with the actions and behaviour of one officer. 
However due to the survey structure this information is lost and never 
presented in the written report to Merseyside Police. 
 
The victim also appears to focus on those prompts that the interviewer 
provides. For example, when asked if the police gave any practical help, the 
prompt from the interviewer was, “such as helping you to get home”. The 
victim focuses in on this and replies, “Yeah, initially when the incident 
happened they gave me a lift home”. However, when asked if the police 
investigated the scene of the crime, the prompt given was “did they look for 
fingerprints”. The victim replies “No, they just looked at the CCTV”. This 
results in the interviewer saying, “Oh they did then ok” and recorded that the 
police had investigated the scene. It is unclear from this which is the correct 
answer. 
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The above survey response shows the victim can focus on the directions being 
given by the interviewer to explain a question which, in turn, can influence the 
data being recorded. The question regarding practical help turned into a reply 
concerning transport home. With a little more time and explanation, which did 
not strictly follow the prescribed script, then perhaps a more accurate narrative 
may have been produced. Likewise, there was an issue of the interviewer 
guiding the victim towards an answer suitable for the survey methodology. This 
occurred on other occasions. Dissatisfied victim 2 was asked if he had been a 
victim of another crime in the last month. When he said he had, he was 
questioned as to how many times? He replied he was unsure but it was more 
than two. He was then asked if it was more than likely 2 or 3 times. This limited 
the victim’s choice and he replied three; however again it is unclear if this 
answer is correct.  
 
Dissatisfied victim 3 appeared to have a story she wanted to tell the interviewer. 
If a victim is dissatisfied due to lack of contact from the police, even though the 
CSRO policy would say this should not happen, then the need to tell the first 
person who asks about their experience is understandable. However, the victim 
satisfaction survey does not lend itself to providing this quality as shown by the 
next victim; 
 
Dissatisfied Victim 8 
 
The victim was in a bar in Liverpool city centre during the early hours when 
his friends were asked to leave. A woman, who was in his party, got into an 
argument with security staff who then slapped her. The victim stated he went 
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across to assist his friend and he too was assaulted by security staff, resulting 
in a bloody nose. They were all then escorted out resulting in more pushing 
on behalf of the security staff. The victim then approached a police officer 
outside the club who recorded the incident and asked the victim to contact 
police the following day. 
 
An investigating officer was allocated and he says that although he tried to 
contact the victim he was initially only ever able to leave a message on the 
answer phone. A copy of CCTV footage was obtained from the licenced 
premises which contradicted the victim’s story and showed both the victim 
and his friend assault the security staff first before they then responded. The 
Investigating officer took the view that the force used by the security staff was 
reasonable and made in self-defence. The incident was subsequently 
reported as a ‘no crime’ and the victim was informed of this by a letter. 
 
The victim expressed dissatisfaction with actions taken, follow up, 
investigation and the whole experience and said; 
 
“From the very first day I was not kept informed properly”. 
 
“I was not treated in a helpful manner”. 
 
 
The subsequent survey was disjointed and proved to be a struggle, for both 
the victim and the interviewer, throughout. Most of the preambles to each 
section were rushed and required the victim to ask for them to be repeated. 
Likewise, the victim spoke fast and with a heavy accent that made it difficult 
for him to be understood by the interviewer.  
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It quickly became clear that the victim was dissatisfied with the service and 
wished to tell the interviewer the full story. Due to the questionnaire structure, 
this often resulted in the victim providing information that the interviewer could 
not record at that time and then having to repeat himself when the relevant 
question was asked. This appears to result in the victim disengaging with the 
interviewer towards the end of the survey and just providing one-word 
answers. This assisted in speeding up the data collecting process but leaves 
the listener wondering if the answers provided are indeed accurate. 
 
It is not possible to fully assess what sense the victim made of the survey 
process. However, it is possible to detect frustration at it was not allowing the 
victim to tell their story and get any issues they may have off their chest. 
 
Such problems during the interview were not just noted with dissatisfied victims 
of crime. Again, when they occurred the listener is left wondering what long-
term effect the survey may have had on the trust of the victim with regards to 
Merseyside Police as shown by the following victim; 
 
Satisfied Victim 9 
The victim became involved in an argument with a housemate resulting in 
him being punched in the face whilst hitting out in self-defence. He then called 
the police as he was in fear. 
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Police attended and ascertained that neither the victim nor suspect wished to 
make a formal complaint. The officer at the scene reported it as a racially 
aggravated incident and filed it as ‘undetected’. There was no further contact 
with the victim after this initial response. 
 
During the survey, the victim stated he was either very or completely satisfied 
with each stage of service. 
 
The interviewer’s style was rushed and it is initially unclear to the listener 
whether the victim understands what is going on. He mumbles his first 
answers and it is not clear what he is saying. This does not put the interviewer 
off who ploughs on with the questions resulting in her missing some detail 
that the victim is trying to provide. On several occasions, she summarises 
what the victim has said, apparently for brevity, and does not record 
everything that the victim says. 
 
The interviewer then gets confused with an abbreviation the victim uses. In 
reply to why he was completely satisfied with the investigation the victim 
starts to explain about a previous experience with the police and gives the 
listener the impression that he is about to compare the two experiences. 
Within this he uses the term ISB. The following conversation takes place: 
 
Interviewer (I) “Why do you say that?” 
Victim (V)  “Because I had something else to do with the….” 
(I)  “I am sorry; I don’t understand what you are saying.” 
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(V) “Because, I had something else, another issue that ISB worked …” 
(I) “Which I?” 
(V) “Madam, can I explain please because I think there is a problem, a line 
problem…. 
(I) “I think I, I don’t understand what you are saying.” 
(V) “I am saying that I have another issue that ISB of Liverpool…” 
(I) “Which I what?” 
(V) “Madam, ISB…Intelligence Service Branch.” 
(I) “Oh, the CID, sorry.” 
(V) “No, not the CID…ISB.” 
(I) “ISP?” 
(V) “I…S…B. B for brother.” 
(I) “I am sorry I can’t understand what you are saying.” 
(V) “I, I for India. S, S for Sugar. B for brother.” 
(I) “ISB…. what does that stand for?” 
(V) “It stands for Intelligence Service Branch.” 
(I) “Is this to do with the incident we are talking about?” 
(V) “No, it’s to do with something else but I am waiting for them to come 
back to me, they haven’t.” 
(I) “I cannot put that in because I am dealing with the date I gave you 
now.” 
(V) “I just want to let you know that there is another issue that, regarding 
me, that I am waiting….” 
(I) “Right, but why are you satisfied to date with the way they have 
investigated your crime?” 
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(V) “My crime, yeah I was satisfied.” 
(I) “And why are you satisfied? Why are you completely satisfied to date 
with what they have done to investigate your crime?” 
(V) “It was ok, yeah.” 
(I) “Did they investigate your crime?” 
(V) “Yeah, they ask a lot of questions and yeah.” 
 
The above example highlights other problems with the victim satisfaction 
survey. The victim refused to make a complaint of an assault and thus the 
matter was correctly recorded as an ‘incident’. Due to the victim being BRM this 
was included in the victim satisfaction survey process (Home Office 2008b) 
However, in such cases the interview script is not adjusted and thus several 
questions were included that did not make sense to the victim. The interviewer 
asks whether the victim negotiated with the police about how often they would 
be kept informed of the progress of the case. The victim sounds confused and 
replies “No, because I didn’t take it further”. However, the rushed style of the 
interviewer causes further confusion and this, combined with an apparent 
unwillingness to listen, creates an exchange that could grace the script of a 
1970s situation comedy. It is impossible to assess what sense the victim makes 
of this experience. 
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Summary 
The Home Office (2008b) presented each police force with a victim satisfaction 
survey process that broke down the victim’s experience into sections, or stages 
of service, which permitted further managerial examination. This allowed the 
performance culture of Merseyside Police to focus on the quantitative issues of 
how often a particular critical input was completed, rather than the qualitative 
aspect of whether police interactions with a BRM victim of crime was a positive 
experience and thereby was improving trust in the police. 
 
It would appear from Supt 1 that, as an organisation, Merseyside Police 
approved of this system as it provided a tangible framework to show activity in 
addressing the problem. Based on unsubstantiated research from their 
Marketing Department, a focus on two stages of service, actions taken and 
follow-up, was developed. This resulted in force wide operations that counted 
the quantitative number of phone calls made and victim contact sheets scanned 
into their system. These were presented as performance that would improve 
victim satisfaction. Reassured by the fact the policy was based on research, at 
no time did there appear to be any concern as to whether this type of contact 
was addressing the needs of the individual victim. 
 
However, Merseyside Police were totally reliant on the victim satisfaction 
survey to produce the performance data that measured their success.  As 
chapter six and seven described, organisational activity solely focused on 
changing this data. According to Interviewee 5 any concerns regarding the 
methodology and working practice of the survey company were overlooked. No 
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explanation has been found for this, but it can be noted that addressing the 
quality of the survey would not have necessarily improved the performance data 
being produced. 
 
It would appear this resulted in victims who, having been surveyed, were unsure 
of the process they had taken part in and therefore became frustrated. Victims 
often wanted time to tell their story and explain the reason for their 
dissatisfaction. Having apparently not been listened to for weeks, it appears 
they viewed the survey as providing them with an audience. However, the 
nature of the survey process did not allow for this. Due to the need for surveys 
to be completed in a set time, some became rushed, with interviewers 
summarising a victim’s narrative to fit into the software data box. There are 
examples of rich data being provided to the interviewer regarding how the 
service provided to the victim could be improved. However, most of this quality 
information was lost. Instead, there was a victim survey in place that sought out 
appropriately quick answers, in the precise order required by the questionnaire. 
This was inflexible and unable to be adjusted to examine the individual victim’s 
story but was completed quickly enough for the company to move on to the next 
survey and thereby comply with the contract they had agreed with Merseyside 
Police.  
 
It has not been possible to show how this process impacted on the victim of 
crime. However, it has been shown to be far removed from the intended 
outcomes of Citizen Focus policing (Home Office 2006). As for the impact on 
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trust and confidence? This appears to have never been a consideration for 
Merseyside Police when trying to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap.  
 
The concluding chapter will consider the key issues highlighted by this research 
in relation to performance gaming, survey methodology, organisational culture 
and, ultimately, how this may relate to trust and confidence amongst BRM 
communities. 
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Chapter 9: Research review and implications 
 
Introduction 
This concluding chapter will look back over the previous chapters that comprise 
the thesis. Whilst I do not intend to discuss further the topics raised within these, 
this chapter will highlight four issues that the research has highlighted. These 
are organisational and officer culture, the gaming of performance data, victim 
satisfaction survey methodology and the effect Merseyside Police policies 
which related to the BRM satisfaction gap had on trust and confidence. The 
chapter will give consideration as to how these issues impacted on victims of 
crime, the organisation and police officers and will consider some further 
implications they may still have on policing. 
 
Context for this research was provided in chapter two which explained how the 
principles of the BRM satisfaction gap were introduced, via the Macpherson 
Report (1999). Following an inquiry into the police response and investigation 
of the murder of Stephen Lawrence, the subsequent report proposed that 
improving trust and confidence, amongst BRM communities with the police, 
should be a ministerial priority. The report then provided the ten performance 
indicators which would assist in the measurement of this. The chapter explained 
how one of these proposals developed into the BRM satisfaction gap 
performance indicator. 
 
The fact that the Macpherson Report (1999) highlighted the need for a 
ministerial priority as the first recommendation, created an expectation that this 
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would be an important, overarching principle that would be the driving influence 
of any subsequent organisational activity resulting from it. However, it was 
shown that the Home Secretary’s Action Plan (1999), failed to live up to this 
expectation. Indeed, the annual reports on progress (Home Office 2000, 2001, 
2002a, 2003a) showed no identifiable concern as to whether trust and 
confidence was improving between the BRM communities and police.  
 
Chapter three examined the issue of trust, confidence and satisfaction in further 
detail. It pointed out that it is usual within police literature to find these terms to 
be used interchangeably, with little recognition of any difference between them 
all (Cao 2015). However, it was shown that a lack of understanding of their 
differences, when drafting and implementing policy, can result in ineffective 
actions for the police service. Chapter three concluded that Tyler’s (2005) 
proposal that there are two types of trust placed in the police, that of institutional 
trust and motive-based trust, appeared to be the most relevant model for this 
research when considering public trust in the police.  
 
Chapter four explained how the victim satisfaction survey process, introduced by 
the Home Office (2008a), provided a performance management tool which 
produced statistical data for each critical input, within each stage of service. This 
was a national standard which, in line with NPM principles, allowed the Home 
Office to compare individual force performance against the targets they set. It 
was discussed how such a style of governance must assume that the setting of 
targets will change the behaviour of both the individual and the organisation to 
achieve the required outcome. Another proposed effect of the NPM governance 
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by target is the manipulation and gaming of data by those who may be directly 
affected by the success or failure of the performance being measured (Bevan 
and Hood 2006). In line with this, chapter four discussed the CSRO and how 
Merseyside Police introduced a policy whereby, under the justification of 
providing the victim with an update, a positive influence on victim satisfaction 
data was gamed (Merseyside Police 2009a).  
 
These chapters describe a process, driven by clear Home Office policy, 
underpinned by a public enquiry report, that provide an apparent strategic sign 
post for the police service. However, Merseyside Police was only concerned with 
the requirements of the performance indicator and applied their established 
performance management processes and culture as the way of gaining an 
improvement in it. This research has highlighted four main issues that has 
resulted from this process, the implications of which are now discussed.  
 
Organisational and officer culture 
Organisational Culture 
It was explained that both a visiting academic and the representative of a 
market research company warned Merseyside Police against the investment of 
resources and effort into trying to narrow the BRM Satisfaction gap. They 
believed it had no statistical significance and was being used for political spin 
which, therefore, deserved no further consideration by the police. However, this 
advice went unheeded, whilst individuals within Merseyside Police failed to 
express their own personal concerns with it. Instead, the organisation worked 
to the direction provided by the Chief Constable, whilst citing research 
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completed by their own communication and marketing department as empirical 
justification for their policies and actions. 
 
Merseyside Police had an established organisational performance culture 
which was applied to the problem of the BRM satisfaction gap. This provided a 
performance management process of regular meetings involving the command 
team of all BCUs, which examined detailed data changes to identify non-
compliance and thereby provide an explanation to any changes in performance 
figures. It has been shown that this is comparable to the Compstat process, 
described by Eterno and Silverman (2012), and used by various police 
organisations across the world. The fact that the Merseyside Police process 
was described as a brutal regime, appears to highlight the concerns of Bevan 
and Hood (2006) regarding those performance management systems which 
developed from NPM. The need to obtain improved performance data, whilst 
using fear and intimidation toward individuals, is a reasonable conclusion of the 
Merseyside Police process, as it explained how senior police officers were held 
to account with relentless follow-up and measurement of their team’s 
performance outputs. 
 
There was an acknowledgment from the Citizen Focus department that a more 
supportive style of performance management could be used. However, it is 
unclear whether this resulted from an acceptance that measured performance 
would benefit from it or from the difficulties they experienced in being heard 
within the established performance culture. Indeed, the narrative regarding the 
difficulties they experienced, during some of the performance meetings, 
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questions the motives of individuals. A case was presented that suggested the 
performance culture encouraged each ACC to focus on the performance of 
their individual portfolio, rather than considering the impact on the whole 
organisation.  
 
This established performance management culture focused on outputs that 
could be easily measured and tracked, with the stages of service and critical 
inputs providing an ideal vehicle. This clearly highlights the concerns expressed 
by Foster, Newburn and Souhami (2005) when they state that police forces 
tend to focus attention on easily identified and achieved performance, whilst 
ignoring the more important but difficult issues that need addressing. This 
performance culture encouraged Merseyside Police to measure and track 
simplistic actions completed by the reporting officer, such as whether a crime 
number was provided or they appeared to take the matter seriously, rather than 
try to measure whether trust within a particular community was increasing or 
not. 
 
This research produced no data that showed Merseyside Police acknowledged 
such a performance culture could result in ‘quick wins’, whilst ignoring the 
difficult issues. The impact this culture had on policing, within Merseyside, 
during times of austerity was not examined by this research. However, it is 
possible to conclude that if such a preferred focus on quick wins continued, 
whilst resources reduced, then a further reduction of trust and confidence 
towards the police may have resulted.   
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Officer Culture 
This research explained how Merseyside Police used the principle of providing 
a ‘gold service’ to each BRM victim to try and improve victim satisfaction data. 
Such a process provided the Citizen Focus department tangible actions to 
measure and audit, as required by the performance management regime. 
However, it can be concluded that such an approach contributed to the 
simplistic belief that the actions of the reporting and investigating officers were 
the sole contributors to a victim’s satisfaction level. This ignored the views of 
those who believe there are other influences, which are just as important, when 
considering issues of trust, confidence and satisfaction with the police, Skogan 
(2005), Tyler (2006) and Fukuyama (1995). 
 
However, as previously discussed, the organisational performance culture 
required such activity to allow the measurement of officer’s actions to 
graphically evidence performance. This research highlighted issues, that can 
be attributed to individual officer culture, that was a consequence of this 
approach. 
 
There was a general consensus, amongst those interviewed, that there were 
problems with regards to the BRM satisfaction gap. However, instead of voicing 
them, there was an acceptance of compliance with the direction given to them 
by the ACC. The Sergeants commented on this with a belief that what senior 
officers wanted would also provide the required benefits to the victim. However, 
the ‘gold service’ required each BRM victim to be provided a service that was 
labelled as being of a higher quality than that provided to other victims. Even 
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though it was never explained what constituted a ‘gold service’, and more 
importantly what was removed when providing one that was not, the principle 
that a BRM victim receiving a different level of service was an appropriate and 
acceptable course of action, may have created a negative influence on officer 
culture. The research identified an environment where officers felt comfortable 
to vary the service provided to the victim, based on their judgement of the 
victim’s needs. 
 
It can of course be argued that police officers will always do this when dealing 
with any member of the public. However, this research highlighted some 
concerns which resulted from this. The Constables described a working 
practice whereby the victim’s needs, and the service they received, was 
established by an officer assessment of how much help they thought the victim 
wanted, or indeed deserved. There was no acknowledgment or acceptance that 
a victim may not wish to cooperate with police due to issues that impact on their 
level of trust in them. It appears reasonable to conclude that if the Constables 
believed they were not dealing with a worthy victim, then a lesser service was 
provided. BRM communities can have lower trust in the police compared to 
white communities (Rowe 2004), such an approach could easily lead to a poor 
service being provided to victims of BRM communities as a result of this. 
 
The principle of the ‘proper victim’ was highlighted in stark terms by the 
Sergeants. They expressed a belief that it was correct to differentiate between 
‘proper victims’ and the ‘others’, when deciding the type of service to be 
provided. This is concerning. The context they placed on the ‘others’ was one 
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of repeat offenders or someone who had no ‘interest’ or trust in the police. When 
considering Fukuyama’s (1995) view of high and low trust communities, 
resulting from culture, then a connection can again be drawn between a low 
trust community and a reduced police service the Sergeants believe those 
members deserve. Indeed, it appears they viewed a victim who did not wish to 
cooperate as breaching a moral contract with them, as gratitude should be 
expressed for the service they offered (Waddington et al, 2006).  
 
It is reasonable to conclude, from the attitudes expressed by both Sergeants 
and Constables, of the presence of an officer culture that permitted individuals 
to vary the service provided to a victim, based on their individual judgements 
and, therefore, prejudices. However, the Citizen Focus department dismissed 
the impact of any external issues, such as trust and legitimacy, can have on 
victim satisfaction levels. If this is correct, then it is reasonable to state that the 
existence of the BRM satisfaction gap is produced as a direct result of the 
service provided by police officers. However, this research did not obtain an 
explanation from the Citizen Focus department as to why the service being 
provided to BRM victims created disproportionate dissatisfaction and required 
such a direct managerial focus on the actions of the individual officer. Supt 2 
provided, perhaps, the obvious explanation.  
 
“I think in the widest context then we must have had that type of officer with 
views of racism. Racism or racist views is extreme but I think along that 
spectrum towards racism. I think there will be officers with certainly strong 
prejudices I would say against BRM and prejudiced on resistance to what we 
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were trying to do as being seen as making BRM victims special really. ‘Why 
should they get special treatment” you know, and I have heard that said.” 
(Supt 2)  
 
There is no acknowledgement from Citizen Focus department that this could 
be a relevant issue. However, as discussed, both the Constable’s and 
Sergeant’s focus groups presented a culture that support the view that, to some 
lesser or greater extent, the system and processes employed to narrow the 
BRM satisfaction gap allowed discretion and, thereby, individual prejudice to 
affect the service being provided to a victim of crime. 
 
It is not possible to draw any sort of empirical conclusion relating to racism 
within the police service from this research. However, it is possible to say that 
an acceptance by the Citizen Focus department to the possibility that officer’s 
behaviour and prejudice may have been contributing to the BRM satisfaction 
gap, would have resulted in a more informed policy design for service delivery. 
Rather, it seems reasonable to assume this culture may still be having an 
influence on any service provided to the victim of crime. 
 
The gaming or corruption of performance data? 
Bevan and Hood (2006) considered the manipulation and gaming of performance 
figures to be inevitable when dealing with performance management. This 
research found clear examples of this, at play by Merseyside Police, towards the 
BRM satisfaction gap with the use of the CSRO and removal process. Bevan and 
Hood (2006) identified three different types of gaming problems, that being the 
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ratchet effect, threshold effect and output distortions, that can influence 
performance data being gathered within an organisation. Indeed, it can be 
argued that the manner in which the CSRO was used was, although perhaps 
cynical, an example of output distortion. The CSRO attempted to achieve the 
measured target, as produced by the satisfaction survey, at the cost of other 
unmeasured aspects of performance. No concern was identified by this research 
regarding the need to provide a victim with an investigation update once the 
chances of a satisfaction survey being completed had passed. 
 
However, it is difficult to apply one of Bevan and Hood’s examples to the way in 
which the removal process was applied. This process was allowed by the Home 
Office (2008b) to provide guidance for each police force regarding who would be 
considered an eligible respondent for a satisfaction survey call. This list (table 
4.1) was shown to be questionable as each force was advised, amongst other 
things, not to survey victims who had made a formal complaint or refused to 
cooperate with the investigation. However, it was the intention of the Home Office 
for this to be applied to the data set prior to the survey taking place, to produce 
comparable data across all police forces. However, Merseyside Police decided 
to apply this list after victims had been surveyed. The fact it was only ever applied 
to remove dissatisfied victims is evidence that it was intended to improve the 
performance data for Merseyside Police. Although senior officers were aware 
this practice was going on, the ethical nature of it was never questioned as it 
delivered the results which their performance culture demanded.  
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Had this process been equally applied to satisfied as well as dissatisfied victims, 
then perhaps the practice may have sat easily within the heading of ‘gaming.’ 
However, within the data highlighted by this research, the ethics of the working 
practice appear highly questionable, to the point of corrupt. If this practice is still 
ongoing then the implications could be severe, although this does require further 
research and investigation before an empirical conclusion can be made. 
 
Victim satisfaction survey methodology 
Concern regarding the data quality being produced by the victim satisfaction 
survey was expressed by all parties. This was supported by the analysis of the 
twenty-four victims, completed for this research. 
 
The Home Office (2008b) stated that the provision of a set questionnaire and 
the use of a private customer survey company would produce data that could 
be compared nationally. However, this was not apparent. Concern was 
identified with regards to the private companies being employed by Merseyside 
Police. It had been identified that regional accents from the interviewer were an 
issue for victims in Merseyside, however due to the national tendering process, 
such issues could never be taken into consideration when awarding a contract. 
 
The quality of the data produced by the survey company has also been 
questioned. A narrative was given that some dissatisfied victims were not, in 
fact, dissatisfied but had been confused by the survey process. It is not possible 
to confirm whether this was correct or was rather an excuse provided by a victim 
who did not have the trust to express dissatisfaction directly to the police. 
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However, analysis of the victim interviews did further highlight issues of 
interviewers speaking too quickly, leading the victim when providing examples 
to clarify a question, surveying the wrong crime and surveying a person who 
was not the victim. It can be concluded that this presents a victim satisfaction 
survey that did not produce accurate data.  
 
Many of these issues was explained as being due to the constraints placed by 
the contract, which stipulated that only a maximum of 250 characters could be 
recorded for each interview. This resulted in a great deal of rich data, which 
could assist with the improvement of the service, being omitted as the narrative 
was summarised. Also, each interviewer was required to complete a set 
number of interviews each day. This was presented as a reason why some 
interviews were rushed. The analysis of the twenty-four victims supported this 
as the victim appeared to be treated as a commodity, from which information 
needed to be obtained from, rather than a victim of crime.  
 
Merseyside Police and the Citizen Focus department were aware of the 
problems with the victim satisfaction survey, however this was ignored. It was 
stated that the process was always about performance. Therefore, the victim 
satisfaction survey was accepted as the way of measuring it, with the process 
going unchallenged whilst they found ways of influencing the data being 
produced, for the benefit of the organisation. There are clear warnings 
highlighted by this research with regards to the use of satisfaction surveys. 
Whilst it appears correct to try and establish how satisfied a victim was with the 
service provided, there is a need to acknowledge the limitations of a survey 
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methodology and a requirement not to view it as empirical evidence with 
regards to quality of service being provided. 
 
Trust and Confidence 
Chapter three highlighted that Tyler’s institutional and motive-based trust 
appeared to be the most relevant model for this research to consider public 
trust in the police (Tyler 2006). Within the dissatisfied victim who have been 
analysed, there were examples of people having low institutional trust due to a 
belief that their crime had not been taken seriously. In line with Tyler, it appears 
they did not view the police as an honest and competent authority, who 
exercised their responsibilities on behalf of all citizens. However, as explained, 
the victim satisfaction survey only asks limited questions regarding the service 
provided. Therefore, this research did not identify any examples of victims 
expressing concerns that could be related to motive-based trust, such as a 
victim’s judgement of the officer’s intentions and motivations when dealing with 
them. However, had the victim satisfaction survey provided an opportunity to 
further probe a victim about an officer’s actions, then it is reasonable to 
conclude that motive-based trust may well have been considered and 
discussed. Therefore, this research does support Tyler’s (2006) view of public 
trust in the police as being relevant. 
 
However, this research does question whether Merseyside Police’s attempt to 
narrow the BRM satisfaction gap ever considered the impact it was having on 
public trust and confidence within BRM communities. No organisational 
knowledge of any connection between the BRM satisfaction gap and the 
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Macpherson report could be found. Instead, the organisational focus was very 
much fixed solely on the performance indicator, with trust and confidence being 
an unconnected issue on the periphery.  
 
 
Did it really matter if there was no connection between the BRM satisfaction 
gap and trust and confidence? If this research had identified many cases of 
excellent service being provided to victims of crime, then it could be strongly 
argued this was not an issue. However, the analysis of the twenty-four victims 
of crime has suggested this was not the case. Instead, it was shown that 
Merseyside Police’s policies and processes where not focused on impacting on 
public trust, whether institutionally or motive-based. Rather, there was a need 
to show activity, as required by the performance management culture, which 
resulted in the construction of activities. However, it can be argued much of this 
activity was an illusion. When terms such as ‘minimum premium service’ are 
used to describe a phone call being made to a victim to ascertain whether the 
officer believes they deserve a further service, then there was clearly never a 
focus on trust and confidence within Merseyside Police when trying to narrow 
the BRM satisfaction gap.  
 
Summary 
This research was initially intended to identify activities the police service could 
deliver to various BRM communities, to improve their level of satisfaction. 
However, the thesis has explained how the focus changed to that of examining 
the systems and processes used by Merseyside Police to narrow the satisfaction 
gap. 
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This research has examined the organisational effort Merseyside Police put into 
the BRM satisfaction gap.  This should have resulted in some noticeable 
improvement in the service being provided to all victims of crime, in line with 
Citizen Focus policing principles (Home Office 2006). However, this activity was 
driven by a need to comply with Home Office policy and, thereby, improve 
measured performance, with little concern or benefit to the victim of crime. 
 
This thesis highlighted the principles of improving BRM trust and confidence with 
the police was the reason for implementing the BRM satisfaction gap 
performance indicator. However, it has been made clear that within this context, 
trust and confidence were never considerations for Merseyside Police. 
Therefore, it may be possible to conclude that their efforts to narrow the BRM 
satisfaction gap really was an example of them ‘hitting the target but missing the 
point.’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 242 
Appendix 1 
User Satisfaction Survey 
 
Hello, could I speak to (INSERT NAME) please. (IF NOT ABLE TO TAKE THE SURVEY NOW, TRY TO MAKE 
CALL BACK ARRANGEMENTS). 
 
My name is …….. I work for a research company called ######### and we are doing some work on behalf 
of Merseyside Police. 
 
I’m calling to ask about the service you received from Merseyside Police in order to help them improve 
their service to others.  
 
The interview takes about 12 minutes and anything you say is treated in confidence.  Calls may be 
recorded for quality control purposes, also taking part is voluntary and you can withdraw at any time. 
 
(READ OUT IF THE RESPONDENT ASKS HOW THEIR DETAILS WERE OBTAINED) 
When you contacted the police about this crime you were asked for your telephone number in case they 
needed to get back to you.  They have passed your number on to us so that you can tell us about they 
way they dealt with you and the service you received. Your details continue only to be used for the 
purpose connected with the crime or incident and Merseyside Police retains full ownership and 
responsibility for the information. 
 
If you would like to confirm my identity, I can supply you with a contact name and telephone number 
for Merseyside Police. 
(PROVIDE IF REQUESTED: ###########, Strategic Analyst – Tel: ############ 
Email: ################## 
 
Would you like to take part? 
(IF NO, PLEASE SPECIFY REASONS IN FULL, THANK AND CLOSE).  
 
Can I just confirm that you are aged 16 or over? 
(IF NO, THANK AND CLOSE). 
 
(RECORD CRIME/INCIDENT TYPE FROM PROVIDED DATA) 
Burglary 
Violence 
Vehicle crime 
Racist incident 
 
READ OUT: Whilst we understand you may have experience other incidents previously, can I please ask 
you to think about (INSERT CRIME/REPORTED DATE) in your responses today. 
 
Introduction 
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I’ll be asking questions about how you got in touch with the police, what they did, how you were updated 
and then how you felt you were treated by the police officers/staff. 
 
There are a few ordinary questions at the end about the overall experience. 
 
SECTION 1: FIRST CONTACT 
 
I’d like to start with some questions about how you first contacted the police. 
 
ASK ALL 
Q1 Firstly, did you contact the police about this incident yourself?  
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 GO TO Q2 
No 2 GO TO Q5 
The police contacted me 3 GO TO Q5  
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 GO TO Q5  
 
 
ASK IF Q1=1 
Q2 How did you contact the police about the incident? (PROMPT: Was it…)  
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
By 999 call 1 
By the non-emergency number 2 
By other telephone call 3 
By a visit to a police station 4 
By email 5 
By text 6 
Direct to an officer 7 
Other (specify) 8 
Don’t know/can’t remember 
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
9 
 
 
ASK IF Q1=1  
Q3 Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with how easy it was to contact someone who could 
assist you?  
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Satisfied And is that Completely  1 
  Very or 2 
  Fairly satisfied 3 
Dissatisfied And is that Completely  7 
  Very or 6 
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  Fairly dissatisfied 5 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied   4 
Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT)   8 
ASK IF Q1=1   
Q4 Why do you say that?  
 RECORD VERBATIM 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________  
 
 Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT) 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q5 After the details were initially reported, can you tell me was your incident then dealt with? 
 (PROMPT: Was it…) 
 ONE CODE ONLY 
 
By someone being sent to your home or attending the scene  
of the crime (without a specific appointment) 
1 GO TO Q9a 
By someone visiting your home at a specific appointment time 2 GO TO Q9a 
Entirely over the phone 3 GO TO Q6 
At a police station 4 GO TO Q9a 
Other (specify) 5 GO TO Q9a 
Don’t know/can’t remember (DO NOT READ OUT) 6 GO TO Q9a 
 
 
ASK IF VEHICLE CRIME AND Q5=3 (DEALT WITH OVER THE PHONE) 
Q6 Was the call handler polite? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember 
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
ASK IF VEHICLE CRIME AND Q5=3 (DEALT WITH OVER THE PHONE) 
Q7 Did the call handler treat you with respect? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember 
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
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ASK IF VEHICLE CRIME AND Q5=3 (DEALT WITH OVER THE PHONE) 
Q8 Was the call handler professional? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
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SECTION 2: POLICE ACTION TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE INCIDENT 
 
READ OUT: Please think about what the police did once they had been given the initial details. This could 
have been over the phone, at the police station, at your home or at the scene of the crime. If you 
had any contact with more than one member of staff, please give your overall impressions of 
what they did. 
 
 
ASK IF VEHICLE CRIME AND Q5=3 (DEALT WITH OVER THE PHONE) 
Q9 Did they explain why it was dealt with in this way?  
 ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 GO TO Q10 
No 2 GO TO Q10 
Not applicable 3 GO TO Q10 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 GO TO Q10 
 
 
ASK IF BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME OR (VEHICLE CRIME AND NOT Q5=3) 
Q9a Did police explain what would happen next and why?  
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q10 Were you given the opportunity to ask questions, ask for advice or further help.  For example, 
can I drive my vehicle, boarding-up services, crime prevention, vehicle recovery costs? 
 ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 GO TO Q11 
No, they didn’t need to 2 GO TO Q12 
No, but they should have 3 GO TO Q12 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 GO TO Q12 
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ASK IF Q10=1 
Q11 Were these queries answered to your satisfaction? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q12 Were you provided with a contact number/name should you need to call back? (For example, 
with further information, IMEI numbers, additional stolen property) 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q13 Were you given a crime/incident reference number? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
 
ASK IF BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME OR (VEHICLE CRIME AND NOT Q5=3) 
Q14 Did officers tell you what action they had taken?  For example, spoke to witnesses, checked 
gardens, carried out house-to-house enquiries, checked for CCTV?  
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No, they didn’t need to 2 
No, but they should have 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
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ASK IF BURGLARY  
Q15 Did the Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) team attend?  
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No, they didn’t need to 2 
No, but they should have 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q16 Thinking about what the police did after they had been given the initial details, are you 
satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with the actions taken by the police?  
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Satisfied And is that Completely  1 
  Very or 2 
  Fairly satisfied 3 
Dissatisfied And is that Completely  7 
  Very or 6 
  Fairly dissatisfied 5 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied   4 
Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT)   8 
  
 
ASK ALL 
Q17 Why do you say that? 
 RECORD VERBATIM 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________  
 
 Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT) 
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SECTION 3: POLICE FOLLOW-UP 
 
ASK IF BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME OR (VEHICLE CRIME AND NOT Q5=3) 
Q18 After the initial action, did you require further contact/progress reports about your case? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 GO TO Q19 
No 2 GO TO Q27 
Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT) 3 GO TO Q27 
 
 
ASK IF VEHICLE CRIME AND Q5=3 (DEALT WITH OVER THE PHONE) 
Q18a After it was dealt with over the phone, did you receive a letter confirming the details of your 
report?  
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 GO TO Q22 
No 2 GO TO Q22 
Not applicable 3 GO TO Q22 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 GO TO Q22 
 
 
ASK IF BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME OR (VEHICLE CRIME AND NOT Q5=3) 
Q19 If any appointments were made with you, were they kept? 
 ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
 
ASK IF BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME OR (VEHICLE CRIME AND NOT Q5=3) 
Q20 Were you informed you would be updated/contacted every 28 days? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
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ASK IF BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME OR (VEHICLE CRIME AND NOT Q5=3) 
Q21 Have you been updated every 28 days? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
 
ASK ALL  
Q22 Have you called the police since regarding this matter? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 GO TO Q23 
No 2 GO TO Q27 
Don’t know/can’t remember 
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
3 GO TO Q27 
 
 
ASK IF Q22=1 
Q23 Why did you call? 
 RECORD VERBATIM 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________  
 
 Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT) 
 
 
ASK IF Q22=1 
Q24 Did you find it easy to contact someone? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 GO TO Q26 
No 2 GO TO Q25 
Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT) 3 GO TO Q26 
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ASK IF Q24=2 
Q25 Why do you say that? 
 RECORD VERBATIM 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________  
 
 Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT) 
 
 
ASK IF Q22=1 
Q26 Were your further calls/queries resolved to your satisfaction? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q27 Have the police contacted you in any way since about this incident? 
(Prompt: letter, email, text etc) 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q28 Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with how well you were kept informed of any 
progress? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Satisfied And is that Completely  1 
  Very or 2 
  Fairly satisfied 3 
Dissatisfied And is that Completely  7 
  Very or 6 
  Fairly dissatisfied 5 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied   4 
Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT)   8 
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ASK ALL 
Q29 Why do you say that? 
 RECORD VERBATIM 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________  
 
 Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT) 
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SECTION 4: TREATMENT 
 
ASK ALL 
READ OUT: Thinking about the attitude and manner of all the police officers and other police staff you 
had contact with, do you think they:  
 
ASK ALL 
Q30 Took the matter seriously? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q31 Communicated clearly with you? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q32 Dealt with you sympathetically? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
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ASK IF BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME OR (VEHICLE CRIME AND NOT Q5=3) 
Q33 Were the officers professional in the manner in which they dealt with you? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
 
ASK IF BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME OR (VEHICLE CRIME AND NOT Q5=3) 
Q34 Treated you with respect? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
Don’t know/can’t remember  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q35 Thinking about the attitude and behaviour, are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with the 
way you were treated by the police officers and staff who dealt with you?  
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Satisfied And is that Completely  1 
  Very or 2 
  Fairly satisfied 3 
Dissatisfied And is that Completely  7 
  Very or 6 
  Fairly dissatisfied 5 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied   4 
Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT)   8 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q36 Why do you say that?  
 RECORD VERBATIM 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________  
  
Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT) 
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SECTION 5: THE WHOLE EXPERIENCE 
 
ASK ALL 
Q37 Prior to this experience, was your overall opinion of Merseyside Police?  
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Generally high 1 
Generally low 2 
No opinion 3 
Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT) 4 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q38 As a result of your contact with the police on this occasion, please tell me if… 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Your opinion has not changed 1 
You now have a better opinion 2 
You now have a worse opinion 3 
Don’t know/ No comment  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
4 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q39 Thinking about everything we’ve talked about, taking the whole experience into account, are 
you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with the service provided by the police in this case? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Satisfied And is that Completely  1 
  Very or 2 
  Fairly satisfied 3 
Dissatisfied And is that Completely  7 
  Very or 6 
  Fairly dissatisfied 5 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied   4 
Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT)   8 
  
 
ASK ALL 
Q40 Why do you say that?  
 RECORD VERBATIM 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________  
 Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT) 
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SECTION 6: GENERAL 
 
ASK ALL 
Q41 If a similar thing happened to you again, would you report it to the police? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know/no comment  
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
3 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q42 Are there any other comments about the service you received, or an individual officer you want 
to mention? 
 RECORD VERBATIM 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________  
 
No/nothing (DO NOT READ OUT) 
Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT) 
 
 
ASK IF RACIST CRIME 
Q43 Have there been any similar incidents, which you have not reported to the police? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 GO TO Q44 
No 2 GO TO Q45 
Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT) 3 GO TO Q45 
 
 
ASK IF RACIST CRIME  
Q44 What were the main reasons for not reporting this/these incidents?  
MULTICODE 
 
Police will not take seriously 1 
Potential racist reaction from officer 2 
No chance of being able to talk to an officer of the same race 3 
Others may find out I have been a victim through courts, press, etc 4 
Other (specify) 5 
Don’t know (DO NOT READ OUT) 6 
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DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
READ OUT: Finally, just a couple of questions about yourself for classification purposes  
 
ASK ALL 
Q45 Gender (DO NOT READ OUT) 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Male 1 
Female 2 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q46 What age were you on your last birthday? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
16 to 24 1 
25 to 34 2 
35 to 44 3 
45 to 54 4 
55 to 64 5 
65 to 74 6 
75 or above 7 
Refused  8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 258 
ASK ALL 
Q47 What is your ethnic group? Are you Asian, Black, Chinese, mixed background, White or another 
ethnic group?  And is that…. (READ FROM LIST) 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Asian or Asian British Indian 7 
 Pakistani 8 
 Bangladeshi 9 
 Any other Asian background (Please specify below) 10 
Black or Black British Caribbean 4 
 African 5 
 Any other Black background (Please specify below) 6 
Chinese Chinese 15 
Mixed White and Black Caribbean 11 
 White and Black African 12 
 White and Asian 13 
 Any other mixed background (Please specify below) 14 
White British 1 
 Irish 2 
 Any other White background (Please specify below) 3 
Other ethnic group  Other ethnic group (Please specify below) 18 
Do not wish to say    
(DO NOT READ OUT) 
 17 
 
Please specify………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
ASK ALL 
Q48 Do you consider yourself to have a disability? 
IF RESPONDENT UNSURE READ OUT: The Disability Discrimination Act defines a person as having 
a disability if he or she ‘has a physical or mental impairment, which has a substantial and long-
term adverse effect on his or her ability to carry out normal day to day activities’). 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes (Please describe the nature of the disability below) 1 
No 2 
 
Please specify………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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CONSENT AND FURTHER ACTION 
 
ASK ALL 
Q49 Do you consent to us passing back your individual responses to Merseyside Police? 
ONE CODE ONLY 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
 
 
THANK AND END INTERVIEW 
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